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What comes into our minds when talking about Islam in Asia? Even 
those who do not know much about Islam would imagine it to be something 
unique and plural. The face of Islam in each country in Asia is unique and 
specific, and integrated with the local culture. So the face of Islam in Asia 
differs from country to country.
But when it comes to Islam and democracy in Asia, there is something 
that they have in common. Most countries with majority and minority Muslim 
populations in South Asia have experienced conflict and complex problems on 
the road to democracy. This makes Islam and democracy in South Asia an 
interesting topic for analysis and discussion. A forum of South Asian countries 
and Indonesia - the world’s most populous Muslim country - is needed to 
share their experiences of the struggle for democracy in their countries.
Asia Calling, a regional radio program produced to create a channel of 
communication and understanding across borders in Asia, felt that there was 
a need to raise the topic of Islam and Democracy in South Asia. This theme 
was raised at the annual Asia Calling Forum.
In August 2008, the Indonesian Association for Media Development 
(PPMN), the organisers of the Asia Calling Forum, invited scholars of Islam, 
journalists, writers and members of parliament representing several countries 
of South Asia to Jakarta. Asghar Ali Engineer from India, Beena Sawar from 
Pakistan, Safia Siddiqi from Afghanistan, and Zafar Sobhan from Bangladesh 
met with two speakers from Indonesia, Ahmad Suaedy and Rizal Sukma, to 
Publisher’s and Organiser’s 
Foreword
discuss the theme of Islam and Democracy in South Asia live on Green Radio 
89.2 FM Jakarta.
The 2008 Asia Calling Forum also included an exhibition of photographs 
“Women, Islam and Democracy, Voices on the Rise: Afghan Women Making 
the News” held in the Utan Kayu Community Lontar Gallery. Curated by Jane 
McElhone and Khorshied Samad, this exhibition of dozens of photographs by 
international photographers told the story of Afghan women who are trying 
to do more than just keeping quiet behind the burkha. Life for these women 
journalists, managers, film makers, human rights activists and members of 
parliament is not easy. Not only do they have to balance their traditional 
role in the home with their new-found freedom; they have to deal with the 
prolonged conflict in their country. And they frequently face the threat of 
imprisonment or even death. 
These women’s stories were the inspiration for the 2008 Asia Calling 
Forum. Their voices are now on the rise, and slowly they are beginning to 
reverberate outside their country. There is growing optimism in their never-
ending fight, that Islam and democracy are possible, even though the fight is 
against the odds. That is why, although the 2008 Asia Calling Forum is long 
past, a book that preserves that moment forever needs to be published. Not 
only as a reminder of our guests’ commitment and dedication to the fight for 
democracy, but also as material for discussion and learning.
Finally, PPMN would like to thank Ihsan Ali Fauzi, the discussion 
moderator and compiler and editor of this book, and Alamsyah M. Djafar for 
supplementing the content of this book with is own research. Our thanks also 
go to the British Embassy in Jakarta and the State Department of the USA, 
who were partners in this activity. Without them, and others, publication of 
this book, “Learning from Each Other: Muslim Societies in Indonesia and 
South Asia”, would not have been possible.
Eni Mulia
Program Manager
Indonesian Association for Media Development (PPMN)
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PART 1 INTRODuCTION
6From Syncretism to Terorism
Muslim Societies in South and South-East Asia
Ihsan alI-FauzI
I.
Originating from a radio program called “Asia Calling”, this book has been 
written to encourage Muslims in Asia to get to know one another better and 
to learn from each other. The focus is on South and South-East Asia, especially 
those living in Pakistan, Bangladesh, India, Afghanistan, and Indonesia, where 
the guest presenter of this program hails from. 
This is not an unreasonable or irrational idea. First, these areas of Asia 
are inhabited by the largest population of Muslims in the world, far more 
even than in the Middle East, the birthplace of Islam. Second, if not the con-
temporary context, history tells us that, in general, Muslims in these areas 
have their own special brand of Islam, marked by syncretism, and wide sup-
port for religious tolerance and pluralism. Third, the economic, political and 
security issues in these regions in recent years, such as radicalism and acts of 
violence and terrorism in the name of Islam, are problems that arise largely 
from the failure of modern state governments to keep independence promises 
 -- and that is not directly related to Islam. Finally, due to all these reasons, 
Muslims in these two regions have many similarities that could be explored 
and shared.
This brief introduction will discuss these points. I also hope that this 
introduction will give readers some basic information about the historical and 
contemporary contexts of Muslim society in South and South-East Asia, par-
7ticularly in the four countries mentioned above, before they go on to read the 
articles and discussions in the other two sections of this book.
II.
Most historical sources say that Islam was brought to and spread across the 
area that we know today as Asia not long after the Prophet Muhammad (570-
632 AD) began his teachings in the Arabian Peninsula, in the early seventh 
century AD. Muslim historical sources in China, for example, state that one 
of Muhammad’s friends brought Islam to that country, and that he died and 
was buried in a place that now lies in south China. 
But Asia is a huge region. Islam arrived and spread to various parts 
of this region in a number of waves and in different ways. At certain points 
in South Asia (Pakistan, India, Bangladesh), and later in South-East Asia 
(Indonesia), the countries that are the focus of this discussion, Islam was first 
introduced and spread by traders and Sufi mystics.
Arab traders first began visiting west India in the seventh century. But 
it was not until 712 that Sind, which now lies in Pakistan, was occupied by 
Muhamad ibn Qasim -- who is widely cited as the bringer of Islam to this area, 
under the caliphate of Umar ibn Khattab. This happened long before Muslim 
conquerors from Central Asia set up their Islamic political power bases in 
North India -- the greatest of all being the Mughal Empire, which lasted from 
1526 to 1857.
Meanwhile, in South-East Asia, Arab-Muslim traders had begun to 
spread Islam in around the eighth century. But wide-scale Islamisation did 
not occur until the 13th century. This began in the Kingdom of Aceh in North 
Sumatera (today, the western-most tip of Indonesia), which was the gateway to 
the archipelago from India and the Middle East. Around a hundred years later, 
Muslim communities began to spring up, mainly in coastal areas. Between the 
15th and 17th centuries, dominant Hindu-Buddhist empires were replaced by 
Islamic kingdoms, and Islam spread rapidly to areas on what is known as the 
Malay peninsula. Traders, religious teachers and Sufi mystics from west India 
(Malabar and Gurjurat) and the Arabian Peninsula (Hadramaut) spread Islam 
in this area, at a time when Islamic sultanates were establishing dominance in 
areas that had previously been dominated by Hindu-Buddhist empires. In this 
context, the Majapahit Kingdom on Java (Indonesia), which was the largest of 
8all the old empires, fell in 1525 to the Muslim Mataram Empire. 
When they introduced Islam, the first Islamic missionaries in South 
and South-East Asia allowed the local people to retain their old cultures 
and traditions. Note that it was in these areas of Asia, and only here, that 
Islam came into contact with the Hindu and Buddhist religions, which had 
been established there first. This never happened in Arabia, the birthplace of 
Islam, where Islam came into contact only with the monotheistic religions 
of Christianity and Judaism.
Many historians, such as Richard Eaton and M.C. Ricklefs, have 
pointed out that one of the main impacts of the meeting with Hinduism 
and Buddhism, which can still be witnessed and felt today, is that the face 
of Islam in this region, which is thickly mixed with local cultures and tradi-
tions, is very different indeed from the Islam that is practised in the heart of 
the Arab world. That is because the Hindu and Buddhist religions, which 
are not based on Abrahamic monotheistic tradition, are quite different from 
Islam and, indirectly, are diametrically opposed to Islam. 
The fact that Muslims in South Asia are still a minority (despite their 
large numbers - which we will discuss more below) indicates that the major-
ity Hindu population on the Indian sub-continent at that time were not 
forced to become Muslims. Their elite, the Brahman caste, refused to be-
come Muslims, and most of the Hindus that converted were of the lower 
caste. However, aside from the fact that the principle of Islamic egalitarian-
ism automatically raised their social status, there were not many advantages 
to changing religion, because their lifestyles after they converted were much 
the same as those practised by the followers of Hinduism.
In this meeting of religions, Islam accepted certain parts of Hindu and 
Buddhist tradition. Various influences left over from the era of Hindu-Buddhist 
domination were tolerated, and even incorporated into Islamic rituals.
Yet this syncretism in no way undermined the Islamic values of 
Muslims in South and South-East Asia. Puritans have tried to purify or “ara-
bise” this version of Islam, but have invariably failed. Religious tolerance, 
and the syncretism between Islam and local cultures, has always been the 
main features of the Islam of these Muslims.
These are the reasons that these Muslims make up the majority of the 
world’s Muslim population. It is why the largest populations of Muslims 
9worldwide are in these three Asian countries: in Indonesia (240 million, 
88 percent Muslim), in Pakistan (160 million, 97 percent Muslim), and 
Bangladesh (142 million, 83 percent Muslim). And in India, out of a total 
population of around one billion, has 140 million Muslims.
And at the same time we are also witnessing something strange but 
true. This has to do with the architectural heritage of these two areas. While 
in India, the most popular historical architectural attraction is the Taj Mahal, 
the product of an Islamic sultanate; in Indonesia, it is Borobodur Temple, 
one of the most important pieces of Hindu architecture in the world. 
III.
If the history of Islam in South and South-East Asia is marked by a will-
ingness to accept and mix with local traditions, and if Muslims in these 
regions are known as a moderate and tolerant religious group, then why 
have these regions been a hotbed of violent action in recent years? And have 
not all, to some degree or another, had to do with Islam as a religion: the 
conflict between India and Pakistan over the Kashmir; the political assassina-
tions in Pakistan; the separation of Bangladesh from Pakistan; the horrors 
of the Taliban in Afghanistan; acts of violence, including suicide bombs, in 
Indonesia?
This problem is extremely complex and difficult to discuss in the space 
available here, especially in an introduction that is only meant to introduce 
readers to the articles and discussions that appear in this book. But I would 
like look at several key aspects that should give us an introduction this prob-
lem, which is also the main focus of the articles and discussions in this book.
These acts of violence committed in the name of Islam have to do with 
the contemporary situation of Muslims in these countries, which among 
others, is marked by the rise of Islamists, some of whom are in favour of the 
use of violent methods to achieve their aims. To understand this, we need 
to look at the history of their growth at the end of the period of Western 
colonialism and in the early years of independence. 
Like Muslims in other regions, Muslims in South and South-East 
Asia lived in a situation that was remote from the world’s centres of civilisa-
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tion, after the fall and destruction of several Islamic kingdoms and sultan-
ates in these regions, at various times between the 17th and 20th centuries. 
Following world domination by those in the western hemisphere, as a result 
of major, transformative events, such as the enlightenment in various key 
points in Europe, the French Revolution, the industrial revolution, and the 
growth of nation states and democracy, came the retreat of Muslims the world 
over, marked, among others, by the occupation of their territories by political 
and military means, by colonial powers from the West, notably England and 
France. None of the Islamic world, which stretched from Morocco to Merauke 
in the eastern-most tip of Indonesia, was spared from Western colonialism.
Thus, entering the modern age, Muslims everywhere, including in 
South and South-East Asia, were in an unfavourable position. Unlike the 
nation states that grew in what we now call the West (Europe and North 
America), where the concept of nation state was first found, practised, and 
developed, Muslim societies did not have the chance to develop gradually into 
modern nation states. In Indonesia and the Indian sub-continent, for exam-
ple, the Dutch and British colonial governments dominated and occupied 
Muslim territories. Once their political and military authority was established, 
these European colonial powers ruled with an iron fist, thanks to the support 
of the local, Western-educated elite.
This process frustrated the acceptance of universal values, which among 
other things, was introduced en-masse by Western civilisations to the Islamic 
world. Muslims, who had been dominating the world civilisation for centuries 
before, were not psychologically prepared to accept the new values that were 
growing in Europe, which, it should be noted, held them in a grip of political, 
economic, and military oppression. At the very most, Western ideas were first 
borrowed and adopted by modernist Muslims, especially in the 19th century, 
in what was known as “enlightened absolutism”. Military and administra-
tive reform within the Ottoman Empire, for example, depended largely on a 
reasonably enlightened Muslim despot. Modernists also sprang up in various 
parts of the Islamic world, mainly rulers who wanted to introduce certain 
Western social and economic technologies and ideas, without upsetting the 
basis of political power in the Islamic world. A number of sultans, for example 
in Persia, even followed certain enlightened European despots into introduc-
ing constitutions and laws, although these political reforms were considered 
too few and too slow.
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Outside these enlightened despots, in general, the Muslim community 
regarded the challenge of the technological and military advantage of the West 
in one of two ways. First, some Muslims accepted Western education and 
adopted a Western way of life, removing almost completely religious values 
from their daily lives. The leaders of this group were to form the origins of the 
secular nationalist elite in new, post colonial countries, and included such peo-
ple as Jawaharlal Nehru in India and Soekarno and Sutan Sjahrir in Indonesia. 
The second group was made up of Muslims who began defining politics with-
in a framework and idiom of Islam, which emphasised that Islam offered a 
complete way of life that differed from that introduced by the Western colo-
nial powers and their modern ideas. From this group would emerge those who 
would later be called Islamists, with leaders such as Mohammad Iqbal and 
Abu al-A’la al-Mawdudi in Indo-Pakistan and Mohmad Natsir and Hasyim 
Asy’ari in Indonesia. There were, of course, other groups that tried to forge a 
middle path between these two extremes, led by figures such as Abul Kalam 
Azad in India and Mohammad Hatta in Indonesia.
Because of these developments, the evolution of the modern era in the 
Islamic world was marked by the beginnings of ideological conflict among 
Muslims about how politics and government should be run. This was because, 
in the past, traditional Islamic literature had focused more on the question of 
how to understand and interpret the scriptures and traditions of the Prophet 
Muhammad (tafsir and hadis), on philosophy and theology (kalam), and a very 
narrow interpretation of the observance of religious duties (fiqh). With few 
exceptions, for example in the writings of the historian Ibn Khaldun (1332-
1406), Muslims paid little attention to political and economic theory, for in-
stance. Because this kind of consistent, systematic  political theory did not 
develop in the Muslim world, certain scholars, such as Bernard Lewis, claimed 
that in Islam, “[i]n principle, at least, there is no state, but only a ruler; no 
court, but only a judge.” But this is only one scholarly explanation. Others, 
such as those offered by Eikelman and James Piscatori, state that the politics of 
Muslims have always been (and always will be) plural and ever-changing. 
Aside from that, at the end of the colonial era, in the mid 20th century, 
there were the first signs of the beginnings of a struggle between the Islamists 
at one extreme, who saw the exit of the colonialists as an opportunity to “re-
vitalise” the traditional Islamic way of life, and the modernists at the other 
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extreme, who emphasised that Muslims need not blindly follow the ways of 
14th century Islam and reject, out of hand, the influence of Western ideas.
In Indonesia, this struggle ended with the acceptance of Pancasila as 
the basis of the state. It signified that the secular nationalists and Islamists 
agreed that, while the newly independent country was not a theocracy, it was 
not a country that would distance the social and political role of religion, 
particularly Islam. This compromise was reached to accommodate the plural-
ism of Indonesia, which comprises various ethnicities and religions, although 
Muslims make up the largest number. 
Unfortunately, in the Indo-Pakistan sub-continent, we witnessed a very 
different phenomenon. The kind of agreement that the political elite reached 
in Indonesia was not to be found in the Indo-Pakistan sub-continent. As a 
consequence, the sub-continent was split, into India and Pakistan, and, more 
recently, in 1971, Bangladesh. This happened because certain Muslim elite 
were worried what the fate of Muslims would be when the British colonial 
rulers withdrew from the Indian sub-continent, given the dominant Hindu 
population there. They then used Islam as the basis for a national identity and 
established Pakistan as an Islamic country. More recently, it was proven that 
this religious unity, among Muslims, was unable to hold together Bangladesh 
and Pakistan, which are separated geographically by the land mass of India.
All these developments point to one important fact: the political trans-
formation that accompanied the demise of colonialism gave rise to serious 
problems with regard to the relationship between religion and state in the 
newly independent countries, which were dealt with differently, and the im-
pacts of which are still being felt today. In India, it was agreed that secularism 
would be the foundation of the state, even though the majority of its popula-
tion is Hindu. Here, democracy guaranteed Muslims a channel for their polit-
ical aspirations, although Hindu fundamentalism has been on the rise of late. 
In Indonesia, the establishment of Pancasila as the state ideology guaranteed 
that Islam would not forcibly become the basis of the state, although Muslims 
do enjoy certain advantages. Meanwhile, the history of Pakistan, which was 
established from the outset as a theocracy with Islam as its ideological basis, 
continues to be marked by the obligation on the part of the political elite to 
define the kind of “Islam” that should be adhered to, sometimes at great cost, 
such as the killings of large numbers of minority Ahmadiyah and the separa-
tion of Bangladesh from Pakistan. 
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To return to our original question: radicalism and acts of violence com-
mitted in the name of Islam have grown when there is a desire to change the 
initial agreements described above, or when they are reaffirmed in the face of 
new challenges, such as the infiltration of purification movements from the 
Middle East into South and South-East Asia in recent decades, a matter we 
shall return to later. In Indonesia and India, this infiltration is eroding the 
Islamic syncretism that once formed the strong foundation for religious toler-
ance and pluralism. Meanwhile, in Pakistan, this infiltration has intensified 
the social and political schism that has resulted from the never-ending struggle 
to define Islam.
But, just as this infiltration of puritanism fuelled the fire of this puri-
tanical Islamic ideological militancy, so radicalism and acts of violence pro-
vided a perfect excuse for the ruling elite in these new countries to fail to 
keep their independence promises, such as economic growth and improved 
welfare, particularly if they were authoritarian rulers who neutered Islamic 
social and political expression. As a result of this failure, in general, at the 
end of the 1960s and early 1970s -- some two decades after independence 
-- many Islamic countries underwent what sociologist Gilles Kepel calls “re-
Islamisation”, because social and political spaces had previously been sterilised 
of Islam. It was in this context that slogans like “Islam is the solution” won 
broad support, because ordinary Muslims were sick of the failure of secular 
and authoritarian government. 
The situation deteriorated further in the 1980s, at the peak of the 
Cold War. At that time, anti-communist Muslim leaders and policy makers 
in Western countries saw the advantage in forging a political alliance with 
the Islamicists. This political alliance reached a peak in what we know as the 
anti-Soviet “jihad” project in Afghanistan, which has recently been convinc-
ingly documented by Muslim scholars (such as Hamid Algar and Mahmood 
Mamdani) and Western scholars (such as Gilles Kepel or Olivier Roy).
The Afghanistan war was the moment when Islamist-Jihadists the 
world over got together, were given training in the use of firearms and bomb-
making by Pakistani and US intelligence agencies, funded by Saudi Arabia, 
which were allies in the Cold War. Their enthusiasm for jihad grew even more 
when they believed that the retreat of the Soviet troops was the result of their 
superior opposition (which was far from the truth). They were a Frankenstein; 
created but then neglected, only to eat up their masters in the United States, 
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Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. 
This is the context that must be understood when we read about the 
acts of terrorism organised by al-Qaeda and other veterans of the Afghanistan 
war, some of whom spread terror in the name of Islam, in India, Pakistan 
and Indonesia. Now we realise that the ‘jihad project’ in Afghanistan played 
an extremely important role in dividing Muslim communities, transforming 
political Islamists into militant jihadists, and destroying the foundations of 
pluralism everywhere. 
IV.
I hope that with this introduction, readers will be benefit from the articles 
and discussions presented in the subsequent sections. Asghar Ali Engineer’s 
article summaries the advantages that can, and have been, enjoyed by Muslims 
in India, who are many in number but form a minority, as a result of the 
secularism and effective democracy in that country. By contrast, from Beena 
Sarwar’s article on Pakistan, we get a picture of how “Islam as an ideology” is 
not a panacea, and may itself even be the root or a part of the problem. From 
Bangladesh, Zafar Sobhan discusses that country’s efforts to establish democ-
racy in the midst of the rise of Islamism.
We were unable to obtain an article from, or about, Afghanistan. 
Fortunately, though, Safia Siddiqi, a women’s activist from Afghanistan who 
was invited to Jakarta, is a well-known figure about whom much has been 
written and published. One of these articles, from the New York Times, we 
have reproduced here. This article talks about the difficulties and risks of be-
ing a woman in Afghanistan, particularly when the Taliban still played a key 
role there. 
Finally, there are two articles about Indonesia, written by Ahmad 
Suaedy and myself. The first looks at the threat to democracy of recent growth 
in sharia-inspired by-laws in Indonesia. My paper, on Pancasila, although it 
has not been read at a seminar, is included here to show the unique position 
of Islam in the constitutional scheme of Indonesia. ***
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PART 2 BACkGROuND PAPERs
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India today has largest Muslim population, about 140 
million, after Indonesia. Also, India is a secular democracy and has 
successfully sustained democratic processes for the last sixty years. Muslims 
in India have ideologically accepted secular democracy and have found no 
contradiction between Islam, Islamic teachings and modern day secular values 
within a democratic frame-work.
What is important to note is that a large number of Ulama of the 
Deoband school fully supported the freedom struggle under the leadership of 
Mahatma Gandhi who insisted on non-violent struggle based on values like 
truth, compassion and human dignity. Though he was not a rationalist, he 
accepted the role of reason in human life. Some Ulama did have reservations 
about non-violence as a principle but they too accepted it as a useful strategy. 
Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, a great scholar of Islam and commentator on the 
Qur’an which was published under the title of Tarjuman al-Qur’an, not only 
accepted Gandhi’s leadership but was also an active member of the Indian 
National Congress, and even headed it twice.
However, the Indian freedom struggle was far from being a trouble 
free, smooth, non-violent affair. Indian Muslims were politically divided. The 
westernized educated elite as well as the feudal lords (jagirdars) on one hand, 
and the Muslim masses and sections of the Muslim middle class on the other, 
had different perceptions of political processes in independent India. The for-
mer (i.e. westernized elite and feudal lords) were more concerned about power 
Indian Muslim
Identity, Nationalism 
and Religious Fundamentalism
asGhaR alI EnGInEER
17
sharing in independent India and questions like land reform and constitu-
tional structure, while the latter (i.e. the Muslim masses and sections of the 
middle class) had faith in the promises held out by the leadership of the Indian 
National Congress.
The westernized elite did not trust the Congress leadership and was 
insisting on a larger share in power, even larger than what the Muslim popula-
tion warranted. However, this question could not be sorted out satisfactorily 
and M.A. Jinnah, the leader of the Muslim League, party of the Muslim league 
and landlords, propounded a two nation theory which implied Muslims were 
a separate nation and could not share common nationhood with Hindus.
The two nation theory was completely rejected by the Ulama belong-
ing to Jami’at-ul-Ulama-i-Hind, and its leader Maulana Husain Ahmad 
Madani argued that Islam does not believe in separate nationhood, and that 
both Hindus and Muslims share the same nationality. They also found the 
concept of secular democracy as being in conformity with Islamic teaching. 
These Ulama opposed the partition plan and refused to go along with Jinnah. 
However, Maulana Maududi, founder of the Jamat-e-Islami, did not agree 
with Jami’at-ul-Ulama-i-Hind and declared that secular politics is prohibited 
in Islam. He advised his followers not to take part in secular politics in India.
Thus it would be seen that Indian Muslims were divided into several 
ideological positions before partition. However, a large number of Muslims sup-
ported composite nationalism and they had no problems with co-sharing na-
tionalism with Hindus, Christians and Parsis. Though partition was very painful 
-- as on this side of the divide large number of Muslims was killed and families 
were divided -- yet Muslims were resilient enough to adjust to new realities.
However, fresh problems emerged as democratization deepened. The 
nation building process in multi-religious societies poses its own challenge, 
especially when there are not enough resources to go around. India is not only 
multi-religious and multi-lingual but also a multi-ethnic nation. Western na-
tions were mostly mono-religious, mono lingual and mono cultural and also 
were comparatively affluent and hence nation building was no challenge.
In multi-religious and multi-ethnic societies, religious and ethnic iden-
tities play important roles in mobilizing people to demand a greater share of 
power, and the Muslim elite had asserted their religious identity to do so, and 
the country was divided.  For majority religious communities nationalism 
becomes coterminous with religious identity, but for religious minorities there 
18
is the problem of religious identity being different from national identity and 
having to cope with duel identities, and often there is a danger of religious 
identity clashing with national identity.
In view of this duel identity Muslims have to prove their loyalty to the 
nation in times of crisis, such as the war between India and Pakistan, and this 
poses no mean challenge for them. Since Pakistan is a Muslim country, the 
right wing Hindu forces often question the loyalty of Muslims to India. Since 
Muslims are in minority in India (about 14%) there is no question of any 
demand for an Islamic state.
But at times religious identity, when under pressure, does assert itself. 
One instance is that of the Shah Bano Movement in the mid-1980s. The 
1980s was a very challenging decade for the Muslim minority in India as 
frequent Hindu-Muslim riots were taking place and Muslims were feeling 
suffocated. They were under intense pressure and in such circumstances the 
Supreme Court delivered a judgment upholding a Muslim woman’s right to 
maintenance beyond iddah (waiting after divorce) period under a secular law.
This angered the Ulama and they cried foul and gross interference in 
Islamic law which, according to the law of the land, it is their right to follow. 
They argued that in Islam a woman is entitled to maintenance only for the 
iddah period and pressured the Government to nullify the Supreme Court 
judgment by enacting a law. The Government of India yielded to the pressure 
from Muslims and changed the law.
Muslims enjoy equal democratic and fundamental rights under the 
constitution and also they enjoy rights as a religious minority in respect of 
their religion, culture and language. These rights have been guaranteed under 
Articles 25 to 30 of the Constitution. However, it also poses certain problems 
in society.  Indian Muslims are free to follow their personal law in respect of 
marriage, divorce, inheritance etc. 
In traditional shari’ah law men can marry up to four wives and in Hanafi 
law triple divorce in one sitting is permissible. Thus in a way a Muslim woman 
is less than equal in Muslim personal law and this clashes with constitutional 
provisions of Articles 14 to 21, according to which men and women enjoy 
absolutely equal rights.  Thus some secularists as well as communal Hindus 
argue that there should be one law for all.
Even the Supreme Court judges differ in this respect. Some judges feel 
that Article 25 will prevail over Articles 14 to 21 and Muslim personal law 
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cannot be tampered with by the state as the Constitution guarantees Muslims 
the right to follow their religion. Muslims as a religious minority are extremely 
sensitive to their religious identity. While secular forces in the country do not 
insist on a common personal law or a uniform civil code, communal forces led 
by Bhartiya Janta Party (BJP), a leading Hindu nationalist party, still demand 
the abolition of Muslim personal law and the enforcement of a common civil 
code.
Though Muslims are a huge number in India, most of them are poor 
and illiterate. The government has neglected their problems but now the 
UPA (United Progressive Parties Alliance) Government, under pressure from 
Muslims, has announced a series of measures recommended by the Sachar 
Committee which was appointed by the UPA Government to look into 
Muslim problems. 
Yet there is always a gap between declaration and implementation. But 
one good thing in a democracy is that political parties, in order to get Muslim 
votes, have often to compete with each other to please them, and in this com-
petitive political environment minorities and other weaker sections of society 
benefit, though not to the fullest extent. 
There is one more problem which Muslims have to address themselves. 
Their leadership generally comes from backward sections of Muslims and is 
quite conservative. What Muslims need today is a dynamic futuristic leader-
ship. There are a large number of madrasas in India. Through modernization 
these madrasas could be transformed into centres of learning both religious as 
well as secular. However, a section of conservative Ulama resist any attempt to 
modernize madrasas, and traditional madrasas churn out only narrow minded 
mullahs who resist any change.
Another problem which has emerged recently is that of terrorism. 
Terrorism is a complex international phenomenon and it is very difficult to 
ascertain what role some Indian Muslim youth are playing in terrorist vio-
lence. It is true that the Gujarat communal riots of 2002, in which more than 
2000 Muslims were brutally killed, generated a lot of anger among Muslims 
but it is difficult to say whether some Muslim youth have taken to terrorism 
by way of terrorist attacks.
Muslims themselves suspect either certain international agencies like 
Israel’s Mosad and the CIA are playing roles to give Islam a bad name, and 
Muslims or some rightwing Hindu organizations are playing their own games 
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Muslim boys reflect, following a morning of worship, Jama Masjid, Delhi, India, 2005 ash_sydney. credit: 
wikipedia
Women and children gather at the tomb of the 13th century sufi saint hazrat nizamuddin auliya in south 
Delhi, India november 3, 2008. credit: fabianfoo.files.wordpress.com.
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from behind. The Indian intelligence agencies blame SIMI (Students Islamic 
Movement of India), HuJI (Hizbul Jihad-i-Islami) of Bangladesh and Lashkar-
e-Taiyyiba of Pakistan. 
However, though some Muslim youth from India may be involved, it 
seems unlikely that banned organization like SIMI, which is quite insignifi-
cant in terms of numbers and its entire top leadership is under arrest, can play 
any significant role.
By and large Islam in secular democratic India tends to be more toler-
ant and peaceful than in other Muslim majority countries. There are no strong 
fundamentalist tendencies as witnessed in countries like Pakistan in South 
Asia. Muslim intelligentsia in India seems to be far more accommodative than 
in other Muslim countries.***
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When the British colonizers left India in August 1947, 
they granted India independence, simultaneously dividing it 
along religious lines as defined by the “two nation theory” 
which saw Hindus and Muslims as two different nations. 
Pakistan was created on August 14, 1947, conceived as a nation-state for 
Indian Muslims, consisted of the Muslim-majority provinces or states, includ-
ing two states with nearly equal Hindu and Muslim populations that were also 
divided up along religious lines -- Punjab, and Bengal, a thousand miles away 
from the other four Pakistani provinces, on India’s eastern border. Two other 
Muslim-majority states ended up in India’s control, Kashmir on the north-
west that Pakistan also laid claim to, and Hyderabad in central India.
The two-nation theory ignored the reality of overlapping, multina-
tional, multi-faith and multilingual communities. Attempting to develop a 
homogenous national identity (largely to counter rival India and justify the 
breakaway), successive Pakistani governments focused on Islam as the unify-
ing factor. They also continued the authoritarian and colonist policies of the 
British, resulting in religious, ethnic or linguistic groups feeling excluded and 
discriminated against. Thirdly, for most of its existence, Pakistan has been gov-
erned by military rulers, who prioritized weapons and military training over 
education and social welfare. This resulted in a sense of injustice and depriva-
tion, and divisions along religious, sectarian, class and ethnic lines. The many 
Islam and State in Pakistan
Threat or Solution?
BEEna saRWaR
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interpretations of Islam also led after a point to religion being not a unifying but 
a divisive force. Islam cannot be an exclusive component of state nationalism be-
cause Pakistanis do differentiate themselves from the Muslims of other countries 
-- Indonesian, Afghan, Iranian, Bangladeshi, or even Indian Muslims. 
Unfortunately, when alternatives visions of Pakistan are formed around 
ethnic identities, the establishment tends to view them as threats. In 1971 
East Pakistan rebelled against the western wing and emerged as independent 
Bangladesh. In what was left of Pakistan, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto became the first 
elected prime minister of Pakistan (Pakistan People’s Party, PPP, polled the 
most votes in the 1971 elections after the Awami League of Mujibur Rehman, 
the founding father of Bangladesh). The PPP is still the only mainstream po-
litical party of Pakistan that can be considered secular and nationalist, fol-
lowed by Nawaz Sharif ’s Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N).
Pakistani governments have historically paid lip-service to religion-
based politics. Even Bhutto tried to salvage political power by trying to ap-
pease the religious elements who had taken over the political opposition. He 
got Parliament to declare the Ahmedis as non-Muslims, made Friday the 
weekly holiday, banned alcohol and gambling, and espoused a pan-Islamic 
vision (he held the second Islamic Summit in Lahore in 1974 and initiated 
Pakistan’s nuclear weapons – “Islamic bomb” -- program). In 1977, popular 
discontent against Bhutto gave his military commander General Ziaul Haq a 
pretext to overthrow him. Zia promised to introduce Shariah, or Islamic Law 
to make Pakistan a truly Islamic state. Shortly afterwards, the Soviet invasion 
of Afghanistan changed politics in the region forever. 
America’s involvement in the war used the strategy of religion to mo-
tivate Muslims against the Communist Soviet Union -- the Afghan “jihad”, 
a term popularized as “holy war” although the word in Arabic literally means 
“to struggle”. The greater, more difficult jihad pertains to the struggle with the 
self; the lesser jihad combats external enemies. Jihad, non-existent as an inter-
national violent phenomenon for the last four hundred years, now propped 
up Pakistan’s military ruler who allowed the country to be used as a conduit 
for providing money, weapons and military training to the Mujahideen against 
the Soviets, with CIA agents recruiting Muslims from around the world. 
Pakistan’s tribal areas became the launching pad for the Mujahideen’s 
incursions across the porous Afghan border. The easy availability of weap-
ons and drugs contributed to growing lawlessness in Pakistan as the chick-
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ens of the jihad came home to roost. Sectarian violence -- violence between 
Muslims of different sects -- escalated in Pakistan after the Soviet withdrawal 
from Afghanistan as Shi’ite Iran and Sunni Saudi Arabia fought proxy wars 
on Pakistani soil. The world forgot Afghanistan -- until September 11, 2001. 
Then, Pakistan again became a front-line state for America and the tribal ar-
eas developed into sanctuaries for the Mujahideen’s successors, the Taliban. 
During the past decade or so, and particularly since 9/11, all these factors have 
converged -- as have the Al Qaeda, the Taliban and the Kashmir “jihadists”. 
Pakistan has emerged as a centre of the “war on terror” due to all these reasons, 
which include:
The country’s geographical location and proximity to Afghanistan on the 1. 
north-west border and long-standing policy of achieving “strategic depth” 
through influencing developments in Afghanistan (driven largely by hos-
tility with India on the eastern border); 
The willingness of successive Pakistani governments to allow the country 2. 
to be used for the foreign policy designs and attempts for regional su-
premacy of other players in exchange for arms and money; 
The lack of a democratic process in Pakistan in general and in the tribal 3. 
areas in particular, where people do not have the right to participate in the 
electoral process when it does take place. This has contributed to a sense 
of deprivation, frustration, and powerlessness;
The lack of development particularly in the tribal areas -- successive gov-4. 
ernments have ignored the necessity of building infrastructures like roads 
and institutions (schools, courts etc). Pakistani laws do not apply to these 
areas, so tribal councils or jirgas fill the judicial vacuum.  These jirgas have 
become corrupted, with militants co-opting them in the name of Islam.
Pakistan’s long-standing enmity and rivalry with India has led to its sup-5. 
port of “jihadi” elements aiming to help the Kashmiri freedom fighters; a 
factor in this was the influx of money from the oil-rich Gulf states, includ-
ing Saudi Arabia, and the practice of preparing “mujahideen” at madrassahs 
and training camps developed during the Afghan war.
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In 1893, the British who ruled India arbitrarily drew the Durand Line 
to divide Afghanistan from India. The Pashtuns who mainly populate this 
area continue to use the porous border to continue their centuries-old trade 
and inter-personal relationships often cemented through marriage. Khan 
Abdul Ghaffar Khan, known as the “Frontier Gandhi” once said that he was 
a Pashtun first, a Muslim second, and a Pakistani last. Although the Taliban 
tend to be Pashtun, their Muslim identity dominates their ethnicity. Pakistan’s 
identity too has been largely projected as Islamic, a construction supported by 
the country’s religion-based social and political organizations. This construc-
tion now threatens the nation-state itself, as the adherents of “Islamisation” 
transcend national boundaries.
The Pakistani Taliban have merged traditional customs, like tribal jirgas 
or councils, with their version of an Islamic identity, based on warped notions 
far removed from principles of justice. The traditional notions of honor in the 
tribal areas have become corrupted with new concepts hitherto unheard of 
in Pakistan: suicide bombings, public executions, beheadings and stoning to 
death, mutilating bodies.
The increase in violence in general overshadows the rising violence 
against women -- not surprising since this is the pattern wherever “religious” 
extremism is on the rise.  In these tribal areas, traditionally, men punished 
women of their own family for any perceived transgression. However, the 
Taliban’s “anti-vice” vigilante squads have no compunction in attacking wom-
en, unarmed civilians and security forces, alleged drug dens and prostitutes, 
video and music shops, internet cafes, hair dressing salons, even girls’ schools 
and teachers in the tribal areas. After the murder of one such teacher, Khatoon 
Bibi in late September last year in the tribal Mohmand Agency, hundreds of 
non-local teachers protested, demanding security in order to do their jobs. 
The lack of response from the ruling alliance of “religious” parties known as 
the MMA that governed the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) led to 
the closure of over a hundred girls’ schools. The MMA in fact encouraged the 
Taliban mindset. It dismissed, suspended or transferred women from public 
offices, and took no action against the vigilantism of “religious militants”. The 
militants have been strengthened by such appeasement and lack of action as 
well as the impetus provided by the US invasions and on-going conflicts in 
Iraq and Afghanistan. 
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The previous military-led regime of Gen Pervez Musharraf allowed 
US military forces to use Pakistani territory and air bases and committed the 
Pakistan military to combating “terrorist” elements. Their actions had no po-
litical sanction, which is why many Pakistanis see the conflict as “America’s 
war”. The military regime also used the “war on terror” as a pretext to crush 
political dissent, for example in Pakistan’s western-most province, Balochistan, 
bordering Iran and Afghanistan. Some 5000 persons are “missing”, presumed 
to be in the custody of intelligence agencies, Pakistani and American.  As 
President Musharraf admitted in his memoirs In the Line of Fire, Pakistan 
captured 689 Al Qaeda fighters who fled into Pakistan from Afghanistan, and 
handed over 369 to the United States. “We have earned bounties totalling 
millions of dollars.” The whereabouts of just a few hundred or so of these 
disappeared people have been made known, most of them in the custody of 
Pakistan’s intelligence agencies. The lack of transparency surrounding such 
President Musharraf is greeted by Dr hamid Karzai at Kabul International airport 
during his visit to afghanistan on 2 april 2002. Credit: www.operations.mod.uk
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detentions arouses scepticism about the claims that they are Al Qaeda fighters. 
Many of the disappeared are secular, nationalist political dissidents. Several 
have been released from American or Pakistani custody without being charged 
after years of deprivation and torture. 
These double standards and inconsistent official approach to terrorism 
has worsened the situation, as the Pakistani scholar Dr Eqbal Ahmad noted in 
his prophetic 1998 talk “Terrorism, theirs & ours”. Overlooking the terrorism 
of friendly governments and allies, engaging in state terrorism involving covert 
operations and low-intensity warfare (leading to more terror and drugs) and 
paying little attention to causes and problem-solving has had disastrous con-
sequences. “Do not seek military solutions,” cautioned Dr Eqbal. “Terrorism 
is a political problem. Seek political solutions. Diplomacy works.” The focus 
on military solutions to what is essentially a political problem, with historical, 
post-colonial and economic roots, has contributed to escalating violence. The 
militants thrive on it; the more violence they are dealt, the more adherents 
they gather. State force also gives rise to “private” violence, with law and order 
breakdowns and political vacuums only worsening the situation.
Although the Pakistan government officially gave up its previous policy 
of supporting the Mujahideen/Taliban after 9/11, elements within the state 
have continued covert support to the religious elements. Various Pakistani 
governments have supported and encouraged religious elements at worst and 
ignored or appeased them at best. They have avoided taking action against ille-
gal activities committed in the name of religion and allowed known militants 
to roam free and continue instigating violence. When things get out of hand, 
they over-react, using unmitigated force and even chemical weapons as in the 
Lal Masjid (Red Mosque) case. For years the administration looked the other 
way as the Lal Masjid clerics illegally occupied land and built a fully-functional 
seminary for girls next to the mosque. When the authorities belatedly decided 
to tear down the seminary as part of a demolition drive against illegal struc-
tures, seminary students forcibly occupied a public building in January 2007. 
The government again took no action until months later in July when matters 
finally came to a head. Then, it responded with the disproportionate use of 
force including chemical weapons. We are still dealing with the repercussions 
of that attack and the “martyrs” that the army operation created.
The army operation of 2004 in the tribal areas also involved too much 
force, too late. The military government launched the operation without tak-
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ing Parliament or the people into confidence. The operation killed or dis-
placed thousands -- nearly 5000 have been killed in the last two years alone, 
besides almost as many Pakistani soldiers since 2004.
In February, Pakistan held general elections after nearly a decade of 
military rule, including the last five years of military-controlled quasi-democ-
racy. Despite terrorist threats, the people turned out in large numbers to vote 
-- around 45 percent, slightly above the previous elections of 2002 in which 
key political leaders like Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif were not allowed 
to participate. The election results overwhelmingly rejected the parties that 
favored military rule and religious politics. Since the elections the number 
and intensity of violent attacks in Pakistan has declined. However, the situa-
tion along the north-west frontier remains tense and there is increasing pres-
sure on the new government to counter the Taliban militarily. The govern-
ment has acknowledged terrorism as Pakistan’s problem rather than “America’s 
war”, stressing that they will fight it “their way” and will deal with the issue 
in Pakistan’s best interests. This approach is likely to win greater acceptance 
among the people as it encompasses dialogue and negotiation as well as firm-
ness in dealing with the violence. 
This is necessary in order for the people of Pakistan to support the gov-
ernment against the Taliban. However, there are fears that this delicate balance 
may be upset if the international pressure for military strikes continues, or if 
American or NATO forces may be called in for this purpose. While firmness 
(without appeasement) is necessary, the door to dialogue must remain open. 
This is not a simple problem that can be resolved overnight. Aggressive mili-
tary action in isolation from the political process will only bring short term 
relief. There is of course an urgent need to contain “terrorism”. However, the 
problems faced by the nation-state with relation to Islam are broader than 
that. Militancy makes it harder to resolve the underlying tension in a peace-
ful and constructive way, but the tension should at least be acknowledged as 
genuine. That is a longer process, and the more negotiated it is the better. 
Islam will always be an important component of Pakistani nationalism, but 
it cannot be an exclusive component, and its role cannot be left to the most 
extreme clerics.
Despite the hopeful results of the Feb 2008 elections, religiously-ori-
ented political parties are making a comeback, having joined forces with the 
opposition that has taken up various issues that are causing unrest, like the res-
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toration of judges, rising inflation and lawlessness. Some analysts fear a similar 
situation to that which toppled Z.A. Bhutto in 1977, when the religious parties 
used Bhutto’s rising unpopularity to gain political momentum and create a 
crisis, providing an opening to the army to step in. The policies of the past con-
tinue to haunt the present, testing the democratic process. The international 
community needs to be patient and support Pakistan in staying the course.
We need to keep our sights on the long-term vision of continuing the 
democratic political process even if there are setbacks. The genie of “religious 
militancy” may not go back into the bottle in the near future, but it can be 
contained if the democratic process continues. Ultimately the violence springs 
not from religion but from a sense of injustice, despair, frustration and help-
lessness about how the system works. Empower the people, personally, politi-
cally and economically, give them something to live for, and they will not die 
in the path of what they have been brainwashed into believing is religion.***
Pakistan’s women anchors and editors say sexual harassment at work is 
their biggest worry (2008) . Credit:Beena sarwar/IPs. 
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The Road to Democracy
Islam and Bangladesh
Zafar Sobhan
Islam and Bangladeshi Identity
Islam and democracy in Bangladesh have always had an uneasy relation-
ship.  This uneasiness stems from the circumstances of Bangladesh’s original 
incarnation as East Pakistan based on its Muslim majority status, the failure 
of Pakistan as a state and the subsequent liberation war which laid to rest any 
notions of pan-Islamic brotherhood amongst the peoples of East and West 
Pakistan, and the still contested issue of how to construct Bangladeshi identity.
The 1972 constitution enshrined secularism as one of the four pillars of 
independent Bangladesh and in the aftermath of independence, the Jamaat-e-
Islami (JI), the only Islamist party of note, was discredited in the eyes of the 
general public due to its opposition to independence and collaboration with 
the Pakistani occupation army. 
Bangladeshi identity in the initial post-independence years was con-
structed largely on Bengali linguistic and cultural grounds, minimizing its 
Islamic component, due in part to an acknowledgement that at independence 
fully 20 per cent of the country were non-Muslim and that it was the iden-
tification of East Pakistan as a Muslim space that had led to its ill-conceived 
inclusion in the nation of Pakistan, created as an explicitly Muslim nation.  
The failure and break up of Pakistan would seem to suggest that Islam 
as a unifying and preeminent determinant of identity for Bangladeshi Muslims 
was an untenable construct. The failure of pre-1971 Pakistan and the anti-lib-
eration stance taken by prominent Islamists during the war of independence, 
together with the liberal and moderate brand of Islam practiced in Bangladesh 
for hundreds of years, perhaps accounts for the continuing failure of political 
Islam to gain a strong foot-hold in Bangladeshi politics.
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However, due to both internal and external pressures and constraints, 
the space for Islam, political Islam, and Islamism continued to exist within 
the body politic and the society at large. In 1975, following the assassination 
of the independence leader Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and the eventual ascen-
sion to power following a series of military coups of Gen. Ziaur Rahman, the 
political and ideological landscape of the country shifted dramatically.
In a bid to create a new political platform to challenge that of Mujib’s 
Awami League (AL), Zia cobbled together a coalition (that would eventually 
become the BNP) that included, for the first time since 1971, those politicians 
(for instance from the old Muslim League) who had opposed independence. 
In the process, the Islamist parties were politically rehabilitated.  The constitu-
tion was amended to remove secularism as a founding principle, and the JI, 
which had been banned due to active support for Pakistan occupation forces 
and formation of death squads during the liberation war, was permitted to 
re-enter politics. Indeed, their rehabilitation was central to Zia’s political and 
socio-cultural mission.
Gen. Zia made the Islamization of Bangladesh a corner-stone of his po-
litical philosophy and of Bangladesh’s identity both internally and externally. 
Article 25(2) was added to the constitution, providing that: “The state shall 
endeavor to consolidate, preserve and strengthen fraternal relations among 
Muslim countries based on Islamic solidarity.” 
Thus gained ground a movement that identified Bangladesh as a Muslim 
country and sought to put Islam at the center, both of the nation’s identity and 
that of the individual’s construction of his or her Bangladeshi identity.  The 
marginalization and dispossession of non-Muslim ethnic and religious mi-
norities necessarily grew exponentially as a result and the space for the positing 
of a non-Muslim Bangladeshi identity shrank significantly. 
In 1988, a constitutional amendment was pushed through by then mil-
itary ruler Gen. Ershad, declaring Islam as the state religion. This contributed 
to the worsening of the persecution of minority communities, which had, in 
any event, been in free fall since 1975.  Especially during the time of BNP/JI 
government, the position of Bangladesh’s ethnic and religious minorities has 
become extremely precarious.  In October 2001, after they came to power, 
BNP and JI cadres went on a well-documented and reported campaign of 
looting, land grabbing, murder, rape, arson, and assault against the Hindu 
community with virtual impunity. Theoretically, all religions are equal under 
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the law. In practice, under the BNP/JI, minorities had no rights that a well-
connected Muslim needed to respect. Many Hindus have voted with their 
feet, and the non-Muslim population -- 20 per cent in 1971 -- today stands 
at 10 per cent.
Political Islam
Since the rehabilitation of the JI and the re-entrance of Islamist par-
ties into mainstream Bangladeshi politics, the Islamists have continued to be 
a formidable though far from dominant force both in the nation’s polity as 
well as in the socio-cultural sphere. Even taken together, the Islamist parties 
have never risen above 10 per cent of the popular vote or gained much above 
five per cent of the seats in parliament. Indeed, in the last elections that the 
JI contested without allies in 1996, it received less than 5 per cent of the vote 
and a paltry 2 seats in the 300-seat parliament.
The results of every election we have had in Bangladesh, stretching back 
to Pakistan and British times, suggest that the Islamist parties are unable to 
make much of an impression at the polls by themselves.
However, in coalition with other right of center parties, they can pro-
vide the margin of victory in scores of seats around the country due to the 
first-past-the-post electoral system.  Running independently in 1996, BNP 
received 116 seats and the Jamaat received 2 seats, and the left of center AL 
came to power.
However, in 2001, when they formed an alliance, the result was very 
different, although the relative popular vote percentages of the main parties 
were similar to that in 1996. Thus, by combining their vote, the 4 party al-
liance (BNP, JI, IOJ, and JPNF)) garnered a total of 216 seats in the 2001 
elections. The reward for the JI was 17 seats in parliament and 2 seats in the 
cabinet, even though its share of the popular vote remained more or less con-
stant at slightly below 5 per cent. Thus we can see that the power wielded by JI 
as part of the 4 party alliance is disproportionate to its popular support.
In addition to JI, there is one other mainstream Islamist party, the 
Islami Oikya Jote, that garnered 2 seats in the 2001 elections (as part of the 4 
party alliance) as well as any number of smaller outfits who have not registered 
any electoral success. In the run up to the aborted 2007 elections, the AL, 
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thought to be the vanguard of secularism in Bangladesh, in its own effort to 
co-opt the Islamist vote bank and split the right of center vote, entered into 
a much criticized electoral alliance with one of these marginal groups, the 
Khelafat-e-Majlis.
There exist non-political religious organizations operating as charities 
and non-governmental organizations.  Interestingly, although NGOs are by 
law barred from political activity, many of the religious NGOs do maintain 
an affinity with one or the other Islamist political parties.
To the best of my knowledge, the most prominent Islamic NGOs and 
charities, to the extent that they espouse political views, like almost all Islamist 
parties, do not reject democracy as a system of government.  The only promi-
nent organization I know of that openly questions democracy as un-Islamic 
is Hizb-ut-Tahrir, although this is the creed of almost all of the underground, 
militant organizations.  Support for a non-democratic state based on Sharia 
law is more or less non-existent in Bangladesh as of today.
Current Situation
Bangladesh is currently being ruled by an army-backed interim govern-
ment which has pledged to hold national elections by the end of this year and 
which is also conducting a high-profile anti-crime and anti-corruption drive 
which is aimed at removing the corrupt and the criminal from politics and 
to decimate the power of the two existing top political parties, the BNP and 
AL.
JI (as well as the other Islamist parties) has been conspicuously absent 
from the anti-crime and corruption drives, and although some of its leaders 
have been caught up in the dragnet, it has managed to largely remain free of 
close scrutiny. It is clear that the party and Islamists in general are receiving 
preferential and protective treatment at the hands of the current authorities, 
who seem hesitant to move against them with the energy expended on the top 
two parties or other secular opposition.
In a troubling show of strength, the JI and other Islamists have been 
allowed to create mayhem with impunity in the streets, even during the on-
going state of emergency, on more than one occasion.  The current govern-
ment appears to be either unwilling or unable to crack down on the Islamist 
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opposition in the same way it has against the AL and BNP.
This is nothing new.  From time immemorial, non-elected regimes in 
the Muslim world have chosen to target secular opposition only.
Time and again, it is the Islamists who are left untouched and use the 
opportunity to strengthen and consolidate. Time and again it is the Islamists, 
who, by remaining untouched, rise to the fore-front of the democratic op-
position. Time and again, it is they, promising social justice and equality and 
freedom from corruption, who step authoritatively into the void created by 
non-democratic rule.
This could be the moment that the Islamists have been waiting for these 
past thirty-seven years. They have never risen to 10 per cent in the polls, but with 
their secular rivals discredited and their leadership and party apparatus more or 
less unscathed, they could emerge as serious players in the next elections.
If the main political parties are decimated and the Islamists are left 
intact then there will be a massive power vacuum that they will sweep in to 
fill. This is elementary history. It has happened again and again the length and 
breadth of the Muslim world.
Future of Islamism
I think that it would be a worthwhile exercise to look a little more 
closely at the religious impulse in Bangladesh, specifically among Muslims, 
instead of dismissing political Islam as the ideology of fanatics and fundamen-
talists that has no hope of gaining popularity among the general public.
The first thing to note is that right now, with Islam perceived to be 
under threat around the world, many Muslims are experiencing a resurgence 
of faith, and feel that they must publicly identify with and rally around their 
besieged religion. With the neo-colonial and neo-imperialist ambitions of the 
West apparently running rough-shod over the world in which their voice has 
been silenced to a whisper, many Muslims are going to be looking for an alter-
native view of the world to that espoused by the neo-cons and their supporters 
in the White House.
In the context of Bangladesh, you don’t have to be religious to believe 
that things have long been heading in the wrong direction, that public and 
private morality is at an all-time low, and that perhaps a complete cleansing of 
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the system and a new start is the only solution. After all, what solutions do the 
mainstream parties have to the wrongs and injustices that we see entrenched 
all around us? The Islamists, at least, for what it is worth, have a solution. 
They have a prescription for what needs to be done. They have a vision for 
the future. They claim to be able to cleanse the system of its immorality. They 
profess an egalitarian vision which will offer hope and opportunity to all. They 
speak to and for the dispossessed. They have a strategy for Bangladesh to gain 
respect and recognition on the world stage.
In an ironic sense, the Islamists are the new communists. There is always 
going to be a strong anti-western constituency in the country that is implaca-
bly opposed to the rampant forces of neo-imperialism and neo-colonialism. 
It used to be the communists and leftists who spoke the language of these 
people, but who is speaking to this constituency today except the Islamists?
Thus there remain significant opportunities for Islamists in Bangladesh 
to continue to gain ground.  With the leading secular parties in severe trouble 
due to the crack down on them as well as public disenchantment due to their 
record of corruption and ineffective governance, with the mainstream political 
parties’ inability to articulate anything even resembling a vision for the future 
of the country or policies that would address issues of poverty, marginaliza-
tion, and dispossession of the country’s rural and urban poor, with the society 
becoming more overtly religiously observant as a result of both internal and 
external forces, and with opportunities for partnership available with both the 
armed forces and the mainstream political parties, the potential for Islamists 
to expand their sphere of influence is considerable.
Indeed, while it seems certain that prolonged army-backed rule or 
even direct army rule would help to consolidate the position of Islamists in 
the polity, the JI, at least, remains a significant player in the democratic po-
litical sphere as well.  The 4 party alliance with the BNP (and 2 smaller par-
ties) remains intact, and any resurgence of the right-wing political forces in 
Bangladesh would necessarily return them to their previous position of power 
and influence.
Conclusion
I do not believe that the absence or presence of democracy per se will 
necessarily affect the rise of Islamism in Bangladesh.  Islamism’s rise is predi-
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cated primarily on the failure of successive government, both elected and un-
elected, to fail to provide decent governance and opportunities for the citizens 
of the country.  To the extent that secular or military alternatives continue to 
come up short, we can expect the Islamists to continue to gain strength.
It is important to note, however, that thus far, Islamism has shown no 
real strength at the ballot box.  Its influence is disproportionate to its actual 
popularity. But such is the first-past-the-post system and the opportunism 
of Bangladeshi politics that Islamists are able to retain such disproportionate 
power even during times of democracy.
Islamism in Bangladesh can thus be understood to be a top-down and 
not a bottom-up phenomena. Without support and sponsorship from the 
government of the day it has never flourished.
In addition, political Islam and the Islamization of society (by which 
I mean the increasing identification of Islam as a central component of indi-
vidual and national identity) has received strong financial and organizational 
support from outside the country.  
It is important to note that the Wahhabized Islam that is pushed by the 
Islamists is at odds with the more syncretic liberal strain of indigenous Islam 
that if followed by the majority of Bangladeshi Muslims.  There is nothing au-
thentic or indigenous about the values and behavioral codes that are enforced 
by political Islam.
Finally, no discussion of the rise of political Islam in Bangladesh (or 
elsewhere) is complete without an analysis of the impact of the foreign policy/
security imperatives of countries such as Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and the US. 
As such, the continued rise of political Islam is at least as dependent on global 
politics as it is on events within our borders.***
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After bumping along five hours of potholes and rock-
strewn mountain switchbacks on the main commercial ar-
tery from Kabul to Pakistan early last month, I was surprised 
as we entered the Jalalabad Valley to see an enormous cam-
paign poster, the size of a Times Square billboard, featuring 
not the boyish face of Hazrat Ali -- Jalalabad’s most famous 
ex-warlord and a parliamentary candidate -- but that of Safia 
Siddiqi. It’s striking enough that a woman would appear so boldly in such 
a poster in a city where women still do not appear in public without a burka 
-- more striking still that she was wrapped in a shawl made from the green, 
black and red of the Afghan flag. These colorful, patriotic images of Siddiqi 
also loomed over the streets of Jalalabad itself, offering a lush kind of hope 
for its residents. But Jalalabad is still a place dominated by Pashtunwali, the 
customary law that regulates life throughout the Pashtun belt (the eastern 
and southern half of Afghanistan). The Pashtun code is based on the values of 
honor, sanctuary, solidarity, shame and revenge, and it treats women as prop-
erty. In such a place, how much difference can a few female politicians really 
make? Many Afghans question all the fuss over elections, and the $150 mil-
On Safia Siddiqi and 
Other Afghan Women
Women’s Work in Afghanistan1
ELIZabET h rUbIn
1 This article was first published as “Women’s Work,” The New York Times, October 9, 2005.
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lion expense, when, after three and a half years of American and international 
efforts, they still have few roads, unclean water and crumbling schools. And 
still every 30 minutes an Afghan woman dies in childbirth.
The image of Afghan women is easily reduced to stereotypes. At one 
extreme is the hidden, voiceless, blue-burkaed cloud floating through the dusty 
streets behind her turbaned man. At the other is the endangered young femi-
nist firing off a tirade against warlords. Both exist, but reality is mostly between 
the extremes. If nothing else, perhaps women in Parliament - by law, 68 seats of 
249 are reserved for women - will begin to demolish these caricatures.
In her rebelliousness, Siddiqi reflects a quality of Pashtun women that lives 
in the poetic memory of eastern and southern Afghanistan and was archived in a 
small book of women’s poetry collected and edited by Sayd Bahodine Majrouh, 
one of Afghanistan’s most revered modern poets. A dean of literature at Kabul 
University, a former governor of Kapisa Province, Majrouh, at age 59 in 1988, 
was assassinated in Peshawar, Pakistan, where the various mujahedeen factions 
fighting the Soviet Union were based. Shortly before his murder, Majrouh went 
through refugee camps in Pakistan to collect landays: simple two-line cries of 
emotion, usually recited by women to women at the river or the well or at wed-
ding parties. They are physical and brutal, passionate and direct. One that was 
recited to me on a few occasions last month was almost a threat to the beloved. It 
shows how embedded is the tribal sense of honor for both men and women: “If 
you do not have a wound in the center of your chest/I shall remain indifferent, 
even if your back is riddled like a sieve with holes.”
The women who composed and shared these poems, Majrouh wrote, 
“feel repressed, scorned and thought of as second-rate human beings. From 
the cradle on, they are received with sadness and shame.. . .The father who 
learns of such an unwelcome arrival seems to go into mourning, whereas he 
gives a party and fires off a salvo of gunshots at the birth of a boy. Later, 
and without ever being consulted, the little girl becomes monetary exchange 
between families of the same clan.” Majrouh, in exile among the hostile mu-
jahedeen, seemed to identify with the anguish of Pashtun women. And he 
identified with their means of defiance - the landays. They could be cries of 
despair: “Cruel people, who see how an old man leads me to his bed/And you 
ask why I weep and tear out my hair!” They could also be bold and desirous: 
“Give me your hand, my love, and let us go into the fields/So we can love each 
other or fall together beneath the blows of knives.”
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Safia Siddiqi has taken the boldness of the landays into both in politics 
and poetry. At a reading last year in Kandahar, attended more by men than 
women, she read from a poem of hers called “I Am Telling the Truth.” In it the 
poet addresses her lover, saying she wants to “smother you with kisses/To put 
you in the swing of my lap/And to cover you/With the wings of my hair.”
Siddiqi has always enjoyed the spotlight and ached when it dimmed. 
She was born to a family of judges and religious scholars. Reared in the vil-
lage of Nazarabad, just outside Jalalabad, she was taught at home and in 
Koran classes next door at the corner mosque. The Soviet invasion destroyed 
Nazarabad’s village tranquillity, and the family was uprooted to Kabul. Siddiqi 
began tailoring at night near her house to supplement her father’s reduced 
income. By 11th grade she had published a poetry collection, “Veil,” in which 
the chador became a metaphor for protection not just from strange men but 
also from the Soviet invaders. Siddiqi went to law school and was energized by 
the artistic and intellectual life of the university.
“It was the peak time for women’s liberty,” she told me. It all ended 
abruptly. The Communists were pressuring people like her to join the party. 
“They were afraid of me at my college,” she said. “My education. My books.” 
Her father decided to send the family to Pakistan. “And there I was accused 
by the Islamists of being a Communist,” she said. “They wanted to kill me. It 
was Hekmatyar’s party” -- the Hezb-i-Islami, led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar 
-- “with those women in Saudi black burkas. And I hate those black burkas 
to this day.”
Yet she had to wear one herself. In Pakistan, she had no name, no de-
gree, no poetry. She was just a poor refugee, and it made her crazy. She began 
to work at an entry-level job for an N.G.O., forced herself to learn English 
and rose in the ranks. Prominence attracted more threats, particularly from 
the Taliban after they captured Kabul in 1996. She wrote poetry of angry 
self-assertion and exploration. “Who am I?” begins one poem. “Am I a no-
mad?. . . No I’m not a nomad, nor a refugee/ They are much better than me.” 
Siddiqi also wrote: “When I’m walking down the street, the people watch me/
Disrespectfully and surprisingly/Watch me,/They are talking and saying/’Who 
is this lout?/Who is she?/Whose daughter is she?/Whose sister is she?/Whose 
wife is she?’ Oh! Allah, is it honor?”
“We had such a bad life in Pakistan as educated women because they 
never accepted our raising our voice,” she told me. She formed a small group 
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of activist women and eventually emigrated to Canada, where she met -- quite 
late by Afghan standards -- her husband, Asif Safi, an artist and journalist. 
He cuts an unusual figure in the Afghan landscape in his goth get-up: black 
wool pakool, black tunic, black baggy trousers, black shoes and long black 
hair. He’s in charge of Siddiqi’s security, and he is paranoid, with good reason. 
Already last year, when she and Safi were consulting for the Ministry of Rural 
Rehabilitation and Development, Siddiqi was attacked in a tough tribal re-
gion. Now that she was campaigning, she would have to go back.
***
At the end of 2001, just after the Taliban scattered from their Kandahari 
stronghold, I received a strange proposal from Mullah Abdul Salaam, known 
as Rocketi, a neckless barrel of a Taliban commander. He was hiding in a 
remote village in Zabul, a province of sand dunes, camels and abandoned 
mud forts, peopled by suspicious men with thick kohl painted around their 
eyes and a taste for burning down girls’ schools. Rocketi was wanted by the 
Americans. He had been the Taliban corps commander of Jalalabad - not be-
cause he was in love with the Taliban but because all he really knew how to 
do was wage jihad and fire rockets (thus the nickname). He showed me his 
Stinger missiles, stashed away in a barn, and asked me to help him deliver 
them to the Americans in exchange for amnesty. I told him it was impossible. 
The next day he was forced to trust a man he didn’t trust, Ismail Gailani, who 
is from one of the most respected religious families in Afghanistan. Rocketi 
tried to hide out in the mountains for a time but eventually landed in an 
American-run prison.
That is why I was so surprised when I found him in Kabul this sum-
mer, in a fine black tunic and a long silver-and-black turban, on his way to the 
Afghan television studios to record a campaign ad for himself. He was run-
a campaign worker readies a poster of siddiqi to be displayed at a rally in Jalalabad, 
three days before the sept. 18 elections in afghanistan. By law, women are 
guaranteed 68 of the 249 seats in the new Parliament. Credit: stephanie sinclair/
Corbis, for The New York Times (October 5, 2005).
as in any politcal campaign, the stump speech must match the audience. When 
addressing men, Khogiani steers away from challenging tradition and appeals instead 
to the pride of Pashtuns. Credit: stephanie sinclair/Corbis, for The New York Times 
(October 5, 2005)
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ning for Parliament, he said, on a simple platform: “I say that I love all God’s 
people.” That’s it? “If you promise a lot and do a little, that is not delicious,” 
he told me. “But if you promise a little and do a lot, it will be very, very deli-
cious.” His smile soon turned to a frown, however, as he contemplated his 
chief misfortune: “No matter how much I respect humanity and how great a 
person I am, my name still misrepresents me.”
Yet despite, or perhaps because of, his nickname, Rocketi’s chances for 
winning a seat in Parliament were excellent. The Afghanistan Independent 
Human Rights Commission tried to force the adoption of an affidavit whereby 
candidates would have to pledge that they were never involved in any war 
crimes or drug dealing. “It was never included,” said Ahmad Nader Nadery, one 
of the commission’s more outspoken members, when I went to see him shortly 
after meeting Rocketi. “All that was left in the affidavit is that ‘you are not in 
an armed group now.’ “ So any commanders under suspicion simply turned in 
some weapons. Ultimately just a few dozen candidates were disqualified on the 
basis of arms. Nadery said that although warlords are a small proportion of the 
candidates, they were overshadowing the process. Which makes sense. Who, 
after all, has been running Afghanistan for the past 25 years? Many Afghans 
understandably wonder whether such elections aren’t intended to show “prog-
ress” in nation building - and give the United States a way out.
On the western outskirts of Kabul, in a neighborhood still scarred by 
the mujahedeen rockets that tore apart Kabul during the civil war 10 years 
ago, Shukria Barakzai stepped from a silver Mercedes to greet a few dozen 
women waiting for her in the garden of a neighborhood elder. Though she’s 
one of Kabul’s higher-profile women -- she started a newspaper called Women’s 
Mirror shortly after the Taliban fell and often appears on political talk shows 
in bright, translucent headscarves and high-heeled, pointy pink or ivory shoes 
-- on this day she had the air of a schoolgirl breaking taboos. A few days earlier, 
at the official start of campaign season, she took an unprecedented move for 
Afghan women and went wading through a crowded bazaar to address men 
and women, shopkeepers and taxi drivers and the police. She was thrilled by 
it. She also must have enjoyed the fact that it irritated her husband, and that 
there was nothing he could do about it.
Like an Afghan version of a Tracy-Hepburn movie, both Barakzai and 
her husband were running for Parliament. And the tension was palpable be-
tween them - two years ago, when she was battling warlords as a delegate to 
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the loya jirga, or grand assembly, convened to agree on a constitution, she 
heard that he had taken a second wife. Her friends at women’s organizations 
wanted to take to the streets to protest the laws that allow men to take up to 
four wives. Barakzai refused. She decided to ride out the change, instead, and 
in the process grow more familiar with the lives of ordinary Afghan women. 
During the campaign she mocked her husband’s tactics. As a millionaire, she 
said, “he doesn’t have to do anything except have big lunches for people in 
trade halls.” (He made his fortune as an exporter.) She teased that he liked it 
that way because he is uncomfortable with public speaking. So, unlike Shukria 
- who had not hung up any posters yet, preferring radio and TV appearances 
and the woman-on-the-street approach - her husband had his team plaster a 
photograph of himself in a suit and tie, with a horse as his voting emblem, all 
over the trees and billboards and shop windows of Kabul.
The women waiting to hear Barakzai beneath the grapevine canopies 
were illiterate. The neighborhood still had no power, no roads and no buses to 
take anyone to work if there was any work to be had. The odor of open sew-
age wafted through the streets and gardens. Some women told Barakzai that 
their husbands wouldn’t let them get their voting-registration cards. One said 
to me, “This is Afghanistan, and the men are rotten-natured,” and a chorus of 
laughter ensued. Unimaginable cruelty had been meted out in this neighbor-
hood just 10 years ago. The women remembered it vividly. One woman had 
lost 17 members of her family. These women were mystified that the same 
people who “fried us in oil and pounded nails in our heads” were in power, 
running for Parliament. Even worse, said one woman with a laugh, “people 
will vote for them.”
Barakzai told them to vote for women instead. Otherwise, “the 
Mujahedeen leaders will suffocate us,” she said. “But they won’t be able to 
oppress you with a strong female voice in the Parliament.” This was campaign-
trail chatter, though; in private, she admitted that everything depended on the 
quality of the women elected. Many female candidates were put up by hus-
bands whose records, even by Rocketi standards, were too tarnished. Others 
were put up by the Islamist parties.
Barakzai hauled herself up onto the bed of a pickup and addressed a 
crowd of young men. When one of them told me he was going to vote for the 
mullah Sayyaf because he had served his country all these years, an old woman 
from behind the mesh of her burka said: “Oh, you’re a good one. We’re wait-
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ing like beggars for wheat because of the service of people like him.”
Having lived through the civil war, through Taliban rule, through the 
complicated compromises she observed and participated in as a delegate to 
the constitutional loya jirga, Barakzai was realistic about the composition of 
Afghan society. And she was realistic about an American policy that still sup-
ported the old commanders in the belief that inclusion was the best way to 
preserve stability in Afghanistan. “Of course, 75 percent of our Parliament 
will be commanders and drug lords,” she told me. “But, on the other hand, 
it’s a kind of pluralism of the last three decades. And some people say it’s better 
they are all coming together.”
When a news report said that U.S. soldiers were desecrating the Koran at 
Guantánamo, thousands of enraged men marched through Jalalabad’s streets, 
torched government buildings, the Pakistani consulate and foreign aid agen-
cies, chanted “death to America” and burned an effigy of President Bush.
In the parliamentary campaign, this same spirit manifested itself in 
a political allergy to the rhetoric of human rights, women’s rights and all 
Western-sounding values. Anti-human-rights rhetoric also makes for good 
old-fashioned politicking, the kind that easily rouses the emotions of men, 
reminding them of the simpler days of jihad against the Soviets, when the mu-
jahedeen were somehow heroes of both the Islamic and the Western worlds, 
and even seen as fighting for human rights - not as war criminals or the fol-
lowers of war criminals.
At a sunbaked rally for the ex-commander Hazrat Ali, a white-haired, 
long-bearded blind mullah energized the crowd when he took to the podium 
and began cursing human rights. “The Koran says women cannot ask for di-
vorce,” he cried, “whereas human rights say women should ask for divorce! In 
the name of human rights we are told to release fornicators and thieves from 
prison. We know anyone who steals should have his hand cut off. Human 
rights says, ‘No.’ You should vote for someone who can fight all those who 
want to bring human rights law in Islamic law. We need a Moses to save us, 
and that is Hazrat Ali.” A great rumbling and clapping ensued.
The women of Jalalabad understand the mentality they are up against. 
Safia Siddiqi and her leading female rival, Saima Khogiani, do not pepper 
their speeches with talk of women’s rights or changing traditions. They speak 
of the honor of the Pashtun woman, and of how the Pashtuns respect their 
women. They warn the men of the dangers of succumbing to the bribes of old 
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warlords and rich, lying candidates. They offer the service of their clean past. 
And they play on the pride of the Pashtun.
When I first met Saima Khogiani, a 34-year-old former schoolteacher, 
she was sitting cross-legged, curled over herself, on the floor of the crumbling 
Jalalabadi house she’d rented for her campaign offices. She peered at me from 
beneath the brown embroidery of a black wool scarf. She was rough and de-
fensive, armored with a sardonic smirk. Khogiani faced the ire of her local 
mullahs when she first decided to run for office. Her uncles wouldn’t speak to 
her. But she insisted and - despite the curse of one mullah, who warned that 
the people would be sending 12 generations of their ancestors to hell if they 
voted for her - the men were turning up to check her out and offer support 
in return for assistance. She had a small army of some 15 male cousins who 
stayed with her and decided where she could campaign. She was the only 
woman in the entire family who was allowed to meet with men. “This one,” 
a cousin said, pointing to Khogiani’s gregarious young niece, “will be banned 
from the men’s room in two years.” The young niece pouted. Then she said she 
didn’t care because she was going to become a doctor.
But at a campaign stop up in the mountains, in a settlement of salm-
on-colored mud-and-straw houses, the women were uninterested in women’s 
rights. After reciting a landay about perpetual poverty, one woman was urged 
by the others to tell Khogiani about their opium problem. “We know it’s not 
good for Afghanistan, but it solved all our problems,” she said. “It grows in 
drought, with almost no water. And it sells for a good price.” The men vowed 
that they would plant poppies again this autumn, even under the threat of 
death. As Khogiani said, “The people lost their poppy, and the Americans and 
the government have not fulfilled their promises of an alternative-livelihoods 
program.” The United States Agency for International Development has be-
gun financing short-term projects - like clearing ditches - that local communi-
ties would have done anyway. It is not a true alternative, and while the farmers 
will lose their opium income, the governors, police chiefs and smugglers will 
simply traffic in opium grown elsewhere.
After returning to Afghanistan, Safia Siddiqi, like Shukria Barakzai, was 
a delegate to the constitutional loya jirga, where she spoke up to defend a 
young woman who had condemned the jihadis for their crimes against ordi-
nary Afghans - then, for the sake of peace, urged the same young woman to 
apologize. Siddiqi understands politics well, as I saw when we drove out to 
46
her home district of Surkhab, a 40-minute drive from Jalalabad. The village 
elders had all gathered in a leafy outdoor meeting ground and dragged along 
their young men, who could be heard grumbling on the sidelines about how 
bored they were of political campaigns. Siddiqi appealed to them as Pashtuns, 
pressing them not to accept money or food in exchange for their votes. She 
appealed to the male elders, recognizing the suffering of their community 
and the uselessness of succumbing to warlords. She was in the village of her 
uncles and cousins. They all knew her father, knew that she’s the daughter of a 
judge. This was a village still without television, where all the children gather 
at night to hear an elder tell them the love story of Saiful Maluk, son of the 
king, and Badri Jamal, a fairy girl. The story can take three nights or longer. 
When Siddiqi invoked the elders, she was signaling that she understood that 
they will decide who gets the votes; most likely it would be her. This is how 
politics works in the countryside. Siddiqi wrapped up her speech with another 
effort at tribal bonding: “You and I are Pashtuns. We appreciate and respect 
women more than the others. And I will not be able to talk as freely to others 
as I do to you.”
Still, when she did speak to others - for example, educated women in 
Jalalabad at the government’s Department of Public Works - her tone was 
markedly different. “Our men are uneducated,” she told them. “Our women 
don’t have jobs. And when you go out, everyone stares at you. If you remove 
your chador, everyone will call you a bad woman. The girl who should go to 
school is getting tailoring education because she has to make money for her 
family. Our kids should go to school, have teachers even at home. Should we 
vote for someone who intimidates or stops women from going to school? They 
want to make us scared of everything so we stay at home and out of politics. 
But we want to help the culture. Who was Malalai?” Siddiqi was referring to 
the 19th-century Pashtun heroine who braved British guns to raise the Afghan 
flag. “She was a woman. A hero of our country. The reason we don’t have any 
other Malalai is because we have people who won’t allow us to go to school.”
As if on cue, a teacher interrupted and said: “Prove to us that the rights 
of men and women are the same in Islam. Because the men are saying: ‘Don’t 
vote for women. It’s not Koranic. It’s only the command of Bush’s wife, Laura, 
that women are candidates.’ “
A few days later, Siddiqi made the mistake of accepting an invitation to 
the most remote region of Khogiani, Saima Khogiani’s tribal base. It’s a place 
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of lurking Taliban, where roadside bombs are now commonplace and people 
joke that the women have to do most of the work because the men are all hid-
ing from blood feuds. Siddiqi delivered her speech to hundreds. Then, just as 
they were rolling out of the village, rockets and grenades and rifle fire hit her 
convoy. A few of the police officers in the leading car were wounded. Siddiqi 
lay with her brother on the ground and then walked for hours to escape from 
the village.
Yet a week later, when most of the female candidates were lying low, or-
dered by their families to campaign only at home by receiving visitors, Siddiqi 
rallied for one last splashy trip through the bazaar of Jalalabad. In a coasting 
S.U.V. she popped out of the sunroof and addressed the crowd through a 
loudspeaker. Men followed her progress in mild horror. “Look at this cow out 
of the car,” one shopkeeper said. “Isn’t she ashamed to wander through the ba-
zaar?” another said. But no, she wasn’t, and as she passed though Pashtunistan 
Square she confronted the people of Nangarhar with her promises and her 
questions. “This was the second attack that happened to me here” - the first 
was last year. “Did I kill someone? Did I steal something? Are my hands red 
with blood? Why did you take the weapon to kill me? It is not in our culture to 
kill a woman without reason.” She thanked the crowd for their support. Then 
her husband jumped in to dispel the rumors that he was in fact a Hollywood 
actor, not a real Afghan Muslim. Children read poetry. The Koran was recited. 
And on election day, Siddiqi donned her Afghan flag chador and voted.
It was a strange day. The turnout in Nangarhar, as elsewhere, was very 
low. One Afghan woman I met, who worked for an N.G.O., told me that 
when she tried to urge women to decide for themselves, not to be under the 
influence of their men, they told her, “Why shouldn’t we listen to our hus-
bands and brothers? You are a kafir” - an infidel - “you’ve been with all these 
foreigners so long!” A woman who was voting for Siddiqi explained, “My 
owner told me to.” “Your owner?” I asked. “Yes. Mullah Abdul Rahim. Our 
husband is our owner.”
Early returns showed Siddiqi, Khogiani, Barakzai and Rocketi all head-
ed for Parliament. Although the returns were incomplete, initial counts even 
had Siddiqi ahead of Hazrat Ali.
***
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A few days after the elections, I drove out of Jalalabad along the Kunar River 
through acres of brown sea-turtle-size stones that gave way to unexpectedly 
lush fields. I was looking for the father of Khalida, a young woman I’d met in a 
hospital. She had thrown kerosene from a lamp upon herself, lighted a match 
and tried to die. She was reed-thin, with burns from her face to her toes. She 
had little feeling left. But she was upset by what she saw in the little mirror her 
sister gave her. She wanted to speak and managed to get a few words out in 
spurts: “My father is an old man”; “We are poor”; “I have two little brothers, 
one is mad”; “My husband was 35, and he was good to me at first.” She was 
15 when they were married. Her price was small - 50,000 rupees, just under 
$1,000. For whatever reason, perhaps poverty, perhaps jealousy or frustration, 
her in-laws began to beat her while her husband was away working as a driver 
in Saudi Arabia. They complained to her husband that she was doing bad 
work - and when he returned to their home, he began to beat her, too. After 
five years, with a 3-year-old daughter, she couldn’t bear it any longer. “That 
day my father-in-law hit my head with a brick”; she crawled away and found 
the kerosene lamp.
When her father-in-law discovered her, he kept her for some 20 days on 
a bed without a mattress next to the cows. The filth and the flies infected her 
wounds. Her suffering and her story, told in the stifling heat of the hospital, 
was like so many others and would end, a week later, with her death.
In his collection of women’s landays, the poet Majrouh wrote that in 
the face of a life of perpetual inferiority and humiliation - “even her husband 
does not stoop so low as to eat with her” - what is the Pashtun woman’s reac-
tion? Submission. Duties performed like clockwork. Acceptance and suffer-
ing. “Yet,” he wrote, “if one takes a slightly closer look, it turns out that in 
her innermost self the Pashtun woman is indignant and skeptical, feeding her 
rebellion. From this deep-seated and hidden protest that grows more resistant 
with every passing day, she comes out with only two forms of evidence in the 
end - her suicide and her song.”
He wrote that the tribal code of honor considers suicide a cowardly 
act, and the Pashtun male will never resort to it. In his time the two methods 
women used were poison or drowning. Today, Sharifa Shahab, a tireless young 
woman from the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission, who 
has worked in Herat, Kabul and now Jalalabad, has found that women tend to 
choose poison or self-immolation. It was Majrouh’s conviction that the songs 
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of Afghan women challenge the society in a similar way as their suicides, by 
glorifying three themes that taste of blood - love, honor and death. “By elimi-
nating herself in such an accursed way,” he wrote, “a woman thus tragically 
proclaims her hatred of the community’s law.”
I don’t know what exactly I hoped to find by tracking down Khalida’s 
father out in his wind-swept village. He was a short way from the cemetery 
where he buried his daughter and, before that, his mad son, whom Khalida 
never knew was dead. Certainly I did not expect the depth of the man’s wretch-
edness. “I thought a mullah” - Khalida’s father-in-law - “would be a good per-
son to take care of my daughter,” he said. “I was wrong. He had no sympathy.” 
He wept so hard I thought his fragile frame would snap.
What I did find in this man, who had spent most of his life as a shoe-
mender in Pakistan and now, in his old age, would often travel the eight hours 
to Kabul to seek work in the bazaar as a laborer, was precisely what Majrouh 
had surmised lay in the innermost self of the Pashtun woman - a wild rage and 
hatred of the community’s law.
I also found a surprising belief that telling the story of his daughter’s 
demise and her in-laws’ malevolence might somehow help prevent such things 
from happening again and prevent Khalida’s husband from getting another 
wife. What the father wanted was justice. He didn’t know how a jirga - the 
assembly of elders who settle disputes - could deliver that, given the many 
months that his in-laws, who were also his cousins, had been able to get away 
with torturing his daughter. “By the human rights commission,” he said, “we 
will find them and bring them to court.”
 
***
Sharifa Shahab has less faith than Khalida’s grieving father that the govern-
ment will be the place to resolve the issues of abuse of women. As she said to 
me one night: “How can we trust the government to do anything when all 
the warlords are in government? Dostum” -- an indestructible warlord from 
Mazar-i-Sharif -- “burned my house down during the civil war because my fa-
ther was against the Communists. Ismail Khan” -- formerly governor of Herat, 
still power broker there and minister of water and power -- “had his men as-
sault my son because I tried to set up a women’s council without his permis-
sion. Khalili” -- Abdul Karim Khalili, currently a vice president - “captured all 
50
my father’s lands. And in Jalalabad, I had an official letter that we are sure is 
from the old governor saying I better leave Jalalabad because I was trying to 
change the religion of the people by working on women’s issues.”
And then Shahab told me the story of two wives who were recently 
killed. Two men exchanged their sisters so they could avoid the high price of 
a proper bride. One of the men killed his wife the first night, accusing her of 
having had sexual relations before marriage. When the news arrived in the 
other village, the other man brought his wife -- the other man’s sister -- and 
made her walk around the grave; he cut her hands and feet off and killed her 
on the grave of the other girl. “Why? I asked him, and he said, ‘He killed my 
sister; I had to,’” Shahab told me. “The government forgave the murderers 
because the jirga forgave them, and the jirga is higher than the law.” So she 
will not wait for the government or any electoral miracle to intervene. Instead, 
she’s creating women’s jirgas, using Afghan traditions to bring about change. 
“Otherwise, I am totally alone here,” she said.
Elizabeth Rubin is a contributing writer for the maga-
zine. She has reported extensively from Saudi Arabia, 
Chechnya and, most recently, Iraq
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Introduction
Indonesia achieved her independence on Friday, 17 August 1945.  Prior 
to that, the archipelago was colonised by the Dutch, from the late 16th century 
to the early 1940s, when the Japanese occupation began.  Today, independent 
Indonesia is the largest archipelago in the world, with about 14,000 islands, 
large and small, inhabited and uninhabited, stretching between the Indian 
Ocean and the Pacific Ocean.  It shares borders with East Timor to the south 
(228 km), Malaysia to the north (1,782 km), and Papua New Guinea to the 
west (820 km).  As of July 2007, Indonesia’s population was an estimated 
241,973,879, making it the fourth most populous country in the world. 
Its people comprise around 300 ethnic groups, the majority being Javanese 
(45%), followed by Sundanese (14%), Madurese (7.5%), and coastal Malays 
(7.5%).  Although Indonesian is its national language, there are about 583 
languages and dialects spoken in the country.  Given these facts, it is little 
wonder that today’s Indonesians are proud of their country’s motto: Unity in 
Diversity (Bhinneka Tunggal Ika).
In terms of religion, Indonesia is also one of the most plural societies 
in the world.  While majority Muslim (88%), there are also Protestants (5%), 
Roman Catholics (3%), Hindus (2%), and Buddhists (1%), as well as follow-
ers of other beliefs (1%).  Since the partition of India and Pakistan in 1948, 
Indonesia has been the largest Muslim country in the world.  But religio-
politically and ideolo gic ally, it is not an Islamic state like Iran, Saudi Arabia or 
A Useful and Necessary Synthesis
The Islamicity of Indonesian Pancasila
Ihsan alI-FauzI
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Sudan.  It is a state based on a national ideology called Pancasila or the Five 
Principles.  These five principles are belief in one supreme god; a just and civ-
il ised hu manity; the unity of Indonesia; democracy; and social justice.
Indonesians, therefore, generally describe their country not as a theo-
cratic state or secular state, but as a Pancasila state.  For those who are not 
familiar with the nation’s ideology, to say that a state is neither secular nor 
theocratic may sound ab surd.  But that is precisely how most, if not all, Indo-
nesians describe their country in terms of its ideology – and they are proud of 
it.  Given Indonesia’s religious pluralism, they believe that Pancasila is a useful 
and necessary synthesis for maintaining the country’s unity.  They believe that 
no one religion should be the ideological or constitutional basis of the state, 
but rather that religion should be its ethical, moral and spiritual basis.  In 
other words, in Indonesia, we believe that religion is important, even essential; 
but that theocracy is not an option.
This belief is shared by most, if not all, Indonesia Muslims, who rep-
resent the dominant religious group in the country.  Both Sukarno and Mo-
hammad Hatta, the country’s founding fathers, and its first President and 
Vice-President, were Muslims.  Despite intense pressure from several Muslim 
leaders, activists, and politicians before independence to make Islam the basis 
of the future state ideology, Sukarno and Hatta stood firm and confident in 
their decision that the country should not be based on any particular religious 
ideology, including Islam, because of its divisive potential.  And perhaps more 
importantly, the two founding fathers were able to convince other Muslim 
actors to accept and support this wisdom; in fact, it was Sukarno himself who 
was the creator of Pancasila.  It is for this reason that Alamsjah Ratuprawirane-
gara, a former Indonesian Minister for Religious Affairs, once quite correctly 
claimed that Pancasila was a Muslim’s gift to the entire nation.  So, we thank 
Sukarno and Hatta for their leadership – and we certainly thank God that 
their legacy remains intact today.
But how and why was this so-called Pancasila state possible in the first 
place?  What are the benefits of having Pancasila as the state ideology?  Do 
Indonesian Muslims accept Pancasila as the state ideology?  What are the Is-
lamic arguments made by Indonesian Muslim leaders and scholars to support 
its acceptance?  This essay will discuss these issues.  
The first section sketches the historical debate among Muslim leaders, 
activists, and politicians on the relationship between Islam and nationalism, 
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including the place of Pancasila as the state ideology in this relationship, before 
and shortly after the country’s independence.  This is followed by discussion 
of the fate of Pancasila during the Sukarno and Suharto presidencies, crucial 
periods during which there were challenges and threats to this state ideology. 
The paper concludes with further elaboration of the Islamic arguments made 
more recently by contemporary Muslim leaders and intellectuals in support of 
the acceptance of Pancasila as our state ideology.
Religious, but not Theocratic: The Islamisation of Pancasila
The relationship between Islam and politics in Indonesia has a long tra-
dition.  In short, Islam was an integral part of the formation of the Indonesian 
state and, later, its nation-building.  Indonesian Muslim support of national-
ism during the colonial period has been well-documented, by both Indone-
sian and foreign historians.  One of it strongest expressions of support was the 
emergence of Islamic Unity (Sarekat Islam or SI) in 1911, which later became 
the first nationalist political organisation in the Dutch Indies.  Notably, under 
the charismatic leadership of Haji Oemar Said Tjokroaminoto, SI pioneered 
the development of political programs demanding Indonesia’s independence 
from the Dutch.  In Ruth McVey’s words, SI formed “the centre of the Indo-
nesian national awakening”.1
Another instance of Muslim support for Indonesian nationalism was 
that provided by the leaders of the traditionalist Muslim organisation called 
the Ulama Awakening (Nahdhatul Ulama or NU).  Following the Dutch at-
tempt to re-colonise the country shortly after the proclamation of independ-
ence in 1945, the NU ulama declared the so-called ‘Jihad Resolution’, which 
was backed by a religious edict issued by K.H. Wahid Hasyim, the highest 
ranking NU official at that time. This edict stated that to fight against the 
Dutch was a personal religious obligation (fardh `ayn) for all Muslims in the 
country.  It was this Jihad Resolution that fuelled Muslim anti-colonial feeling 
in the heroic Battle of Surabaya on 10 November 1945, which is now com-
memorated as Heroes’ Day in Indonesia.
1 Ruth McVey, “Faith as the Outsider: Islam in Indonesian Politics”, in James Piscatory (ed.), 
Islam in the Political Process (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), p. 200.
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Almost at the same time, however, intellectual debate on the relation-
ship between Islam and nationalism began to emerge among Indonesian Mus-
lim leaders, activists, and politicians.  And with the day of independence fast 
approaching, the debate heated, and its ramifications expanded into the de-
bate on the state ideology.  In this debate, which had started back in the early 
thirties, Muslim leaders, activists, and politicians were broadly divided into 
two camps: the nationalists and the Islamists. While the former argued that 
nationalism was in keeping with the spirit of Islamic teachings, and proposed 
that the future Indonesia be a secular state; the latter saw the danger in a 
chauvinistic form of nationalism, and demanded that the nation be an Islamic 
state2.  It is important to note here that the founding fathers, Sukarno and 
Hatta, were two of the major players in the nationalist camp: they believed 
that while religion should play important role in the country, Indonesia could 
not be a theocratic state.
Initially, the debate centred almost entirely on the nature of national-
ism.  In an effort to unite all groups in the country to achieve independence, 
Sukarno broadly defined nationalism as “the feeling of love for a country, the 
readiness to sacrifice oneself for a country, and the willingness to put aside 
narrow group-interests”.  Elsewhere, he wrote that “nationalism is a belief 
and realisation of people that they are united in a single group, a nation”.  In 
short, he saw nothing incompatible between Islam and nationalism.  For Is-
lamic leaders and activists such as SI leader Agus Salim, Sukarno’s conception 
of nationalism seemed to place it on an equal footing with religion, and was 
therefore unacceptable.  If the concept was to be adopted, he maintained, it 
would “enslave people and make them country idolaters”.  For that reason, 
Salim strongly recommended that nationalism be framed in terms of “our 
service to God”.  And following this logic, Salim argued, Islam must take 
priority over nationalism.3
The debate developed in more detail during the sessions of the Com-
mittee for the Preparation of Indonesian Independence (Panitia Persiapan Ke-
2 A rich presentation of the debates during this period is given in Deliar Noer, The Modernist 
Muslim Movement in Indonesia 1900-1942 (Singapore and Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University 
Press, 1973) and B.J. Boland, The Struggle of Islam in Modern Indonesia (The Hague: Martinus 
Nijhoff, 1971).
3 The quotes are taken from Bahtiar Effendy, Islam dan Negara: Transformasi Pemikiran dan 
Praktik Politik Islam di Indonesia (Jakarta, Paramadina, 1998), pp. 70-71.
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merdekaan Indonesia or PPKI).  As Anthony Reid notes in his study of the 
Indonesian revolution, the representatives of the Islamists on the PPKI had 
“always argued the need for a Muslim state in which religious law would be 
enforceable”.4
These issues were also debated during the meetings of the Advisory 
Council, the body responsible for providing answers to the Japanese adminis-
tration’s questions on issues related to Islamic affairs  Here, the debate expand-
ed into issues as detailed as whether the future Indonesian president should be 
a Muslim, whether or not Islam ought to be the state religion, the necessity of 
establishing the state apparatus and agencies relevant for the implementation 
of Islamic law or Sharia, and the possibility of Friday being the day off  instead 
of Sunday.
During the sessions of PPKI, which convened from late May to mid 
August 1945, fully-fledged debate of these issues ensued.  In his telling mem-
oir, Hatta recalled that when the sessions began, the majority of the members 
were reluctant to answer directly the question raised in the chairman’s opening 
address: “What will be the foundation of the state that we are about to shape?” 
5  In other words: If Islam was not to be the basis, what was the alternative? 
The entire debate was a too complex to be summed up just in a few words, but 
it is fair to say that Sukarno’s and Salim’s opinions, as outlined above, broadly 
represented those of the nationalists and Islamists.
Here, Pancasila emerged as a modus vivendi that bridged the gap be-
tween the two groups; a useful and necessary synthesis by which both groups 
felt that their positions were satisfactorily represented, at least in the interim. 
It all began with Sukarno’s elaboration of his position on nationalism.  In an 
attempt to answer his critics, Sukarno stated that the nationalism he proposed 
“was not jingoistic or chauvinistic nationalism, nor was it a replication or 
imitation of the Western form of nationalism”.  He added that the national-
ism he envisaged was a tolerant, Eastern-style nationalism; not the aggressive 
European kind.  He further claimed that it was this form of nationalism that 
made the Indonesian people “God’s tools”; what gave them “spirit”.6
But the real breakthrough in the debate came only after Sukarno gave 
his famous “Pancasila Speech” of 1 June 1945, in which he proposed that 
4 Anthony Reid, Indonesian National Revolution: 1945-1950 (Melbourne: Longman, 1974), p. 20.
5 Mohammad Hatta, Memoir (Jakarta: Tintamas Indonesia, 1979), p. 435.
6 See Effendy, Islam dan Negara, p. 74.
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7 Mohammad Hatta, Menuju Negara Hukum (Jakarta: Yayasan Idayu, 1975), pp. 9-10.  See also 
Mohammad Hatta, Pengertian Pancasila (Jakarta: Idayu Press, 1977), p. 28.
the state be based on “five basic principles,” which would later be known as 
Pancasila.  The five principles, as stated at the time, were: nationalism (ke-
bangsaan), humanitarianism (internasionalisme or perikemanusiaan), democ-
racy (mufakat or demokrasi), social welfare (kesejahteraan sosial), and belief in 
God (ketuhanan).  Sukarno hoped that this formula would be acceptable to 
the Muslims.  He also openly warned them that if they wanted more, they 
were free to fight for that, through democratic channels.  Because Pancasila 
had a broader appeal, Sukarno’s warning was well-heeded. In contrast to the 
Muslim leaders and politicians who insisted on an Islamic identity for the 
new state, Sukarno insisted on a culturally neutral identity, compatible with 
democratic or Marxist ideologies, and overarching the vast cultural differences 
of the heterogeneous population.  Like the national language, Indonesian, 
which Sukarno also promoted, Pancasila did not originate from any particular 
ethnic or religious group, and was intended to define the basic values of an 
“Indonesian” political culture.
Hatta was not present at the fourth and final session when Sukarno 
delivered his speech on Pancasila  However, many years later, in 1975, when 
reviewing the committee’s deliberations, Hatta acknowledged that he had al-
ways approved of Pancasila.  He pointed out that as long as belief in God 
was written into the basic principles of the state, the Islamic tenet that God 
must be at the centre of every Muslim’s activities was ensured.  For Hatta, a 
devout Muslim and a son of an Islamic leader, “Belief in God is not just a way 
of respecting each other person’s creed, as was first suggested by Bung Karno 
[Sukarno], but it is a basic principle which leads towards truth, justice, good-
ness, honesty, and brotherhood”.7
It might be suggested here that, for Hatta, the broad concept of belief 
in God also provided an escape route from any obligation to support the ap-
peal for an Islamic state.  In one of the sessions of the Advisory Council, he 
clearly made this point when discussing the role of the Qur’an in contempo-
rary society:
The Qur’an is, in essence, the basis of religion, not a book of law.  
No regulation can be found in the Qur’an for contemporary legal 
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8 This quote is taken from Daniel S. Lev, Islamic Courts in Indonesia: A Study in the Political 
Bases of Legal Institutions (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 
1972), p. 40.
9 Mohammad Hatta, Bung Hatta Menjawab, 2nd edition (Jakarta: Gunung Agung, 1979), p. 
89.
10Boland, The Struggle of Islam in Modern Indonesia, pp. 21-22.
needs. …Of course, the Qur’an establishes a basis for justice and 
welfare, which must be followed by Muslims.  But this basis…
is only a guiding goal. …The people of the state themselves must 
establish law and order through mutual deliberation. Of course, 
every person will express his opinions based on his religious convic-
tions. But the resulting law will be state law, not religious law.  It 
may be that state law will much influenced by religious spirit. … 
We will not establish a state with a separation of religion and state, 
but a separation of religious affairs and state affairs.  If religious af-
fairs are also handled by the state, then the religion will become a 
tool of the state… its eternal character will disappear.  State affairs 
belong to all of us.  The affairs of Islam are exclusively the affairs of 
the Islamic ummah and the Islamic community.8
This quote implies that Hatta positioned himself on the side of the na-
tionalists: he rejected the idea of an Islamic state and proposed the creation of 
a national unitary state, in which affairs of state would be separate from affairs 
of religion.  However, in spite of his strong preference for a national unitary 
state, he maintained that such a state would not be an irreligious one.  In the 
later years of his life, reflecting on the opening session of the PPKI, Hatta 
recalled: “At that time, I said that if we established a free state, don’t let us just 
have the same basis as European states; there is no need to repeat the history 
of Western countries and their conflict between religion and state”.9
However, despite Hatta’s support for Sukarno’s Pancasila, the Muslim 
leaders in the committee were offended by the fact that Sukarno, in his speech, 
treated Islam as merely one religion among many.10  To bridge the gap between 
the Islamic and nationalist groups, a sub-committee was set up, whose mem-
bers consisted of Sukarno, Hatta, Achmad Subardjo, Muhammad Yamin, 
Abikusno Tjokrosujoso, A. Kahar Muzakkir, Agus Salim, A. Wahid Hasyim, 
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and A. A. Maramis.11  This sub-committee drafted a gentlemen’s agreement, 
which, in one centrally important passage, provided that Indonesia would be 
a republic founded not only on the basis of unity, a righteous and civilised 
humanity, democracy, and social justice, but also on the belief in God, “with 
the obligation for adherents of Islam to practice Sharia”.
It was soon apparent that this formula was much easier to formulate 
than to sell.  When the draft was again debated by the PPKI, the Islamists 
argued that it did not go far enough.  For this reason, Wahid Hasyim of NU 
suggested that Islam be adopted as the state religion.  He also suggested that 
only Muslims could be elected to the office of president or vice-president of 
the Republic.  Pushing further in the direction of establishing Islam as the basis 
of the state, Ki Bagus Hadikusumo of Masjumi demanded that the theologi-
cal principle be stated as “Belief in God with the obligation practice Sharia”, 
without the condition that this was applicable only to Muslims.   The national-
ist group, particularly those of non-Islamic origins, strongly objected to this 
compromise.  Driven by their concern of possible discrimination against other 
religions and the growth of religious fanaticism in the newly-born country, 
they demanded that the state must be unconditionally removed from associa-
tion with any religion, including Islam.12
It was only after Sukarno’s appeal to both sides to make great sacrifices 
that the debate cooled down.  The PPKI agreed that the future independent 
state would be based on the principle of “Belief in God with the obligation for 
adherents of Islam to practice Sharia”.  They also accepted “Islam as the state 
religion and that the President of the Republic must be a Muslim”.13  This 
decision was incorporated into a special document called the Jakarta Charter 
(Piagam Jakarta), which was to serve as a Preamble to the Draft of the Con-
stitution.
A day after the declaration of independence, however, when the consti-
tution was about to be promulgated, the PPKI decided to drop the clause in 
the Jakarta Charter and retain only “belief in God”, to ensure the support of 
11Given the centrality of the agreement (see more below), it is crucial to consider the religious 
background of these gentlemen.  The first eight members were Muslims with differing political 
outlooks (the first four were nationalists, and the latter four, Islamists), and Maramis was a 
Christian who shared the ideological leanings of the nationalists.
12 Boland, The Struggle of Islam in Modern Indonesia, pp. 30-33.
13 Boland, The Struggle of Islam in Modern Indonesia, p. 33.
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non-Muslims for the newly-proclaimed Republic of Indonesia.  These words 
were also deleted from article 29 of the Constitution, where they had also ap-
peared before.  “Although well short of Muslim hopes,” Reid notes, “this was 
to prove the highest point in their pursuit of an Islamic state”.14
From this brief description of the acceptance of Pancasila as Indonesia’s 
state ideology, three conclusions can be drawn.  First, Sukarno proposed the 
five principles as a synthesis of the secular nationalism advocated by the na-
tionalists and the idea of an Islamic state promoted by the Islamist politicians. 
But second, and more importantly, as a national ideology, Pancasila was ac-
cepted by all concerned only after long and tedious deliberations.  And third, 
reading the history of the debate from the perspective of Indonesian Muslims 
today, the acceptance of Pancasila seemed possible only after some of its prin-
ciples were ‘Islamised’, in one way or another:
Monotheism replaced Sukarno’s original concept of a more generalised 1. 
“belief in God”, which may include polytheism.  And while Sukarno pro-
posed it be the fourth principle, the Muslim representatives demanded 
that it come first.  This made monotheism the predominant principle, 
which coloured the four other principles following it.
Sukarno’s initial concept of the third principle was “nationalism”.  This 2. 
was replaced by the more neutral but dynamic term, “The Unity of In-
donesia”, in response to the objections raised by Muslim politicians to 
the term “nationalism”, which for them went against the Islamic ideals 
of universalism and cosmo politanism, and brought to their minds the 
chauvinist nationalism of Germany and Japan.
“Democracy”, the fourth principle, is a short form of the longer “De-3. 
mocracy guided by the inner wisdom in the unanimity arising out of 
the deliberations among representatives”. This notion of “wisdom arising 
out of delibera tions” is reminiscent of an adage or hikmah ascribed to 
the Prophet Muhammad, who once said, “Ra’s al-hikmah al-musyâwarah” 
(“The trunk of wisdom is deli beration”).
14 Reid, Indonesian National Revolution, p. 20.
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It is widely believed that Mohammad Hatta (the first vice-pres ident 
of the Republic), Haji Agus Salim (a prominent Muslim intellectual of revo-
lutionary Indonesia), Ki Bagus Hadikusumo (head of Muhammadiyah, an 
Islamic modernist move ment), and Abdul Wahid Hasyim (head of NU, an 
Islamic tradi tionalist movement), are to be credited most for the ‘Islamisation’ 
of Pancasila that eventually made it acceptable to most Indonesian Muslims. 
This makes sense of Ratuprawiranegara’s assertion, mentioned at the begin-
ning of this essay, that Pancasila was a gift of Indonesian Muslims to Indonesia 
as a nation.
Challenges and Threats to Pancasila 
Ever since the acceptance of the gentlemen’s agreement discussed above, 
Pancasila has been Indonesia’s national ideology.  But this does not mean that, 
in the country’s history, it has always been accepted across the board without 
challenge or even threat.  The first challenge came from a repeated effort by 
some Muslim leaders and politicians to impose Islam as state ideology.  Pan-
casila was again threatened when Indonesian Communist leaders and activists 
attempted at a national coup d’état in October 1965, which ended Sukarno’s 
presidency and opened a new period of Indonesia’s history under the presidency 
of another Muslim named Suharto.  But, as explained below, the integrity and 
purity of Pancasila were also challenged from sources rarely identified: presi-
dents Sukarno and Suharto themselves, as dictators, attempted to monopolise 
the interpretation and practice of Pancasila, thus discredited its value.  
The first major threat to Pancasila came in 1955, when the country was 
only about ten years old.  At the time, as part of the Indonesian experiment 
with parliamentary democracy and general elections, the door was opened 
to all political parties to again discuss the philosophical basis of the Repub-
lic of Indonesia.  In the Cons tituent Assembly (Majelis Konstituante), which 
was formed following the 1955 general election, the politicians fell into one 
of three main ideological camps: nationalism (Partai Nasionalis Indonesia or 
PNI), communism or socialism (Partai Komunis Indonesia or PKI), and Islam-
ism (Partai Masyumi and Partai NU).  While the nationalists wanted to keep 
Pancasila as the philosophical basis of the state, the communists aspired to a 
Marxist state modelled on the Soviet Republic (USSR), and the Islamists once 
again argued for an Islamic state.
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The deliberations in the Constituent Assembly came to a deadlock, 
and President Sukarno, backed by the Indonesian mi lit ary, finally decreed the 
return of the Republic of Indonesia to the 1945 Constitution with Pancasila 
as the per ma nent philosophical basis for the nation.  And in a gesture to ac-
commodate the Muslims’ desire for a state imbued with Islamic values, Su-
karno declared that the 1945 Constitution and Pancasila should be seen as the 
historical continuation of the Jakarta Charter, calling the charter a “historic 
document”.
But Muslim leaders and politicians were in no mood to accept this 
move by the president.  This situation, coupled with dissatisfaction about how 
politics and economy were regulated and managed at the national level, led 
some Muslim leaders and politicians from Jakarta to proclaim an alternative 
government, the Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia 
(Pemerintahan Revolusioner Republik Indonesia or PRRI), in February 1958. 
Here, prominent politicians from Masyumi, including former Prime Minis-
ter Mohammad Natsir, joined forces with regional military commanders and 
civilian leaders who had been rebelling for months on the island of Sumatra. 
The PRRI rebellion was short-lived, however, defeated in June of the same 
year.  And Masyumi, which had been the most vocal in supporting the idea of 
an Islamic state and had been supportive of the PRRI rebellion, was banned 
in 1960.
This incident came with another cost: on 5 July 1959, Sukarno issued a 
presidential decree that dissolved the Constituent Assembly and that eventu-
ally led to his personal rule, presiding arbitrarily over what he called “Guided 
Democracy” (Demokrasi Terpimpin).  Under his dictatorship, Sukarno firmly 
placed Pancasila as Indonesia’s national ideology, but he also monopolised its 
interpretation and practice.  Here, it was not really Pancasila as the state ideol-
ogy as a whole that was saved, but Sukarno’s authoritarian conception of it. 
In so doing, he identified Pancasila with himself – and thus discredited it in 
the eyes of the Indonesian public.  And a figure no less than Hatta, Sukarno’s 
soul-mate during the colonial period, vehemently opposed Sukarno’s move: 
in protest against Sukarno’s growing authoritarianism and dictatorship, he re-
signed as vice-president.15
15On this period of Indonesian politics, the best source is still Herbert Feith, The Decline of 
Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1962).
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16The most balanced analysis of this incident is given in Harold Crouch, The Army and Politics 
in Indonesia (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1978).
With the emergence of Sukarno’s personal rule, another unfavourable 
development took place when the PKI, with the direct or indirect support of 
Sukarno, began to dominate the political arena shortly after the presidential 
decree of 1959.  This domination was demonstrated particularly after 1963, 
when the PKI openly attacked religious establishments, including many in 
Indonesia’s countryside.  This situation led to the political debacle of the 
1965, when the Communists tried to seize power by force and their oppo-
nents fiercely fought back.  Again, Pancasila as the state ideology survived, 
but at great cost: it is believed that about 500 thousand people, mostly PKI 
leaders and supporters, were killed during this incident, the bloodiest event 
in post-war Southeast Asia until the Khmer Rouge established its regime in 
Cambodia a decade later.16
Suharto, at the time a rising-star major general in the Indonesian army, 
put an end to the crisis.  And on 12 March 1967, he was installed as act-
ing president; although he would ultimately maintain his presidency until 
1998, more than three decades later.  Like Sukarno’s Guided Democracy, the 
so-called New Order under Suharto was an authoritarian regime.  Although 
opposition movements and popular unrest were not entirely eliminated under 
his presidency, Suharto’s regime was extraordinarily stable compared with that 
of Sukarno’s.  His success in governing the country is mainly attributable to 
two factors: the military’s absolute or near-absolute loyalty to the regime, and 
the military’s extensive political and administrative powers.
But the stability of the regime was also made possible by the establish-
ment of a large number of corporatist-style organisations to link social groups 
in a subordinate relationship with the regime.  These included organisations of 
a social, class, religious, and professional nature.  Here, again, Pancasila played 
a significant role.  Rather than imposing cultural and ideological homogene-
ity, Suharto revived the Sukarno-era concept of Pancasila.  Striking the balance 
of “stick and carrot” mechanisms, Suharto’s approach to political conflict did 
not reject the use of coercion but supplemented it with a rhetoric of “consulta-
tion and consensus”, which, like Pancasila, had its roots in the Sukarno era.
For this reason, starting in 1978, a national indoctrination program 
was undertaken to inculcate Pancasila values in all citizens, especially school 
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children, students, and civil servants.  From being an abstract statement of 
national goals, Pancasila was now used as an instrument of social and political 
control: to oppose the government was to oppose Pancasila; and to oppose 
Pancasila was to oppose the foundation of the state.  In addition, in 1985, the 
stage-managed legislature passed government-backed bills requiring all po-
litical parties and social organisations to declare their support for Pancasila as 
their ideological foundation.  Through this campaign, called ‘the making of 
Pancasila as the sole foundation’ (pengasastunggalan Pancasila), even Islamic 
social organisations had to change their charters, deleting Islam from it and 
– in its place – acknowledging only Pancasila as the ideological basis of their 
organisations.
This campaign caused great resentment, especially among Muslims. 
Declaring such support was an extremely delicate issue for many Muslim 
groups, since it attacked the basis of their religious identity.  Some Muslim 
leaders were even convinced that the real and long-term goal of this policy 
was the final destruction of their organisations: the policy seemed to them to 
hark back to the earlier Dutch colonial policy of tolerating Islamic religion but 
ruthlessly repressing all forms of political Islam.  So, the policy aroused strong 
opposition among politically active Muslims: riots broke out in the Tanjung 
Priok port area of Jakarta on 12 September 1984; and a wave of bombings 
and arson took place in 1985, with targets including the Borobudur Buddhist 
temple and the palace of the Sunan of Surakarta in East Java, commercial 
districts in Jakarta, and the headquarters of the Indonesian state radio, also in 
Jakarta.17
This was in spite of the fact that the state under Suharto, particularly 
by the 1980s and early 1990s, and within the legal and politically acceptable 
boundaries of Muslim involvement, had become a major promoter of Islamic 
institutions in the country.  Thousands of new modern mosques and mushalla 
(smaller places of prayer) were built everywhere, mostly on the initiative of , 
and with financial aid from, the government.  The government also subsidised 
numerous Muslim community activities, such as the annual Qur’anic recita-
tion competition (Musabaqah Tilawatil Qur’an or MTQ), and the celebration 
17See R. William Liddle, “Suharto’s Indonesia: Personal Rule and Political Institution,” in his 
collection of essays Leadership and Culture in Indonesian Politics (New South Wales, Australia: 
Allen & Unwil Ltd., 1996), pp. 15-36.
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of special religious days, including maulid (the Prophet’s birthday) and hijrah, 
in the presidential palace or national mosque.  Generally speaking, within the 
overall value structure of Pancasila, Islamic moral teaching and personal codes 
of conduct balanced the materialism inherent in secular economic develop-
ment, the mantra of the New Order government. For example, on many uni-
versity campuses across the country, especially in big cities, the fasting month 
of Ramadan was marked by major religious activities, so-called “Ramadan on 
Campus”, just as if they had been converted to Islamic centres.  And last but 
not least, Suharto himself went to great lengths to demonstrate that he was 
a good Muslim. On 6 December 1990, he authorised the formation of the 
Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals (Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim 
Indonesia or ICMI), Indonesia’s most powerful and controversial Muslim so-
cial organisation; in August 1991, he pledged three billion rupiahs to a new 
Islamic bank (Bank Muamalat Indonesia or BMI) and declared that he would 
encourage other wealthy Muslims to contribute; and in May 1991, he made 
the hajj pilgrimage to Mecca, making him Haji Mohamad Suharto.18
By wooing Islamic intellectuals, leaders and teachers, Suharto’s govern-
ment won broad support for its developmental policies.  Some observers began 
asking whether this was “the bureaucratisation of Islam” or “the Islamisation 
of bureaucracy”.  Whatever the case, there was no question that Islam was the 
state-favoured religion in Indonesia, although it was not the state religion.
But still this was not an ideal situation for Indonesian Muslims, for 
at least two reasons.  First, the formula was made possible only by Suharto’s 
authoritarianism, and it was managed on his personal terms.  In other words, 
there was no guarantee that it would prevail over the longer term.  Second, Su-
harto’s favouritism of certain Muslim factions in the country betrayed his sup-
posed neutrality in the matters of religious affairs – not only to non-Muslims, 
but also to the Muslims who did not support his politics.
Islamic Justification for Pancasila
When the New Order period of Indonesian history finally ended, the 
question then remained: How could democratic opposition, Islamic or other-
18A rich presentation of this aspect of Suharto’s Islamic politics is given in Robert W. Hefner, 
Civil Islam: Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia (New Jersey: Princeton University 
Press, 2000).
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wise, be legally and peacefully expressed within the framework of Pancasila as 
the state ideology?  This was an important question, because the Pancasila on 
which Suharto had based his power and rule was his own, dictatorial interpre-
tation and practice of this state ideology.  Although Suharto’s Islamic policy had 
benefited at least some groups of Indonesian Muslims, it was founded on a per-
sonal, and therefore fragile, foundation.  To put it another way, living harmoni-
ously in religiously pluralistic Indonesia would be possible if, and only if, two 
conditions were met: (1) Pancasila as the state ideology was whole-heartedly 
accepted and supported by Indonesian Muslims, the largest religious group in 
the country; and (2) Indonesia as a country was governed democratically.
Thanks to the Reform Movement (Gerakan Reformasi) that brought the 
end of Suharto’s dictatorship in May 1998, progress has been made towards 
meeting these two conditions in post-Suharto Indonesia.  There is no stronger 
indication of this than the rejection by the majority of Muslim politicians in 
the newly- and democratically-elected People’s Consultative Assembly (Ma-
jelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat or MPR) of the so-called ‘Sharia amendment’ 
in 2002.  Note that this proposed amendment, which stated that the state 
should be responsible for the implementation of Islamic law or Sharia for 
all Muslims,19 represented the latest effort to revive the Jakarta Charter.  Al-
though the amendment was supported by some politicians from Islam-based 
political parties such as the Unity and Development Party (Partai Persatuan 
Pembangunan or PPP), Crescent Moon and Star Party (Partai Bulan Bintang 
or PBB), and Justice Party (Partai Keadilan or PK), in all they constituted 
only about 15% of the total members of the People’s Consultative Assembly. 
A significantly larger number of Muslim politicians in the Assembly, from, for 
example, the NU-based National Awakening Party (Partai Kebangkitan Bang-
sa or PKB), Muhammadiyah-based National Mandate Party (Partai Amanat 
Nasional or PAN), and nationalist parties such as the Functional Group Par-
ty (Partai Golongan Karya or Golkar) and Indonesian Democratic Party for 
Struggle (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia-Perjuangan or PDI-P), firmly rejected 
the proposed Sharia amendment.
The importance of this decision cannot be overstated, because, as of 
this time in Indonesian history, this was the first and most democratic decision 
19The original text of the proposed amendment (Article 29) was: “The state is based on the 
belief  in God, with the obligation for all adherents of Islam to practice Sharia.”
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by the Indonesian people  to accept Pancasila as the state ideology and reject 
the Jakarta Charter.20  Remember, during the Cons tituent Assembly sessions 
that took place after the general election of 1955 – which was the only demo-
cratic election that Indonesia had ever had before the one held after the fall 
of New Order in 1998 – the debate over state ideology came to a deadlock, 
prompting Sukarno to issue the presidential decree to return to Pancasila and 
begin his dictatorship.
In this contemporary context, it is interesting and important to ask: 
why did this happen?  Why have Muslim politicians in the modern-day Peo-
ple’s Consultative Assembly (MPR) finally and willingly accepted Pancasila? 
In short, this would have been imaginable without the changes that have been 
taking place in the last three decades of Muslim intellectualism and activism in 
Indonesia, which have provided further Islamic justification for the acceptance 
of Pancasila.  To conclude this essay, let us look at the contribution made to 
this end by the late Nurcholish Madjid and Abdurrahman Wahid, undoubt-
edly the two most influential Muslim thinkers and reformers in contemporary 
Indonesian history.
Madjid (1939-2005) was chairman of the Muslim Student Association 
(Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam or HMI), the largest student organisation in 
Indonesia, for two terms of office (1966-1974).  A son of a Javanese ulama, he 
was formally trained in Islamic studies (after finishing his early education at 
the Dar al-Salam Islamic Boarding School in Gontor, Ponorogo, East Java, he 
went to the State Institute for Islamic Studies in Jakarta, and then completed 
his PhD in Islamic Studies at the University of Chicago, US) and was widely-
known as an authority in Islamic teachings and history.  He was the first Indo-
nesian Muslim scholar to publicly introduce the idea that political secularisa-
tion – the separation of state and religion – was not only legitimate in Islam, 
but also necessary.  In a controversial speech delivered in early 1970s, and in 
the spirit of defending the Islamic teaching of tawhid [belief in the oneness of 
God] that is corroborated by the development of modern political thought, he 
argued that as long as Muslims were unable to distinguish the sacred from the 
profane, Islam from worldly social and political affairs, the essence of Islam 
20A more detailed discussion of this is given in Saiful Mujani, Muslim Demokrat: Islam, Budaya 
Demokrasi, dan Partisipasi Politik (Jakarta: Gramedia Pustaka Utama, 2007), pp. 74-77.
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(the sacred) and the establishment of a modern form of politics (the profane) 
would be beyond their grasp.  Madjid said:
‘Secularisation’ does not mean the implementation of sec-
ularism, because ‘secularism’ is the name of an ideology, a new 
closed world view that functions very much like a new religion.  
What is meant here is all forms of ‘liberating development’.  This 
liberating process is particularly needed because the umma [the 
Muslim community], as a result of its own historical growth, is no 
longer capable of distinguishing – among the values which they 
consider Islamic – those that are transcendental from those that 
are temporal.  In fact the hierarchy of values is often reversed: the 
transcendental becomes temporal and vice versa, or everything, 
without exception, becomes transcendental and valued as ukhrawi 
[pertaining to the hereafter].21
For Madjid, because the only thing sacred in Islamic teachings is God, 
the secularisation or de-sacralisation of the profane (mundane politics) is a 
religious necessity.  Thus, he was known for his pro-secularisation motto, “Is-
lam, Yes; Islamic party, No”, which basically meant that Muslims did not have 
to support political parties that used Islamic names or symbols.
Unsurprisingly, given his mastery in Islamic teachings and history, 
Madjid developed his support for the modern ideas of equality, tolerance, plu-
ralism, consensus, opposition, and popular sovereignty from Islamic doctrines 
and traditions.  He argued that any ideas developed by Muslims that contra-
dicted these modern social and political ideas should be subjected to historical 
criticism.  By taking this approach and stating it publicly, and thanks to his 
effectiveness as a writer and speaker, he became an important agent of Islamic 
cultural change among his contemporaries.  In the last three decades, he has 
been a major force in developing modern Islamic discourse and political prac-
tice in Indonesia.
21Nurcholish Madjid, “The Necessity of Renewing Islamic Thought and Reinvigorating 
Religious Understanding,” in Charles Kurzman (ed.), Liberal Islam: A Sourcebook (New York 
and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 286.
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Considering Indonesia’s diversity and pluralism, Madjid used the same 
approach to support Pancasila as the state ideology and to reject the idea of Is-
lamic state.  He argued that for many Muslims, Pancasila is, from the Qur’anic 
perspective, the common denominator or common ground (kalimah sawâ’) 
between people of different religions that God commands us to seek and find. 
He quoted a verse in the Holy Book (3: 64), addressed to the Prophet Mu-
hammad, which states: “O followers of the scripture, let us come to a logical 
agreement between us and you: that we shall worship none but God; that we 
set up no idols but Him, nor set up any human beings as lords beside God.”
Thus the principle of monotheism, for Madjid, was the common de-
nominator of all divinely-inspired religions.  But he quickly added that the 
adherents of different religions could also agree to a set of common values 
that included more than that of mo notheism: “And the more values that the 
adherents of different religions can agree upon as common terms, the better”, 
he wrote.22  To support this argument, he quoted a dictum in the Islamic prin-
ciples of jurisprudence (Ushul al-Fiqh), which say, in Arabic, mâ kâna aktsar 
fi`lan kâna aktsar fadhlan (“The more the [good] deeds, the greater the vir-
tue”).  Thus, it is better for different religions or factions to have five values in 
common (such as Pancasila for the Indonesian people) than to have just one. 
In this way, Pancasila provides a firm basis for the development of religious 
tolerance and pluralism in Indonesia.
Directly or otherwise, Madjid’s ideas won crucial support from his close 
colleague Abdurrahman Wahid, another major agent of the modernisation of 
Muslim political culture in Indonesia.  In fact, given his background and so-
cial status, Wahid’s agency is perhaps even more decisive than that of Madjid. 
A grandson of the founder of NU and a son of long-time NU Chair Wahid 
Hasyim, Abdurrahman Wahid is not only a part of the NU subculture, but 
also an important member of the core elite of this social organisation, the 
country’s largest. He is, as we describe him in Indonesia, of ‘blue-blood line-
age’.  After completing his early traditional religious training in NU-based 
Islamic boarding schools, Wahid was sent to Egypt and Iraq to continue his 
Islamic studies.  But in addition to his mastery of Islamic teachings and tradi-
tion, he has also been known for his close attention to Western intellectual, 
22For further elaboration of this point, see Madjid’s long introduction to his book, Islam Agama 
dan Peradaban (Jakarta: Paramadina, 1993).
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civilisational and artistic tradition (he can speak about Aristotle’s philosophy, 
Tolstoy’s novels, or Spielberg’s movies as fluently as he talks about Islamic his-
tory or discusses Ibn Taymiyah and al-Kindi).  Although he is less inclined 
than Madjid to anchor his ideas in Islamic teachings and tradition, his voice 
is strong and widely accepted in NU circles, most possibly because of his 
social status.  And even before he became the Chairman of NU in the early 
1980s, he started writing extensively in popular publications such as Tempo, 
the country’s most-widely circulated weekly, on Islam and modern political 
thought, and social issues.
Since returning from his studies in the Middle East in the early 1970s, 
Wahid’s major concern has been with pluralism and tolerance in the context 
of the modern Indonesian nation-state.  He argues that in order for Indonesia 
to be a modern nation-state, and for the sake of the public interest (mashâlih 
al-mursalah), itself the core value of Islamic teachings, every citizen should be 
treated equally, regardless of his or her religious affiliation.  Since Indonesia is 
a religiously plural nation, in which Islam is only one among many religions, 
then treating someone as a second-class citizen simply because he or she is 
non-Muslim is utterly intolerable.  For this reason, Wahid argues, seeing Islam 
and other religions as complementary, not contrary, is necessary for the sake 
of the public interest.
Moreover, he sees nothing contradictory between Islam and national-
ism.  He also believes that Islam could thrive spiritually in a nationalist state 
that is not formally based on Islam.  He writes: 
NU adheres to a conception of nationalism that is in ac-
cordance with Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution.  NU has 
become the pioneer in ideological affairs.  This is the case even 
though throughout the entire Islamic world there is still a problem 
between nationalism and Islam.  All the Saudi writers consider 
nationalism a form of secularism.  They do not yet understand 
that nationalism such as in Indonesia is not secular, but rather it 
respects the role of religion.23
23Quoted from Douglas Ramage, Politics in Indonesia: Democracy, Islam and the Ideology of 
Tolerance (London and New York: Routledge, 1995), p. 53.
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 During the New Order period, Wahid’s idea of an inclusive Islam led 
him to support Pancasila as the sole foundation of Indonesian politics.  And 
under his leadership, NU was the first major Islamic organisation to accept 
Pancasila as the absolute state ideology.  Moreover, NU declared that Pancasila 
is its organisational foundation, a decision that had a powerful effect on NU’s 
role in national politics.  Among others, under his leadership, NU withdrew 
from partisan politics and declined to support PPP, an Islam-based political 
party.  And in 1984, NU returned to the 1926 khittah (the so-called “1926 
guideline”, after the year the organisation was established), meaning that it 
once again became a purely social and religious, but not political, organisa-
tion.  Thus, as if echoing Madjid’s “Islam, Yes; Islamic party, No”, the mem-
bers of NU were free to participate and vote for any political party, regardless 
of its religious affiliation.  Since then, NU members are to be found in many 
political parties, both Islamic and secular, including the NU-based PKB po-
litical party that rejected the proposed “Sharia amendment” in 2002.*** 
Mr. Sjahrir, President Sukarno, and Mohamed Hatta sharing a lounge at 
Sukarno’s estate (1946). Credit: John Florea/Life
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 The rapid growth of Sharia-inspired by-laws since the 
start of the democratisation and decentralization of Indo-
nesia following the demise of the New Order government 
has caught the attention of many. A large majority worry that this 
phenomenon will be a setback for democratisation. That is, they see it as 
the emergence of seeds of discrimination and disregard for the equality of 
all citizens under the law in Indonesia which is, after all, a country of law. 
Moreover, they see it as an intention to turn Indonesia into a country based 
on Islam.
This fear is well founded if we consider that the establishment of the 
state of Indonesia, based on Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution (with all its 
amendments), was consciously intended as the basis for a democratic nation-
state that holds in high regard the equality of all its citizens under the law. 
In several areas, Sharia-inspired by-laws and other rulings have already had 
quite an obvious discriminative effect on public services (Subair Umam et. al, 
2007).
However, for its supporters, this process is part of their as yet unfinished 
struggle for the establishment of Indonesia itself. Failure at the national level 
to make Indonesia an Islamic state has obliged them to alter their strategy to 
one of ‘the village besieging the city’. That is, to adopt a strategy that supports 
and promotes the creation of Sharia-inspired regulations at the local level with 
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the aim of changing the foundation of the Indonesian state to one based on 
Islam (Haedar Nasir, 2007).
Yet, historically speaking, incorporation of a variety of elements of reli-
gious (particularly Islamic) law into the national legal system has occurred since 
the state of Indonesia itself was established. Ratno Lukito’s study (2003) showed 
that, although in essence customary law and Islamic law have had the same op-
portunities to influence the development of national law, in reality Islamic law 
has been the more frequent winner of the two. In other words, in the history of 
the development of Indonesian law, Islamic law has been more influential than 
customary law in the development of national law, including laws on marriage 
and inheritance, and even economic laws such as those passed in the 1990s on 
Bank Muamalat and zakat (charitable giving) (Robert Hefner, 2003).
As a public issue, adoption of Sharia appears to be increasingly un-
popular. This trend is reflected in the results of several direct local elections 
such as in Cianjur, West Java and Bulukumba in South Sulawesi, and even the 
South Sulawesi gubernatorial election, where the candidates that advocated 
the adoption of Sharia failed to win a significant share of the vote. But the 
reality is that Sharia is in fact being adopted through a process of ‘creeping 
mainstreaming’. For example, the Ministry of Religion and the Ministry of 
Law and Human Rights are currently preparing at least three laws concerning 
the so-called “application of Sharia” with regard to marriage, inheritance, and 
religious donations, all three of which are problematic with respect to relations 
between citizens of different religions. Various elements of Sharia have been 
incorporated into local and national laws and regulations, without ever having 
been the subject of public debate.
Proponents of the implementation of Sharia have shifted the fight for 
their cause from the public arena to the strategic, practical arena and, as a re-
sult, what is now happening is that exponents of Sharia are now vying among 
themselves for strategic positions. Political parties based on the ideology of 
Islam, such as Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS), Partai Bulan Bintang (PBB) 
and Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP), tend to conceal their support for 
the adoption of Sharia. Indeed, PKS has been seeking to expand its voter base 
by promoting pluralism and diversity.
But in practice, the supporters of these parties, both in society and in 
the bureaucracy, are systematically working to incorporate elements of Sharia 
into laws and government regulations, both stand-alone and general.
[1] spanduk bernada kritik terhadap usaha politisasi 
syariat terpampang di pinggir jalan kota Tasikmalaya 
2003, yang dipasang kelompok seniman pimpinan acep 
zamzam noor. Credit: Doc. Wahid Institute 2003.
[2] Petugas syariah (Wilayatul hisbah) Kota Banda aceh, 
melaksanakan hukuman cambuk kepada salah seorang 
pelaku khalwat (perbuatan mesum) yang berlangsung di 
halaman Masjid Kampung Mulia, Banda aceh (12/1 2007). 
Credit: Fauzul/rakyataceh.com
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These three political parties, along with Partai Demokrat (PD) estab-
lished by incumbent president Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, are the inner 
ruling parties. Their position gives them significant opportunity to plan and 
carry out their mainstreaming agenda without having to bring the issues to 
the public realm for debate. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s tendency to turn a 
blind eye, coupled with his party’s lack of knowledge of Islam, empowers these 
parties and enables them to utilize their proximity to power. Some predict that 
these parties, in particular PKS, will increase their share of the vote, and that 
this will, in and of itself, consolidate the creeping mainstreaming of Sharia.
Taking a quantitative approach, Robin Bush (2007) calculated the ex-
tent of Sharia-inspired by-laws. She estimates that there are about 78 such reg-
ulations in 52 regencies and cities, not including decrees/official letters from 
district heads, mayors and governors, and draft regulations still before local 
parliament. So, if this trend continues, like it or not, it is indeed possible that 
it will influence the direction the development of national law takes. Concerns 
about this trend have mounted as a result of the decision by the Supreme 
Court to decline a judicial review of a by-law adopted in Tangerang (Nurun 
Nisa et. al., 2007). The Supreme Court reasoned that this anti-prostitution 
regulation, which discriminated against women, fell outside its jurisdiction.
Factors in the Emergence of Sharia-Inspired Local Regulations
Fairly careful observation would arrive at the conclusion that, in real-
ity, there is no single factor involved this phenomenon. Rather, it must be seen 
from several perspectives, and in doing so, a number of contributing factors 
can be distinguished. Bush, for example, suggests that there are several factors 
contributing to the rapid growth of Sharia-inspired local regulations. These 
factors are:
History and local culture. According to Bush, the development of this 1. 
phenomenon is associated with areas that have historical links to DI/TII 
(Darul Islam/Tentara Islam Indonesia). 
Corruption. The phenomenon is more likely to occur in areas that have a 2. 
high potential for corruption. It is therefore likely that these local regula-
tions/policies constitute part of the effort to conceal the corruption of 
politicians, both at executive and legislative levels.
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Local political influence. One way for politicians running for office as 3. 
local head can draw voters is by offering them Sharia-inspired local regu-
lations.
The legal drafting skills of politicians. The questionable legal drafting skills 4. 
of politicians, notably their apparent inability to apply the principles of 
good governance, coupled with their lack of vision and inability to iden-
tify strategic issues to improve public welfare, and set against the extensive 
political opportunities and powers they have to make regulations, lever-
ages the growth of Sharia-inspired by-laws.
Arksal Salim as quoted in Bush identifies at least three categories of 
Sharia-inspired local ordinances:
By-laws concerning issues of public order or the regulation of societal mor-1. 
als, such as local regulations against gambling, prostitution and drinking 
alcohol. The adoption of these regulations makes these issues of concern 
not only to Muslims, but to almost everyone.
Regulations connected with religious observance and ritual obligations. 2. 
Specifically targeting Muslims, these include by-laws requiring citizens to 
read the Quran, pay zakat, and so on.
By-laws related to symbols of religion, such as regulations requiring wom-3. 
en to wear hijab and men to don Islamic-style dress on Fridays. In prac-
tice, these by-laws are the cause discrimination in public services and in 
the community, against both non-Muslims and Muslims.
Several Considerations in Response
These facts suggest that there is no single, all-encompassing strategy 
that can be adopted in response to this rapid growth in Sharia-inspired by-
laws. They must be examined on a case by case basis, taking into account the 
background and political context of each. A response that is overly general and 
fails to distinguish the complexities and differences associated with each by-
law would be inappropriate and run the risk of neglecting important issues. 
The solution should also generate debate, and perhaps even involve propor-
tional advocacy.
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First, the paradigmatic and substantive standards for by-laws need to 
be clarified and rationalized. For example, the state foundation of Pancasila 
and the 1945 Constitution and all its amendments are the primary standards, 
which are supported by the principles of human rights. It is very difficult to 
respond to regulations that are concerned with ‘public order’ or that address 
issues of public concern, such as gambling, prostitution and drinking alcohol, 
at the substantive and paradigmatic level by very nature of the fact that these 
are public concerns.
Rather, the aims of these by-laws and the steps involved their applica-
tion need to be monitored. These include regulations concerning redundancy, 
which without a solution would cause mass unemployment and suffering. 
Monitoring is also needed of the methods of enforcement, which may, for ex-
ample, include violence and uncalled-for and discriminatory criminalization. 
This being the case, advocacy would better fulfil the objective. Without clear, 
concrete standards and norms and a measured response such as this, the fear is 
we will have a debate without basis.
One core standard regarding procedure for drafting of regulations is 
Law 10/2004. This law covers, among others, the procedure for drafting lo-
cal ordinances. It underlines the importance of testing the consistency of the 
preamble, which serves as the basis for a by-law, against existing Indonesian 
laws. It also establishes the need for public participation, which is particularly 
important in view of the fact that some by-laws presumed valid in a particular 
region are mere carbon copies of by-laws from other regions. This effectively 
minimizes the public participation stipulated by Law 10/24, and undermines 
well-intended efforts to resolve social problems within that region.
Then there are the various regulations, including decrees/official letters 
issued by district and municipal heads that are based, for example, on fatwa 
issued by the Indonesian Council of Ulema or on group opinion, and which 
ignore existing laws. In this case, advocacy should focus on the errors of and 
departures from law these regulations contain, without having to take it as 
high as, for example, the constitutional level.
Where it is proven that by-laws are mere political commodities used 
by politicians for political gain, advocacy should focus on commoditization. 
In South Sulawesi and Cianjur, for example, it has been proven that “sell-
ing” Sharia does not significantly increase the chances of elected governor or 
district head. These regions, known for their “fanatical” support of Sharia, 
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despite electing district heads who do not value such issues, elected governors 
and deputy governors who promote pluralism and tolerance, 
Occasionally, political issues do become major problems and this de-
mands courage and vision from those in the central government. Theoretical-
ly, decrees/official letters issued by district/municipal heads and governors that 
have no legal basis, such as those based on Indonesian Council of Ulema fatwa 
and those that contravene national law, should be revoked by the Minister of 
Home Affairs. In practice, however, this rarely happens. For political reasons, 
the government prefers to turn a blind eye, for fear that political reaction may 
undermine public confidence in the government.
What is needed is major political pressure on the government to take 
such action. Yet the outcome of research undertaken by the Wahid Institute 
(2008) on this phenomenon indicates that civil society lacks strength to pres-
sure politicians and the government to pay more attention to public issues 
such as poverty, justice and corruption, rather than focusing on pseudo-issues 
and satisfying the interests of the few.
Thus, besides the need for reform of Islamic law (An-Na’im, 2007), 
civil society movements need to promote substantial issues based, to borrow 
Na’im’s term, on public reason, in order to realize the substance of Islamic 
values. For some time now, movements like this have been busy working in 
many sectors, and extend to almost all kinds of social groups, including those 
that have always upheld Islamic values in support of democracy and those that 
have more recently taken up this cause in response to social challenges. These 
movements, however tend to be limited in their ability to directly mobilize the 
masses, and by the concentration of power in the hands of the government 
and parliament (Suaedy, 2007).***
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Editor’s note: This is an edited version of the transcript of the discussion on 
the first day, Wednesday, 13 August 2008, among the guest speakers and with 
members of the audience and listeners. The discussion begins with questions put 
by moderator Ihsan Ali-Fauzi.
Ihsan alI-FauzI: Our theme today is “The Road to Democracy in 
Afghanistan, Bangladesh and Indonesia”. We have speakers from each of 
those countries. We will start with the normative and historical antecedents 
of the relationship between Islam and democracy. Then we will be going into 
more detail, into country studies, about what is going on in Afghanistan, 
Bangladesh and Indonesia.
Let me start with Mrs. Siddiqi. Do you think Islam is compatible with 
democracy? Is there any antecedent in Islamic histories that we can use as 
sources to promote democratisation in Muslim countries?
saFIa sIddIqI: It is a great moment for me to be in Indonesia. Together 
not only with the Indonesians, but also other colleagues from outside of 
Indonesia.
The question is: Is Islam compatible with democracy? Yes, certainly. We 
learn from the Qur’an that, for example, education is both for girls and 
boys. There is no gender discrimination here. Now, some Muslims say that 
education is only for boys and not for girls, as I see it pronounced by the 
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Taleban in Afghanistan. That’s Muslims’ problem and not Islam’s. And that’s 
why we have the responsibility to introduce Islam that’s compatible with 
democracy. This is the promotion of democracy in Islam or the promotion of 
Islam in democracy. 
I believe we cannot live without democracy today. I also believe that 
as Muslims we cannot live our lives without our religion as well. For that 
reason, we have to be very realistic about Islam and democracy. For example, 
I could not get here, from Afghanistan to Indonesia, without the freedom of 
movement guaranteed by democracy. It has been a long, long road to get here.
Some conservative and radical Muslims say that women are not allowed 
to leave their countries or their homes without muhrim.1 But nowadays we 
need to be in Bangladesh, Indonesia, Canada, Pakistan, or Saudi Arabia 
to see how other people live their lives and learn from them; to see how 
Muslims all over the world cooperate with each other.
Sometimes we see that there is a gap between what Islam wants Muslims 
to do and what the Muslims are really doing. That is why as scholars and 
teachers we need to educate people. That’s my real concern about Islamic 
radicalism; that wants to limit the freedom of movement of Muslim women.
Ihsan alI-FauzI: Mr. Sobhan, do you agree with that? If that is the case, 
how should we explain the lack of democracy in almost all Muslim majority 
countries in the world today? Can you say more about this, please?
zaFar sobhan: Yes. I agree one hundred percent with everything that Mrs. 
Siddiqi said. And if you look at our situation in Bangladesh, we have tried 
very hard to establish democracy, because most Bangladeshis take Islam very 
seriously and also take democracy very seriously.
I think, if you look at Muslim majority countries, with regard to Islam 
and democracy, a lot of it [has to do with] cultural issues. If you look at the 
Arab world right now, they are struggling with democracy: the issue is that 
they are culturally part of the Arab world. But it has nothing to do with 
being Muslim.
 Ihsan alI-FauzI: So, this is not about religion but about culture, Arab culture?
1 Muhrim, Arabic word, refers to close relative(s) of the opposite sex.
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zaFar sobhan: That is right. If you look at Africa, where there is a fairly even 
split between Christian and Muslim countries, it is not the case that the Islamic 
countries are less democratic and the Christian countries are more democratic. 
But if you look Arab countries, like Lebanon, where there is a very large 
Christian population, you will see there is a great problem with democracy.
I would say that this is cultural issue and not religious one. I think maybe 
the Muslims in South Asia and Southeast Asia can lead the way, and can 
demonstrate the compatibility between democracy and Islam.
Ihsan alI-FauzI: I think, being a journalist, you will be familiar with 
the thesis that Prof. Huntington made about ten years ago, the clash of 
civilisation thesis, which among other things suggested that there was an 
incompatibility between Islam and democracy. Can you say more about that, 
because it is question often discussed here [in Indonesia]?
zaFar sobhan: Absolutely. I disagree with Huntington’s thesis and I think 
the thesis doesn’t really have strong support. There is a book that I would like 
to recommend to all of the listeners here, by Tareq Ali, called The Clash of 
Fundamentalisms. What we have in this world is not a clash of civilisations, 
but a clash between fundamentalists or extremists in one civilisation against 
fundamentalists or extremists in another civilisation.
And what’s more important than the clash of civilisations is, I think, that 
we in fact have a war going on right now within Islam: a war for the soul of 
Islam, between the moderate Muslims and the extremists. Within Christian 
civilisation, they are also having a similar war and struggle. And I think that 
this struggle is much more important, and much more real, than any kind of 
clash between civilisations.
Ihsan alI-FauzI: Let’s now turn to Mr. Suaedy. Mr. Suaedy, I know that you 
have a rich experience in strengthening democracy in Indonesia. Can you 
describe the role that Muslim organisations such as Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) 
play in strengthening Indonesia’s democracy?
ahmad suaedy: The main value of democracy is that the system guarantees 
individual rights. So this system is compatible with Islam because Islam also 
guarantees the creativity and rights of individuals. The question is how to 
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implement democratic rights, and whose responsibility it is to guarantee the 
expression of those rights.
In Indonesia we have many ethnic and religious groups. They have the 
rights to express their opinions and work together in diversity and the spirit 
of pluralism, as it is expressed in Pancasila. We have Islamic organisations 
like NU and Muhammadiyah that support this state ideology. We also 
have many traditional Islamic education institutions, like pesantren (Islamic 
boarding schools), that contribute to strengthening the compatibility of 
Islam and Pancasila. Almost all Muslim groups in Indonesia support the 
pillars of democracy, such as elections. Only one or two small groups reject 
the concept of elections. 
Ihsan alI-FauzI: I know that you’re a close colleague of Mr. Abdurahman 
Wahid, or Gus Dur, our former president. Can you tell more about the role 
that ulama such as Gus Dur have played in strengthening and deepening 
democracy in Indonesia?
 
ahmad suaedy: Yes. In my opinion, the greatest contribution that the ulama 
in Indonesia, like Gus Dur or the late Nurcholish Madjid, have played in 
strengthening Indonesia’s democracy is by providing the Islamic justification 
of our acceptance of Pancasila.2 This goes against other interpretations of 
Islam by Muslim fundamentalist and extremists, who suggest that Pancasila 
is un-Islamic and that Pancasila must be replaced with Islamic sharia.
Ihsan alI-FauzI: Let me come back to Mrs. Siddiqi. When you heard the 
news that Indonesia, the biggest Muslim country in the world, was going 
through a process of democratisation, what was your reaction? Did you 
believe it? Are you happy about it? Are there any lessons that you can take 
from here for the democratisation of Afghanistan, for example? 
saFIa sIddIqI: Well, yes. Mostly I am really jealous of the majority Muslim 
countries that are democratic at the same time.
But here, first of all I would like to thank Asia Calling for broadcasting 
such a good program in Afghanistan. I am one of the listeners in 
2 On Pancasila, see Ihsan Ali-Fauzi’s contribution in this volume.
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Afghanistan, although initially I did not know where the program was 
broadcast from. Fortunately, today I am here in this studio with the 
audience and listeners of Asia Calling. We need broadcasts like this in 
Islamic countries, especially in Afghanistan, to learn about Islam in the other 
countries, to learn about democracy in Islamic countries. Because you know, 
introducing American democracy in Afghanistan is not applicable. Whereas 
introducing an Indonesian-style democracy would be applicable; introducing 
a Pakistani-style democracy would be applicable; introducing a Tunisian-
style democracy in Afghanistan would be applicable, and acceptable to our 
scholars. Because we know that in this country what is democracy is left alone 
and what is Islam is left alone; nobody meddles with Islam as a religion, and 
nobody meddles with democracy as a way of life for everybody in the society. 
For that reason, we need your Islamic scholars to come to Afghanistan to talk 
to the people, to talk to the Islamists, the people who are making trouble 
for the Islamic country of Afghanistan and for the Islamic government of 
Afghanistan. The government of Afghanistan is Islamic and the people in 
Afghanistan are Muslims. They have the right to live in the country in peace 
and security, praticing their religious ways in the Islamic society that we have 
right now. And we believe that we need others who are close to us; even 
people from as far away as Indonesia and the other Islamic countries. They 
should help us as human beings, as Muslim brothers and sisters. We need 
their help. We need their views; we need them to come to Afghanistan, to see 
the way of life of Afghans, and to see how our scholars are introducing Islam. 
I would like to go back to one thing that Mr. Sobhan said: I think 
politics and Islam are two different things, but unfortunately the people who 
are interfering in Afghanistan are mixing them together. For that reason, 
we need people to tell to those who are forcing power over and fighting in 
Afghanistan, that they should separate Islam and politics.
Ihsan alI-FauzI: Let’s hear the Bangladeshi view point. Do you agree that 
South East Asian countries themselves are better ambassadors of democracy 
in South East Asia than George Bush is?
zaFar sobhan: I do agree – although not with the point that George Bush 
is bad at democracy – but beyond that I agree with the point that South 
East Asian countries have to learn a lot from one another. Because we have 
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cultural similarities and historical similarities. And I think we spend too 
much time looking to Europe, looking to North America, when actually 
there are many things that we can learn from our neighbours. That is one 
of the reasons that I am happy to be here in Indonesia, learning from the 
Indonesian experiences, and I am happy to be part of the show Asia Calling, 
which I think puts into action the idea that we should be talking the one 
another. And I think the lessons we can learn [from one another] are 
definitely more applicable; I would agree with that statement. 
Ihsan alI-FauzI: You tend to look to American and European history, is that 
what you meant here?
zaFar sobhan: That is right. We tend to look too much to North America 
and Europe. In fact in Bangladesh, a recent government had an official policy 
look east. We really need to do this, because in Bangladesh we see ourselves 
as South East Asian. So, of course we think about India and Pakistan, but 
we don’t think about the countries on our other side – Myanmar, and just 
beyond that Thailand, and then Malaysia and Indonesia. These countries are 
very close, and there may be many things that we can learn from them; and 
there may be a few things that they can learn from us as well. 
Ihsan alI-FauzI: Mr. Suaedy, I think it would be a good idea if you and 
other people from NU would come and have another, broader, discussion 
about Islam and democracy, with ulama and other people from Afghanistan 
and Pakistan. What do you think about that? 
ahmad suaedy: Although our cultures are different, we can share issues and 
experiences. We may have more than one hundred ethnicities and more than 
ten religions, but we can share and debate not only about the state, but also 
about justice, economic distribution, and so on. And we can also share about 
Indonesia, Bangladesh and Afghanistan.
Ihsan alI-FauzI: Let’s hear what some people from Bangladesh and 
Afghanistan say about the theme that we are discussing today. Some of our 
correspondents asked people in these two countries the same question that 
we are looking at today: Is Islam compatible with democracy? 
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respondent 1: I don’t think it is compatible because in Islam we have what 
we call hudud,3 we have to cut our robbers’ hands off and we have the death 
sentence for murder, and in a democracy, these things are not allowed. 
respondent 2: Are Islam and democracy compatible? Well we have to 
separate them. Islam is democracy in its own shape. Islam guides us in every 
little thing. For example, Islam says that we must not kill an insect. In Islam 
and democracy, even an insect has rights.
respondent 3: Religion is one matter, and using the religion for politics 
is another matter altogether; using religion for political purposes, for party 
politics. What we have done is made people afraid of religion because they 
are unable to read and understand the texts because they do not write and 
read Arabic.
Ihsan alI-FauzI: You are listening to a special Asia Calling talk live. Our 
theme is Islam and democracy in South and South-East Asia. If you are 
listening out there in offices, homes or cars, and want to give us your 
views and opinions about the theme that we are discussing today, please 
send us a text message to 08121188181, or, to the free of charge number 
08001403131. Don’t forget to tell us your name and don’t hesitate to say 
what you think about the theme that we are discussing. So, now let’s go back 
to the speakers. Do you have comments?
saFIa sIddIqI: Yes, I think the first person is an Afghan, and what he said is 
that in Islam the punishment for robbery is having your hand cut off, and in 
a democracy that would not be called for. Yes, Islam calls for that; but on the 
other hand, it is impossible to commit a robbery in front of four witnesses. 
And for that reason, I think this is the way of democracy, because on the 
one hand, people are forbidden from doing something, and on the other, 
the punishment for doing it is spelled out, but there has to be four people 
who testify that it was done in front of them. That’s just not possible. For 
3 Hudud, Arabic word, literally means “limit” or “restriction”. In islamic law or Sharia, hudud 
usually refers to the class of punishments that are fixed for certain crimes that are considered 
to be “claims of God” such as theft or consumption of alcohol.
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that reason, we believe that this is the Islamic way of dealing with people, 
of keeping peace and security in society. But it is also democratic, because 
the demand that a robber’s hands be cut off stops people from committing 
theft; because if they did, they would have no hands and everyone would 
know that he or she is a thief. It’s a deterrent. But for centuries nobody has 
seen that the reason people do not commit robbery is because they are afraid. 
Even if that is no longer applicable because of human rights, they still do 
not do it. But sometimes people are afraid of doing it, because of the people, 
because of the social shame. I have always believed that Islam and democracy 
are compatible.
ahmad suaedy: I think people have individual experiences and collective 
experiences. Democracy is not static; it is a dynamic process. And people 
have dreams, plans, agendas and challenges, too. Indonesia, for example, 
in terms of procedure is completely democratic, but in terms of justice and 
religious freedom, there are serious problems. We still have to deal with 
making democracy more just and free.
zaFar sobhan: On that subject, I think a lot has to do with how Islam 
is interpreted. When people think of Islam, they have a very traditional, 
orthodox, conservative interpretation of Islam. But that is not necessarily 
the case. You can say well, you know Islam says that women must get a 
larger share of inheritances than men. But there are actually many ulama in 
Bangladesh who now say that there is a limit, which is established by law in 
Bangladesh, the inheritance law. This has been a topic of debate for a long 
time. If the inheritance law says that men and women inherit equally, there 
is no problem with this, there is no bar within Islam on equal inheritance 
rights. This is the type of issue which we need to discuss in public, because 
this is a big issue: that there is more than one interpretation of Islam, and 
some can be very liberal, and democratic, interpretations.
Ihsan alI-FauzI: Let’s look at each country in more detail, here. Mrs. 
Siddiqi, you are a major player in Afghanistan, what is the situation for 
women and women’s issues in Afghanistan? 
saFIa sIddIqI: It is a very a difficult question. We all know about the Taliban 
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rule in Afghanistan; and that was six very hard years for the women and girls 
who had previously worked outside their homes. But fortunately, after 9/11, 
the attention of the world was drawn to Afghanistan. One of the good things 
has been [its effect] on the women’s freedom in Afghanistan. I think that one 
of the reasons we as politicians, and Mr. Sobhan as a journalist, are here in 
Indonesia. It is one of the good things to come out of our struggle during 
the time of Taliban rule. 
Ihsan alI-FauzI: Excuse me, are you from a political party?  
saFIa sIddIqI: No. I am not from a political party. I am an independent, 
writer, journalist, and politician of women, for all matters concerning 
women, especially during the time of the Taliban regime, and the struggle. 
I have called for the freedom of women in Afghanistan. I have been 
involved in activities to raise the voice of Afghan women as human beings, 
in Afghanistan and outside of Afghanistan as well. Today, there are women 
working as doctors, as teachers. We have almost six million children going 
to school, and of this number, thirty-five percent are girls. The majority of 
our government employees are women, and most teachers are women, and 
we have women doctors and politicians. We have women busy everywhere 
with all kind activities. I really admire the women who work for the media. 
Especially because, when I ran for parliament, the woman journalist got a 
big picture of a young woman. Women are busy everywhere, but they are 
afraid of tomorrow. Especially in terms of the Taliban movement, in terms 
of the people, or our neighbouring countries who are now interfering our 
country, the people who do not want stability in Afghanistan. I think this is 
one of the things that is really frightening for women. For example, in my 
constituency, every week I go to meet constituents, but the Taliban show up 
on the way and attack people, and they may go to my constituency. Because 
of that, for me as a woman in parliament, travelling from one province to 
another with other women is a problem. And one which we believe will get 
worse in the future.
Ihsan alI-FauzI: So that is true, the news that we have been hearing in the 
last two months that the Taliban is regaining a foothold?
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saFIa sIddIqI: That is true. This is the problem. I have no problem because 
I have the bodyguard and I can go with my family members, but what will 
happen to a young girl if she wants to go to school? What will be happen to 
a woman teacher who is going to teach the children in the school. You know 
this is one of the things, one of the signs of insecurity for women in the 
future. 
I think the other thing that I can say is that the women are competing 
equally in the social and political arenas in Afghanistan. This is one of the 
good things about democracy in Afghanistan, that women have a role both 
in Islam and in democracy. Unfortunately, the situation might not improve.  
Ihsan alI-FauzI: Do you expect the international community do something? 
saFIa sIddIqI: As I mentioned before, the international community can help 
us by sharing information, experiences, expertise, about how we can live in 
Islamic society that is also a democratic society. We believe that in this day 
and age, people cannot live behind curtains, cloths, windows, and closed 
doors. Because the people, they should be interacting with people from 
other parts of the world. And for that reason, the Islamic scholars can help 
us, and we can ask our government, to invite Islamic scholars to come to 
Afghanistan and to negotiate with the people who are fighting in the name 
of Islam and Afghanistan. Because you know today we have and Islamic 
government, we have Muslims ruling the government of Afghanistan. 
We believe that for the last thirty years or so, for three decades, people 
have been trying to force us out – Russia, America, this and that – and this 
is not fair, because we are human beings. They should help us. And other 
Islamic scholars should intervene to show us how we can live as Muslims in 
that part of the world. Why is that all the time the international community, 
from Pakistan, Iran, the Arab Emirates, everybody comes to Afghanistan 
and fights in Afghanistan and kills the Afghan people? Why do they have 
to go there? We are an Islamic country too. We are asking other Islamic 
countries, we are pleading with them, to come to Afghanistan. People from 
neighbouring countries are fighting in Afghanistan. Four days ago, eleven 
Alqaida members were killed in Afghanistan; and of the eleven, four were 
foreigners. The people who are fighting in Afghanistan are not Afghan, 
they are people from other countries. They do it for their own interests in 
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Afghanistan. This is not for Islam, not for the benefit of Islam and the people 
of Afghanistan. We ask the international community and Islamic scholars to 
come to Afghanistan and have a conference to talk about the Islamic world 
and the changes in the lives of Muslims, and about how we can live together 
in a world-wide Islamic society. This is my suggestion to the Islamic countries.
Ihsan alI-FauzI: OK, let’s go back to Mr. Sobhan. We will talk more about 
that later. In Bangladesh the elections will be held this December. Are you 
optimistic about the elections? Are they going to be OK? Are they going to 
be fair? 
zaFar sobhan: I think so. Right now in Bangladesh, for the last two years, 
we have had the military back up the government, and they instituted many 
reforms, which we hope will strengthen democracy, and take democracy 
forward. There is some apprehension among certain people, who fear that 
perhaps the army supporting the government has its own agenda. But last 
week, when we had city council elections, by all accounts, the election was 
very fair; the old political party did very well, the turnout was good, so no 
complaints. The turnout was about 70 to 75 percent, which is very good for 
Bangladesh. Insyaallah we should have a good election in December.
Ihsan alI-FauzI: What about the role of Islamic political parties in 
Bangladesh? Do you think that they are strong?
zaFar sobhan: In Bangladesh, not really. We do have Islamic political 
parties, but they have never won more than between 5 and 10 percent of the 
national vote. I do not anticipate that changing in December; that they will 
do any better than they have done in the past. The truth is that there are two 
mainstream political parties, BNP (Bangladesh National Party) and Wamili, 
and it is not like, if you are a Muslim you must vote for an Islamic party. I 
mean there are Muslims in the other parties as well. You can separate your 
religious beliefs from your political beliefs. So I don’t think in this election 
they will have much more impact [than they have in the past]. But I will say 
that if the political parties ignore the increase in the number poor, ignore 
the increase in the number of marginalised people, and the religious parties 
speak to those constituents, then maybe in the future they will do better and 
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they will become stronger. And I think it is true that political parties speak to 
the people. So far so good – in Bangladesh, since we got our independence 
in 1971, we have reduced poverty to 80 percent, and then down to below 
50 percent. But in the last four years the poverty rate has been rising again. 
The latest reports put the poverty rate at 55 percent. The price of rice is 
very high. This is a very big thing for the average Bangladeshi, which can 
cause a great deal of trouble for some. So, there are working class, rural, and 
agricultural families who are really suffering right now. If the government 
does not address this issue, if the mainstream political parties do not address 
this issue, then someone will step into that void. Likewise with corruption; 
there are a lot of anti-corruption movements against the mainstream political 
parties. If they don’t sort themselves out and if they don’t show to the voting 
public that they have cleaned up their activities, then maybe voters will look 
for a different alternative in the future.
Ihsan alI-FauzI: In Indonesia, we have been dealing with the issue 
of Ahmadiyah over the last five years. I believe this is also an issue in 
Bangladesh. Is that right? 
zaFar sobhan: That is right. We had this issue with the last government. 
They had a lot of extremists. They had a coalition with one of the extremist 
parties, Jamaah Islam, and IOJ (Islami Oikya Jote) is also anti-Ahmadiyah. 
There is a movement to have Ahmadiyah declared non-Muslims. 
Unfortunately, this has not happened and there have been attacks on 
Ahmadiyah mosques and on Ahmadiyah communities, and in 2004, even 
the government banned Ahmadiyah publications. However, you know I 
think there is no popular support for these actions. It is a certain segment of 
the population and certain political parties that are trying to advance their 
own political interests by making this an issue. I think that for the last two 
years we have not seen any anti-Ahmadiyah activities, and I hope that after 
the elections we will continue not to see any. I hope that very much.
Ihsan alI-FauzI: Thank you. We can share the experience of Indonesia later. 
What is the situation of Ahmadiyah in Indonesia today? What should we do? 
ahmad suaedy: This is part of the challenge of democratisation, and I think 
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that the people and groups who are anti-democracy also can join in this 
democracy. For example, I think that groups that perpetrate violent attacks 
on other people or groups, like conservative and fundamentalist groups that 
attack Ahmadiyah, are a part of the democratic situation. The problem is 
how the government handles the situation. It has to handle this situation, 
and this conflict, carefully. For example, there is a political party that has 
an anti-democracy agenda, that is anti religious freedom and anti non-
discrimination. So the people and political parties that promote democracy 
have to meet the challenge of the situation, not only through argumentation 
for the compatibility of Islam and democracy, but also in terms of the 
practicalities of running a democracy and promoting its values so that people 
will vote for the political parties that are pro democracy. 
Ihsan alI-FauzI: Are you suggesting that PKS [Partai Kesejahteran Sejahtera 
– Prosperous Justice Party] poses a threat to Indonesian democracy? Is that 
what you mean?
ahmad suaedy: Yes. I think that PKS is one of the political parties in SBY’s 
[Susilio Bambang Yudhoyono’s] ruling government with a very strong pro 
Islam agenda. Publicly, they have promoted diversity and pluralism. But in 
practice, implementation of their agenda has been anti-religious freedom 
and so on. They have also been behind the implementation of sharia Islam in 
local regulations.
Ihsan alI-FauzI: Let’s talk about that more, the emergence of local sharia-
inspired by-laws, as one of the impacts of democratisation in Indonesia. 
How widespread is this?
ahmad suaedy: It is a combination commitment to religious values and 
anti-America and anti-west sentiment. There are many sharia-inspired 
local district regulations, and they can be divided into several categories. 
Some address common morality issues, like drugs, gambling and so on, but 
based on religious argumentation. Some tend to be discriminatory against 
Muslims, like requiring women have to cover their heads. Care is in order 
in response to this issue. Sometimes they go against democracy, but in other 
cases they address common concerns.
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Ihsan alI-FauzI: Let me ask Mr. Subhan – from your experience as a 
journalist, do you believe having Islamic parties is a threat or a challenge 
to democratisation? Is it better to have Islamic parties that are doing things 
constitutionally, peacefully than having, let’s say, terrorist groups, for 
example. What do you think about that? 
zaFar sobhan: That is the argument that people made in Bangladesh. I 
have to say, I personally do not agree with that. I think it is actually more 
dangerous. Because I saw what happened during the last government when 
Jamaah Islam was a coalition partner. Because they were in the government 
, they were able to give sponsorship and support to radicals, extremists 
and militants, and that is why we see more militancy when they are in the 
government. When they are not in the government, and they are not able to 
sponsor the radicals, we see fewer radical activities. That is our experience in 
Bangladesh. 
Ihsan alI-FauzI: There are some text messages coming in now in response 
to the talkshow. (1) From Buya in Jakarta: May I have some information 
about how well Muslims in Afghanistan and Bangladesh get along with the 
minority groups? (2) From Buya also in Jakarta: What is the understanding 
of the democracy among Muslims in Afghanistan and in Bangladesh? Are 
there any groups that are opposed to the models of democracy applied there? 
(3) from Laila also in Jakarta: The Afghanistan and Bangladesh constitutions 
state that every citizen has the right to freely conduct activities according to 
their religion, Laila, Jakarta.
Let’s begin with Mrs. Siddiqi first.  Your response?
saFIa sIddIqI: I have got only one question: are there some people who are 
against democracy in Afghanistan? Yes. And that is why there is still fight 
going on in Afghanistan, because they say, the reason they are doing it is 
because they are against democracy, opposed to democracy in Afghanistan. 
That is why, they say things like they don’t like women working in offices. 
They don’t like women going to school. They don’t like women being a part 
of society. That is why there is still fighting in Afghanistan. They are against 
democracy in Afghanistan. 
People are arguing that Afghanistan is Islamic country. That it should be 
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purely Islam, Islamic law not any other law, even though our constitution 
very clearly states that the men and women have equal rights, equal 
participation in the law. But unfortunately some people are making different 
rules for some countries, like in Afghanistan. These are the people who are 
against democracy in Afghanistan. 
zaFar sobhan: I’ll take the second one first. Fortunately, in Bangladesh, there 
is very strong support for democracy. The number of people or groups that are 
anti-democracy is very small. So, that is one thing which is good in Bangladesh.
I would like to address the other two text questions. The first is the 
minority situation; how Muslims respond to them. I would say that 
the majority of Muslims have very good relations with our minority 
communities – we have Hindus, we have Christians and Buddhists, and we 
also have tribal communities with their own religions. However, there is a 
small group in the country that is anti the minority communities. And so 
much depends on the government. If the government defends the minority 
communities, then everything is okay. If the government steps back and does 
not take up its role to defend the minority communities, then there may 
be many incidents. I think we saw this from the government [that was in 
power] from 2001 to 2006. They did not defend the minority communities, 
and so things go very difficult for the minorities. Theoretically, everyone has 
equal rights in Bangladesh. It doesn’t matter what your religion is, it doesn’t 
matter what your community is; but for enforcement of those rights, you 
depend upon the government. 
Ihsan alI-FauzI: Any comments from the audience?
asker 1 (yusuFlIh): It is too bad that there is no interpreter. In Afghanistan, 
why is that if a Muslim converts to another religion, the sentence is death? 
There is no freedom in that country. Actually, [freedom of ] belief is a basic 
human right. The Qur’an says lakum dinukum waliyadin. Thank you.
saFIa sIddIqI: I think this is very difficult to answer. Actually, I don’t want 
to answer this question. The only thing that I would like to say is that this is 
true not only in Afghanistan, but everywhere in Islam. The Qur’an states this 
very clearly. But I am so sorry I don’t want to answer this.
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asker 2: My name is Yeni Rosada Damayanti. I am a women’s activist. I 
would like to say something to Mrs. Siddiqi. Actually, in Indonesia there is a 
worrying trend in Islam. When I was a student at university during the 80s, 
no women in my faculty wore a headscarf , and at a gathering like this, you 
might find one or two women wearing headscarves. Twenty years later, in my 
faculty, for example, about sixty women students wear headscarves. This is 
a very fast growing tendency. I don’t know whether to call this Islamisation; 
but in Indonesia, something like that is quiet worrying. Following that 
trend, there is also demand to change our constitution from a secular one 
to an Islamic based one. And they are using that to campaign or to promote 
their ideas. They use the very same arguments that you do: that we should 
not be afraid to make Islam the basis of our constitution or our ideology 
or our state foundation, because Islam is compatible with democracy. That 
is what the promoters of an Islamic state say. Here in Indonesia, we have a 
secular country because the constitution is secular. But there is a growing 
demand that Indonesia should change from a secular country to a theocracy. 
And the reason [they give] is that Islam is compatible with democracy, that 
the kind of democracy that we have in Indonesia is democracy from the 
western perspective, which is actually is not suitable for us in Indonesia. 
Therefore, [they say] we should adopt Islam as our state ideology and we 
should not be afraid because it is compatible with democracy. What do you 
think about this? From the three of you.
zaFar sobhan: It is a difficult question to answer. I think in the context 
of Bangladesh, I would say that while they are compatible, they should be 
separated. So you can be a Muslim and you can be a democrat. But I still 
think that does not mean you should base the entire country on Islamic law, 
Islamic understanding, because in Bangladesh we also have non-Muslims, 
and they are equal as members of society. If it were an Islamic state, I 
don’t see how they could be considered equal. But it is an issue that we are 
discussing and debating in Bangladesh very much as well. 
ahmad suaedy: We have very small anti-democratic groups and they 
struggle to implement their ideas and agendas in the society and state. 
But we also have big people and big political parties that support 
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democratisation. So, it is like fair competition between the pro- and anti-
democracy people and political parties. I think that Muslim scholars have 
to re-interpret Islam, so that Islam is compatible with democracy. Also, the 
government has to guarantee the people freedom of expression, freedom of 
religion, and so on. 
saFIa sIddIqI: About ten years or eleven years ago, I went to Bosnia for a 
conference. There were women for Friday prayers, me and my colleagues. 
When we went there, there were some young girls, also going to Friday 
prayers. When I came out from the mosque, a man asked me who was in 
the mosque. I said there were men and women. Are they young or old? 
I said they were young. Here, in this country [Afghanistan], people fight 
against Muslims going to the mosque to pray. It’s as if we are not proud to 
be Muslims. But we cannot just close our eyes to religion. We believe in our 
religion, and we believe in democracy as well. We live in the 21st century; we 
don’t want, as I said before, just to stay indoors, behind curtains. We will end 
up like Iran. You see women working, and you see women wearing burqah, 
or whatever it’s called. But we should have the right to education, we should 
have the right to work, and we should have the right to be free. Like my 
colleague Najiba, she does not wear a scarf like I do; and I am proud of 
this, I really believe in this. Everybody should have that right, not have it 
forced upon them. But I don’t think women are forced to wear the scarf in 
Indonesia. In Afghanistan, we don’t mind wearing the scarf as long as we 
have the right to education, as long as we have the right to work. If we don’t 
have the right to anything, then it is time to fight for our rights. I think in 
Afghanistan right now, women wearing the scarf is just part of the bargain. 
That’s all I can say. 
asker 3: My name is Ferdi. I would like to ask to Mrs. Siddiqi form 
Afghanistan why the statue of Buddha in Banyam has been destroyed? The 
Silk Road is very famous; it symbolises the melting of cultures. In the past, 
merchants from the Middle East or Arabia going to China and Chinese 
merchants going to Arabia, used the Silk Road without any problems. Why 
is it that these so-called fundamentalists, these so-called radicals, have only 
appeared in the 20th and 21st centuries? 
I would like to add something about Turkey. Turkey is very moderate; 
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they have bars, karaoke, and nightlife. The people are Muslims. Do you 
think Turkey is a good example of a Muslim country. Because they are very 
moderate; not fundamental, and not radical. Fundamentalists will not live in 
Turkey. So, what do you think about that? 
Mr. Suaedy, I’d like to add something about there being no democracy 
for women in Saudi Arabia. If they are not muhrim, they aren’t even allowed 
to get into a taxi. They are not allowed to travel overseas alone. Why is it still 
like that? And why do Arabs want it to be like that? It’s not democratic.
Mr. Sobhan, in your opinion, what is the reason that Islamists have 
become so radical? What is the main factor in the recent emergence of 
radicalism and fundamentalism in the late 20th century and 21st century? 
Do you think it has something to do with Islamic scholars in the western 
countries, because universities in America have departments of Islamic 
studies? 
saFIa sIddIqI: As I said earlier, there is a great difference between Islamic 
democracy and American democracy. In Afghanistan, right now, there is 
a fight against American democracy. In my opinion, there is not a lot of 
difference: democracy is democracy everywhere, whether in Islamic society 
or non-Islamic democracy. It is about respect for the rules and regulations, 
for better lives and more freedom. 
About the Buddha statue in Bamiyan, I think the people of Afghanistan 
are really sorry and sad about what happened, about what was done by the 
enemies of Afghanistan. It was not the Afghans, it was not the politicians of 
Afghanistan, it was not the people who think about Afghanistan as Afghans 
do. It was not the work of Afghans. It was the work of the enemies of 
Afghanistan, the enemies of Afghani society, of Afghani culture, of Afghani 
people, and of the Afghani government. We are very sorry and we are very 
sad about what happened. It will not be repeated again in Afghanistan. 
About Turkey, if you go to Ankara or Istanbul, you will see radicals, 
and you will see Islamist groups in that country, too. But the government 
treats everyone equally, regardless of their way of life. Some Muslims are 
very open and free, and some are very closed and live their own way of life. 
But my hope is that the people of Afghanistan can make their own choice 
about the rights we have. Whatever the people want, that should be the 
way of life in Afghanistan. Because at the moment we are not really free to 
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choose the way of life that we want. And I think not only Turkey, but in 
some other countries as well, they really have democracy, like in Pakistan and 
India. India, our neighbour has a very good way of life, like its neighbour, 
Bangladesh, and like Iran and central Asia. We are very close. We have 
similarities. We share the same cultures. We share the same religion. We 
have the same languages as our neighbouring countries. We don’t have any 
problems. But it is Afghanistan’s strategic location that means it is always the 
centre of problems and trouble. And unfortunately, we really suffer because 
of that. 
ahmad suaedy: I can’t say anything about women in Saudi Arabia, but 
from the Indonesian Islamic perspective, this is anti-democracy. But the 
situation in Saudi Arabia has its own history, and we cannot interfere. Some 
Americans and democracy activists say they have introduced democracy, 
including women’s rights, into a few groups in Saudi Arabia, but only time 
will tell what will happen in Saudi Arabia. Thank you.
zaFar sobhan: Just want to answer the question very quickly. I think that 
in the 20th and 21st centuries, in the southern world, the eastern world, 
whatever you want to call it, there has always been a strong anti-western, 
anti-colonial, anti-imperialist constituency. This is a position that used to be 
voiced by the left, but with the demise of political left in this part the world, 
there is a vacuum, and the only language to fill that vacuum is political 
Islam. So that is why we see have seen the rise of political Islam in the late 
20th century and the 21st century. 
 
asker 4: My name is Umara from the Afghanistan embassy. I am a diplomat. 
Actually I am not asking question and I am not answering the questions. I 
just want to clarify something our brother asked about killing people when 
they change their beliefs and thoughts. In Afghanistan, Muslims make up the 
majority, more than 99 percent; but we have minority religions like Hindus, 
sects, and we have Jews, they live in Afghanistan very peacefully. The practice 
of other religions is free in the constitution, but changing your religion and 
proselytising your religion is not constitutional. But, nobody has yet been 
killed for changing his religion; there has only been one case of a person 
[being condemned to death], and he is now in Italy. 
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The thing I hope our Indonesia brothers ask about, and sympathise with, 
is the hundreds of people, civilian women and children, who in just three 
months were killed. I am waiting for them to ask about that, and to show 
their sympathy; to ask why civilians and Muslims are killed in the name of 
Islam, by both sides. The other point I would like to make is that the statue 
of Buddha was not destroyed by Muslims or by Afghani people. There is a 
political reason for what happened, that has nothing to do with religion or 
any other issue in Afghanistan. As for Turkey, we cannot make democracy in 
Turkey the model for democracy in our country. We should have our own 
models, and make our own choices.
saFIa sIddIqI: Actually, I have not raised the issue of conversion. I don’t 
want to answer that question. This is not my job to do that. The other thing, 
as I said, for model ways of life, I think Afghanistan, should look at other 
Islamic countries, at their cultures and ways of life, such as in Pakistan, Iran, 
Saudi Arabia and Indonesia. Afghanistan has to have the right to make its 
own choice, the one that is best suited to the way of life of the people there. 
This is one thing that I really hope for: that the Afghan people can determine 
their own future.***
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Editor’s note: This is an edited transcript of the discussion on the second 
day, Thursday, 14 August 2008, among the guest speakers and with 
members of the audience and listeners. As on the first day, the discussion 
begins with questions put by moderator Ihsan Ali-Fauzi.
Ihsan alI-FauzI:  We will be talking about Islam and Democracy in South 
Asia, focusing on Islam and the state today. By learning from the experiences 
of Indonesia, Pakistan and India, we will be focusing on whether Islam, with 
its respect for human rights and so on, is a resource for state building or a 
constraint to state building. 
Let me start with Professor Asghar. Let’s talk about something very 
normative. Do you think that there is compatibility between Islam and 
nation state? Is Islam a resource for the nation state, or a constraint?
asghar alI engIneer: When did Islamic theology emerge? It emerged when 
there was no concept of nation state at all. That is why when the caliph 
Umayyah became head of state after the death of the holy Prophet, peace 
be upon Him. At that time, there could be no more than one caliph at a 
time. But then Abbassiyyah challenged and defeated Ummayyah, and took 
over as caliph. Meanwhile, Umayyah founded a state in Spain, so then there 
were two caliphs: Abbassiyyah and Umayyah. Then Islam spread to many 
countries, and many new rules came into existence at that time. So multiple 
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caliphs were accepted, modifying theology once again. Thus, we can see that 
theology is not set in stone. 
But what about the modern state, Islam and nation state? Nation states 
did not come into existence in Asia until the 20th century, because most of 
our countries had been under colonial rule. All deliberated about creating 
nation states. 
Let’s take India as an example. When the question of nation state was 
debated by ulama in India, the great philosopher and poet Ulama Akbar 
argued that India could not be a nation state, because all Muslims must 
unite in one millah or religion. This was the position taken by Akbar. But 
Maulana Husain Madani, a very eminent theologian from India and syekh 
of Darul Uloom Deoband, one of Asia’s most prominent Islamic seminaries, 
countered that there was no conflict between Islam and nation state, citing 
the example of the holy Prophet when He migrated from Mecca to Medina. 
He pointed out that Medina was a pluralist community, made up of Jews, 
Muslims, and idol worshippers. He drew up a covenant known as Mithaq-e 
Madina, the terms of which recognise the state. Jews were free to worship; 
Muslims were free to worship; idol worshippers were free to worship. But if 
Medina was attacked, they had to stand together in its defence. Medina was 
a pluralist state. As well as Muslims, there were several Jewish tribes and idol 
worshipers who had not converted to Islam. We cannot say that this was a 
nation; but it was state, where everyone was free to worship according to his 
religion, and was bound by a covenant. What is a nation state? We are bound 
by one constitution, which is our covenant. The constitution guarantees 
everyone the right to worship according to his religion; we enjoy equal 
rights. This is exactly what the holy Prophet did in Medina: He founded the 
concept of the nation state in Mithaq-e Madina, the Covenant of Medina. 
So there is no contradiction between Islam and nation state. Because so 
many countries came into existence when Islam spread outside Saudi Arabia, 
and so many ethnic groups, with unique cultures, languages, customs and 
traditions, embraced Islam. Out of this, a new theology had to emerge 
because the theology that developed when the only Muslims were Arabs had 
no relevance in these new situations. 
Ihsan alI-FauzI: Which means that it is actually 100% okay to accept the 
ideas and the reality of secularism, of a state based on secularist principles?
asghar alI engIneer: Yes. Even in Medina when the Prophet was alive, 
there was no state as we know it. There was no bureaucracy, no police, no 
military; all of these functions were purely voluntary. When the holy Prophet 
had to fight, he asked “Who wants to fight with me?”. There was no paid 
army, paid bureaucracy, that we could call a state. It was a society where 
voluntary groups coexisted and enjoyed equal rights.
Ihsan alI-FauzI: Mrs. Sarwar. Do you believe that, do you agree with that, 
do you buy Professor Asghar’s argument? 
beena sarwar: I think Professor Asghar, being an engineer, is a very learned 
man. I have learnt a lot from him about history and what he said makes 
complete sense to me. So, I think, unfortunately, the people on this panel will 
agree with each other on this point. But let’s apply what he said to the context 
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of Pakistan, for example. Pakistan is also a very pluralistic society. We have 
many ethnicities, tribes, languages, religions; and within the religions, there 
are the sects, within the languages, there are dialects. It is very diverse society. 
But it seems to be the compulsion of the modern nation state to construct 
an identity. So what is the Pakistani identity? And the only thing that people 
in Pakistan can come up with [as an identity] is Islam. Then again, Islam as 
a religion is followed by many different kinds of people, each with their own 
culture, language, way of living, dress, whatever. So in the process of trying to 
impress this Islamic identity in Pakistan, I think that a lot of damage has been 
done; damage that needs to be undone as soon as possible.
Ihsan alI-FauzI: I believe Pakistan was one of the first religious states ever 
build in the 20th century…
beena sarwar: It was founded on the name of religion, as, I believe, was 
Israel. But I don’t think that a country can have a religion, because religion 
is something that living beings, human beings, people with souls, have. You 
can say a country has Muslim majority population, but how can you say a 
country is Muslim or non-Muslim?
Ihsan alI-FauzI: Are you suggesting that even if you establish a religious 
country, there will still be diversity within that country?
beena sarwar: That’s right. I think that you can’t declare that a country has 
a religion. The reality is that Pakistan is a Muslim majority country. But to 
say that it is an Islamic country is a very strange concept to my mind. I think 
it is a political strategy. It is a way that politicians at that time used to divide 
and rule; to promote their politics. It was unnecessary. When something is 
done in the name of religion, it is very difficult to undo. Rallying people to 
do something in the name of religion, can, as we have seen, end in violence. 
Ihsan alI-FauzI: You said that in the history of Pakistan, damage has been 
done because of that. Can you tell us more about that? 
beena sarwar:  The start of all the bloodshed, was, as you know, the 
partition of India in 1947, which led to the establishment of an independent 
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Pakistan. Between one to two million people were killed, and thousands 
of women were raped, abducted. There was so much bloodshed in the 
name of religion at the time of partition to start with; and then along 
came the religious figures who had opposed the creation of Pakistan on 
the grounds described by Professor Asghar, and said we can have a nation 
state for Muslims. They all said that it was an opportunity, and they came 
to Pakistan and started trying to co-opt the state – which they succeeded in 
doing to some extent – to put pressure on the constituent assembly to adopt 
the objective resolution. The objective resolution stated that Islam would 
be the state religion. But, as I mentioned earlier, this was just a  political 
means of consolidating a new identity, which laid the groundwork for a lot 
more damage in the early fifties, when the religious organizations realized 
that nobody was paying them any attention. So they started attacking the 
Ahmadiyah and there was a lot of bloodshed in Lahore, where many people 
were killed. 
Ihsan alI-FauzI: Let’s go back to Indonesia. What can we learn from the 
Indonesian experience in the context of Islam and nation state? 
rIzal sukma: The tension between Islam and nation state was there even 
before the creation of the Republic of Indonesia. The early forties were a 
time of great debate in Indonesia, too. Fortunately, the debate to a certain 
extent was about the state identity, the basis of the state and how we would 
define the state identity. It was decided that the new state was going to be 
called the Republic of Indonesia, and the founding fathers of Indonesia 
agreed on the five principles of Pancasila.  And I think that even today, the 
majority of Indonesians are quite happy and content with the fact that we 
have this dual identity. That Indonesia can be classified as a Muslim country, 
in the sense that we have a Muslim majority population, but not an Islamic 
state; that the state identity, the basis of the state, has never been defined 
in terms of religion. So, of course, in that kind of population you have all 
different kinds of interpretations, points of view, but the way we tried to 
resolve that tension was to define the Indonesian state not as a secular state 
or theocratic state, but as something different. 
Basically, we define it in terms of a grand philosophy that aims to unite 
this diverse nation and its differences in religion, ethnicity, and background, 
105
into a solid concept of nation state. In reality, we have remained steadfast 
in the face of many challenges. The compatibility of Islam and nation state 
was not an issue during the early years of independence, although the debate 
was re-opened at that time. The question of whether we should define the 
state in terms of religion, whether it should be a theocracy or we should 
continue with our neither secular nor theocratic state, continued during the 
early fifties. But, I believe that at that time, the Indonesian political system 
that was introduced after independence was referred to as liberal democracy, 
parliamentary democracy. In fact, there was no question whatsoever that 
democracy was the political arrangement that all political forces accepted. 
And in fact, if you recall, even when the Islamic parties actually became the 
government of the day, leaders such as Natsir of the Masyumi Party basically 
accepted democracy as the political arrangement by which the country 
would be governed. Of that, there was no question whatsoever; there was no 
debate at that time as to whether democracy and Islam were compatible.
Ihsan alI-FauzI: What is the latest on the debate in Indonesia? Has it been 
resolved?
rIzal sukma: When the process of democratization began in 1998, of course 
some groups tried to re-open the debate. But events during the People’s 
Consultative Assembly sessions in 1998, and again in 2004, clearly suggested 
that the majority would like to see Pancasila continue; would not like to see 
the state defined in terms of religion, but to continue with, and to see, the 
dual identity preserved. Because that is the basis, and also the guarantee, for 
the survival of a pluralistic country like Indonesia, without which Indonesia 
would break down. We have also had to deal with challenges from ethnic 
nationalism, but as far as the role of Islam in that context is concerned, I 
think the majority would prefer that the country not be defined in terms of 
religion.
Ihsan alI-FauzI: Let me come back to Professor Asghar. Do you think this, 
the example of Indonesia, is a good model that other Muslim countries 
could adopt?   
asghar alI engIneer: Each country is unique. We should not say that a 
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country should adopt this model or that model. Each country has each own 
historical situation, political situation and social situation. India is called a 
secular state, a secular democracy; but secularism does not mean atheism as 
it did in the in western context when the West had to fight against Church 
domination. That is why their secularism became atheistic. But we Indians 
did not have to fight any church. I mean, our situation was different, because 
our population has followers of different religions. Even after partition, there 
are a huge number of Muslims in India. We are second only to Indonesia, 
with a hundred forty million Muslims. We have a large number of Muslims, 
but also Christians, Sikhs, Buddhists, Parsees. So we decided to have a 
secular country, a secular nation. And secularism would mean equal respect 
for all religions. That the state has no religion is the most important part of 
our secular concept. The state has no religion, but people are free to follow 
any religion they want, or no religion at all. I mean, even atheism is not a 
sin in India. You can proclaim yourself an atheist and you still can enjoy all 
the rights guaranteed by the constitution; and similarly I can be a Muslim 
and enjoy all the rights, or a Hindu, or a Christian, or whatever. It is a very 
different context in India, which has a unique model of secularism by law. 
Ihsan alI-FauzI: Do you think that the emergence of the BGP [Hindu 
fundamentalist party] in India poses a threat to Indian secularism?
asghar alI engIneer: Yes, you see, unfortunately in every country parties 
emerge that are racist, quite radical, that hate minorities. And in India, 
we have what we call the Hindu dual family. But they don’t represent real 
Hinduism. Real Hinduism is not about violence or hating others. In fact, 
Hindu tradition says that all religions should be respected. And India 
welcomes the Paris, the Jews, the Christians, the Muslims, whatever their 
origin. So, the form of Hinduism represented by the BGP is a very dangerous 
form, which creates hatred between the followers of one religion and those of 
another religion. They represent majoritarianism; they believe that followers 
of the majority religion should dominate. That is their way of looking at 
things. So, the secular process in my country is always fighting against 
communal processes in India represented by this so-called “severance family”.
Ihsan alI-FauzI: What can Indonesia and Pakistan learn from each other? 
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What can you learn from the Indonesian experience? What do you think 
Indonesia has to learn from Pakistan? 
beena sarwar: I think what Indonesia should learn from Pakistan is not 
to mix religion and politics, because you can see how it has really torn our 
country apart and how Muslims are fighting other Muslims within Pakistan. 
And once you start on that road, there is no end. I think what Pakistan can 
learn from Indonesia is that it is possible to reconstruct the national identity 
without having to force religion, or one religion, down everybody’s throat.
Ihsan alI-FauzI: Our correspondent has recorded some people’s opinions 
about the topic we are discussing. 
Comment 1: I think first of all we need to question the concept of 
democracy itself. Because Afghanistan has always said that it is true to 
democracy, that this is a war for democracy and a war against terrorism. And 
why is it always a question of being against Islam? We all know that it is 
because we need to conjure up an enemy to survive; and Islam today was also 
created by this so-called process of democracy. I don’t think that anything is 
compatible with this kind of democracy.
Comment 2: Islam is a complete core of life and a complete religion. We 
can find a solution for everything in Islam. Allah distributed human beings 
in tribes and nations, so they could know each other. No nation or tribe is 
superior. Islam is a threat to all those which do not follow Islam, even if in 
a democracy or nation state. There is no room for other laws in Islam. The 
other laws are made by men, and Islamic laws are made by caliphs.
Comment 3: No religion is compatible with democracy, whether it is 
Christianity or Islam. Second, I strongly feel that the state should be 
separated from religion. Religion should not enter into the public domain.
Comment 4: The holy Prophet Muhammad, peace be upon Him, was 
a democrat who believed in consultation, who believed in promoting 
egalitarian values, and who believed in the equality of opportunity. Islam 
is not a threat. Islam is part of the process that promotes and protects the 
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nation. Islam protects the identity of Muslims. So they are loyal to the 
nation state and they are loyal to the faith; the two are compatible and they 
coexist.
 
Comment 5: I feel very strongly that the government should follow the 
Qur’an when it comes to handling matters of religion. The Qur’an states 
very clearly “laa ikraha fiddiin”, which translates into English as “there is no 
compulsion in religion”. You are not meant to enforce religion. Shariah is 
not meant to be enforced. Fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence) is not meant to be 
enforced. Quranic law is not meant to be enforced. The hadith and sunnah 
just give the details of what it is in the Qur’an.1
Ihsan alI-FauzI: Professor Asghar, I believe that the imam of the Taliban 
said that there was no separation between religion and state, din wa dawlah. 
What does that mean? 
asghar alI engIneer: The concept of religion and politics going together in 
Islam came into being because of the unique situation of Islam at that time. 
Because before Islam there was no state in Mecca, there was no government 
in Mecca; no kind of government, neither in Mecca nor in Medina. It was 
just a tribal society. But then Islam emerged and the Prophet, peace be upon 
Him, headed our organization, which became a state. And then the successor 
of the Prophet was both a head of religion and a head of state. That is how 
our doctrine that come into existence. You won’t find it in the Qur’an, you 
won’t find it in hadith. I mean it is purely a product of a historical situation. 
So we should not call it Islamic doctrine. I am not in favour of that.
Ihsan alI-FauzI: Mr. Rizal Sukma, do you think that radical Islamic 
organisations are a threat to Indonesian democracy?
rIzal sukma: I am not saying that the consolidation of democracy in 
Indonesia is guaranteed. We started this process just over ten years ago, 
1 Hadith, Arabic word, refers to oral traditions relating to the words and deeds of the Prophet 
Muhammad.  Sunnah, Arabic word, refers to the sayings and living habis of the Prophet 
Muhammad.
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and of course there are still a lot of challenges. I need not stress that these 
challenges, or threats, if you like, come not only from so-called Islamist 
groups. Threats also come from within the democratic movement itself, 
which in many cases have nothing at all to do with religion, but are to 
do with things like democratic behaviour; the behaviour of civil servants; 
communal violence; the inability of the government to deliver the promise 
of economic prosperity; and the absence of justice, especially legal justice. 
So, while there are threats from so-called radical Islamic groups, we need 
to understand these threats within the broader context of the political 
challenges and threats and economic threats I mentioned. The inability 
of the current state to deliver economic prosperity, and to guarantee legal 
justice and social justice, has actually provided a space for these radical 
groups to mount a challenge against the current political arrangement, 
against democracy. 
But in my view, despite these challenges, and even when these groups use 
violence and justify the use of violence in the name of Islam, they are still 
more of a nuisance than a serious threat, because the state is reluctant to rise 
to these kinds of challenges to democracy in Indonesia. In fact, even when 
violence is used, not only by radical Muslim groups, but by other groups 
in Indonesia, the state invariably fails in its function as law enforcer. The 
state needs to perform this function effectively in order to stop this kind of 
violence. 
The real challenge is how to demonstrate the effectiveness of the current 
political arrangement, the current political system, to the wider public in 
Indonesia, so that people do not need to go looking for alternatives, such as 
those promised by some radical Islamic groups. But, so far, I think the ability 
of Indonesian society to withstand the challenges that come from groups 
that use or abuse or misuse Islam for their own ends, is actually quite good. 
First, as I mentioned earlier, there has been no real debate as to whether 
democracy is compatible with Islam. We have just practiced democracy from 
the time we established this new nation in 1945. Even the Muslim parties at 
that time practiced democracy, and in fact called it liberal democracy. And 
it was when the Muslim parties were in power that progress, real progress in 
democracy, was made in the first decade of independence. 
Second, since 1998, many key Muslim leaders have been at the forefront, 
advocating and pushing for the democratization of Indonesia. These leaders 
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are from two largest Muslim organisations in Indonesia, as well as other 
Muslim organizations. I think we also need to understand that the rise of the 
Islamic parties in Indonesia actually owes much to the space created by the 
process of democratization. Everyone, including Islamic radical groups, are 
stakeholders in democracy, so it is in their interest to preserve democracy, 
otherwise they would not be able to participate in the democratic process. 
In reality, in the 1999 and 2004 general elections in Indonesia, the 
Islamic parties – by Islamic parties I mean those that declare that their 
parties are based on Islam – won no more than 18 percent of the vote. And 
if you include political parties that target Muslim constituents but are based 
on Pancasila, like PAN or PKB, the total vote was less than 32 percent. So, 
in that context, when it comes to the political preference of Indonesians, 
I think the majority will continue to vote for parties that do not have a 
particular religious identity.
beena sarwar: If you look at the democratic process in Pakistan, up until 
the 2002 elections, the Islamic parties never won more than 3 to 4 percent 
of the total vote. People say, yes we are Muslim, but they vote for parties that 
are not based on religion. In the 2002 election, they managed to secure 10 
percent of the vote. But that was only because several Islamic parties joined 
together to form one party, and also because of the sympathy factor, due 
directly to the US intervention in Afghanistan that led to scores of refugees 
flooding into Pakistan and scores of people being killed. There was sympathy 
for parties that voiced anti-imperialism, anti-capitalism rhetoric. As Mr. 
Sobhan pointed out yesterday, the anti-capitalism agenda that was once the 
platform of the political left has now been taken up by the Islamic right. 
But even so, in the February 2008 election, people demonstrated that even 
if they declared themselves Muslims, they would not necessarily vote for a 
religious based party. 
Ihsan alI-FauzI: What is the current state of play between radical groups 
and Muslim groups in Pakistan?
Beena Sarwar: It is difficult say because many Muslims are members of 
groups, but these groups are not overtly based on religion. But the radical 
groups have now been infiltrated by so many foreigners, people from all over 
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the world; and that is true of the radical groups in the north-west belt that 
are supporting attacks into Afghanistan and Pakistan. I think that this is a 
major threat to Pakistan, and I think that we in Pakistan have suffered the 
most from the presence of these radical, militant Islamic groups. 
An important point that I want to add here is that the main issue is law 
enforcement. The government tends to be very lenient towards these groups, 
towards their followers, when they break the law; for example, when they 
do ‘fundamentalist’ things like blacking out the faces of women on public 
billboards, burning CD shops, burning down cinemas. These kinds of crime 
are dealt with very leniently – people are never punished for them – so 
things just get worse. 
Ihsan alI-FauzI: We hear that madrasa are being used to train terrorist 
Muslims. Is that true?
beena sarwar: I think Professor Asghar will be able to tell us more about 
that. But traditionally, madrasa are places of learning, they are schools. 
After the 1979 Russian invasion of Afghanistan, and the US involvement 
in Pakistan and support for Zia al-Haq, the then Pakistan military dictator, 
madrasa were used to train fighting forces for the war in Afghanistan. 
That is when militancy in the madrasa started; it was something that the 
governments of Pakistan, America, Saudi Arabia, and countries like that 
founded themselves, to train the Afghan jihad. 
asghar alI engIneer: Madrasa are by no means training grounds for 
terrorists. That is a very unfair accusation. Madrasa were great centres of 
learning throughout Middle Ages, and are in modern times too. And what 
Mrs. Sarwar said is absolutely true. It is CIA (?)who used madrasa to train 
students from Pakistan and then turned against them. They started saying 
that madrasa were training grounds for terrorism. In India, this allegation 
is frequently made. Even the home minister has declared that madrasa 
are training grounds for terrorists. These are political statements used by 
politicians for their own agendas. As far as India is concerned, I assure you 
that there are no madrasa that are training grounds for terrorists. And you 
will note that terrorists are not usually mullah, they are not the students 
of madrasa. They are highly educated people; technology and software 
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engineers, doctors. These kinds of people are training to be terrorists because 
they are angry young people, and they are more concerned because they are 
educated. Madrasa are not concerned with raising political consciousness. 
These are modern, educated people. They are more educated, they are more 
aware, they understand the technology of bomb-making and whatnot. 
But let me make one thing absolutely clear here: there is no justification 
for violence as far as Islam is concerned. I mean you are not allowed to kill 
innocent people under any circumstances, even in the event of war. Detailed 
rules are laid down in sharia which state that non-combatants must not be 
killed; women, children, old people and those who are not participating 
in war must not be killed. It is very clear. And terrorists kill only innocent 
people who are doing shopping, who are going to schools. These are the 
people who are killed. 
Ihsan alI-FauzI: Let me go back to Rizal. Can you tell us about the 
international connection between terrorists groups in Indonesia and terrorist 
groups outside Indonesia? For example, it was reported in the news that the 
Bali bombers had connections with the Afghan jihad. What should be the 
response to this?
rIzal sukma: Actually, I don’t know much about this. But news reports at 
the weekend did say that some of the terrorists were so-called veterans of 
the Afghan war. But the extent to which this terrorist group in Indonesia 
maintains organisational links with terrorist groups in other countries is still 
open to debate. There are, of course, what we call inspirational or ideological 
links; but as to whether they are pursuing a wholly homespun agenda or 
being influenced by  global forces – the extent to which they are a proxy for 
the global terrorist agenda – is still open to debate. Inspirational or ideological 
links can always be established, especially during, or within the context of, the 
resurgence of terrorist ideology, which basically justifies the use of violence to 
achieve certain political aims, and exploits the pride of Muslims all over the 
world, especially in Palestine, but also in other parts of the world.
Again, I tend to think that the Indonesian approach, which relies not 
only on the use of law enforcement and law enforcement agencies, but 
also on the greater participation and involvement of Muslim based civil 
society, is the best response to this problem. I think so far, Indonesia could 
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be described as an achiever in terms of our counter-terrorism operations. 
Nevertheless, we must also acknowledge that we have to produce even better 
results in order to contain and combat the threat of terrorism.
Ihsan alI-FauzI: Mrs. Sarwar, can you tell us about the current position of 
women in Pakistan? And also about Musharraf ’s position in Pakistan today? 
beena sarwar: Both are very important, multi-dimensional issues, and 
there is no one-line answer for either. But very briefly, women in Pakistan 
have made many advances over the last few years, and are now active in 
all professions – women are working in journalism and the media, and as 
commercial airline pilots, nurses and surgeons, even as motorbike-riding 
traffic police in Lahore. But at the same time, Pakistan is still a deeply 
traditional country, and the socio-economic and political changes that have 
taken place over the last few years threaten the way life, the status quo. And 
because of that, there is also a lot of violence against women, particularly in 
more traditional, rural settings when women assert themselves, give voice to 
their aspirations. That is just a very quick look at two sides of the problem. 
As for Musharraf, I think that if he were wise, he would have stepped 
down by now. He said that when the people no longer supported the parties 
that supported him, he would leave. But he didn’t. In the 2000 election, the 
parties that supported him had no standing, no credibility. Yet there he is, 
sitting there talking about the impeachment motion. His being in power is 
the source of great instability in Pakistan. I also think that joining America 
in its ‘war on terror’, instead of dealing with our own war, has brought 
more damage to Pakistan than to any other country. We have suffered the 
consequences of suicide bombings all over the country, but rather than 
dealing with our war, he chose to join America in its war. And because he 
has no political credibility, no political backing; he is a military dictator; in 
power thanks to the backing of the army, not by the vote of the people.
Ihsan alI-FauzI:  Is the army backing Musharraf?
beena sarwar: Right now, the army is staying neutral. But the fact that 
Washington has been backing Musharraf is one of the reasons that he is 
still in power. And Washington is only now starting to acknowledge that 
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Musharraf is not the only Pakistani who is opposed to terrorism. We all are 
against terrorism, and a politically elected government would be able to rally 
the people in that fight, so that it is seen not as an American war, but as 
Pakistani war.
Ihsan alI-FauzI: There are some text messages coming in now in response 
to the talkshow. (1) From Nuri in Jakarta: Is it true that Islamic nations are 
not successful? (2) From Akbar, also in Jakarta: Many people equate Islam 
with violence and terrorism especially after 9/11. How to counter such 
understanding? (3) From Melda, also in Jakarta: How can democracy and 
pluralism be implemented in an Islamic government system?
Mr. Rizal Sukma, would you please answer the question about Islam and 
terrorism, extremism and violence? 
rIzal sukma: In terms of counter terrorism, everybody understand that the 
threat has two dimensions. First, of course, there are the law enforcement 
and counter terrorism procedures or operations undertaken by the police 
force. The second dimension is acknowledging that this terrorism is linked 
to the use, the abuse and misuse of Islam. This needs to be addressed, and 
I think the best way to address is that the Muslim community itself should 
show that it is angry that the teachings of Islam are being misused and 
abused. By the Muslim community, I mean Muslim organizations, Muslim 
civil society, and all other elements of society, particularly Muslim thinkers, 
leaders, and so on. Another part of this second dimension is that the state, 
especially in a country like Indonesia where Muslims are the majority, should 
be very sensitive and understand the context in which counter terrorism 
measures need to be taken. The idea that city leaders, mayors, are political 
instruments to be used to corner and to marginalize Islamic forces really 
needs to be avoided. The state used this technique in the past, particularly 
during the New Order period. But because its real purpose was to sideline 
Islam as legitimate political force, suspicion of this method still runs high 
within certain groups in Indonesia. On the other hand, measures by the 
book, taken by the police force, have met with some success. So far, counter 
terrorism measures carried out by the police force has not been perceived as 
deliberate political attempts to marginalize political aspirations within the 
process of democratization. 
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Ihsan alI-FauzI: Professor Asghar, I think the first text message is suggesting 
that pluralism cannot be expected to flourish in an Islamic state. Do you agree? 
asghar alI engIneer: There are different interpretations of Islam. That 
might be one. In fact, pluralism has been accepted by many scholars of 
Islam. Again, using India as an example, the ulama there accept pluralism, 
they accept secular democracy. Jamiat Ulama Hindu has always been with 
the Indian national congress and they were in the frontline of the opposition 
against partition. As I said, Maulana Husein Ahmad Madani challenged 
the position of the ulama on Islam and nation state. There are different 
views, but I for one strongly believe that Islam is not at all incompatible 
with pluralism. Islam accepts pluralism because there is a verse in the 
Qur’an which says if Allah had wanted to, He would have created only one 
community, one religious community, one ummah; but He chose to create 
many. Why? He gave us the challenge of living in peace with all others, 
saying: Do not challenge each other’s religions. Do not challenge each 
other’s beliefs. But extol each other in good faith. If we do that, we will live 
in paradise. But instead, we use religion deliberately to promote our own 
politics, our own political agenda, and that is our downfall. 
Ihsan alI-FauzI: Sarwar, why are Islamic countries not successful?
beena sarwar: Well, as I said before, a country does not have a religion; 
a country cannot be Islamic. But if we look at Muslim majority countries, 
many are located in areas that have strong tribal traditions or in areas that 
have despots as rulers. And if we look at global politics, we can see how 
western powers have supported those despots and those kings, those military 
rulers, and not allowed any kind of progressive political movement to 
take place. We have seen this in Iran and Pakistan, and in other countries. 
Also note that there are many non-Muslim majority countries that are not 
democratic. So, this is a red herring thrown in to confuse the real issue of 
socio-economic-political power and democratic processes. 
Ihsan alI-FauzI: Any comments from the audience?
asker 1: My name is Andy Budiman. My question is for Sarwar. Ahmadiyah 
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has become a big issue here in Indonesia. Some conservative groups are 
putting pressure on the government to ban Ahmadiyah. I want you to 
share your experience, your country’s experience. What happened when the 
government officially banned Ahmadiyah?
beena sarwar: I’ll just answer that quickly. Look at what happens when 
a government legislates in the name of religion, whether it is to outlaw a 
community or to introduce laws like the blasphemy law in Pakistan, or 
other laws legislated in the name of religion, regulating, for example, rape 
and adultery. All of these laws introduced in Pakistan have led to great 
injustice, bloodshed, violence and loss of life. And I think that Indonesia 
should learn from these lessons. Because when something is not laid down 
in black and white, when there is no law that says how a particular crime 
should be viewed, that allows society to deal with it in a more flexible way. 
But if the law says when you do this, the punishment is this, it leaves no 
room for a grey area, and it leaves the door open for corruption and abuse 
of the law. Take the blasphemy law for example. If a non-Muslim is getting 
married and they send out invitations with the words bismillah al-rahman 
al-rahim2 at the top, they can be arrested. They can be tried for blasphemy. 
If they are convicted, they face years in jail. And their fellow prisoners 
might attack them, or something like that. Sometimes the real motive 
behind such accusations is economic rivalry. I have been part of several fact-
finding missions in Pakistan with the Pakistan Human Rights Commission, 
and wherever people have been accused of blasphemy, of apostasy or 
turning their backs on the Qur’an and the Prophet, peace be upon Him, 
or something like that, in many cases the motive is economic rivalry. 
Shopkeepers accusing neighbouring shopkeepers of blasphemy. And in many 
cases, the accused are Christian or non-Muslim; but lately, increasingly also 
Muslim. And this has opened the flood gates. Look at Pakistan for a good 
example of why you should not legislate in the name of religion; of why you 
should not mix religion and politics.
2 Bismillah al-rahman al-rahim, Arabic phrase, means “In the Name of God, Most Gracious, 
Most Merciful.”  The phrase constitutes the first of every “sura” (chapter) of the Qur’an (except 
for the ninth sura).  The phrase is used in a number of contexts by Muslims, such as when they 
start doing something.
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Ihsan alI-FauzI: Another question. Some Muslims in Indonesia say that 
they [the Ahmadiyah] are insulting Islam. How should we respond to this 
argument?
beena sarwar: I think you should tell them their faith is weak. That they 
are the ones misrepresenting Islam. You should say, if your faith is so weak, 
you really need to clean up your act. Do not blame other people. They are a 
proselytizing community. They go around, inviting people to find Islam. But 
I think the answer is to educate people. So that people themselves are strong. 
Let people preach what they want to preach. Your faith should not be so 
weak that is a threat to you. I think that basically it is about insecurity. And 
also it is used as a political tool. Every time a government starts getting weak, 
there is always somebody who comes along and claims that so and so has 
offended Islam, and that so and so has insulted the Qur’an and things like 
that. This is just a ploy to distract people’s attention from other problems. 
Economic problems, social injustice, political problems get sidelined, are 
marginalised.
Ihsan alI-FauzI: Mr. Rizal, do you think that the Indonesian government 
is firm enough in guaranteeing the Ahamadiyah’s right to the freedom of 
religious expression? 
rIzal sukma: Yes I think, like many other groups in this country, the 
state is also unsure about how to deal with this problem. You pointed out 
exactly the core dilemma of this issue. On the one hand, people accuse the 
Ahmadiyah of so-called blasphemy, of deviating from the mainstream core 
teachings of Islam. But on the other hand, there is the debate about the role 
of the state to guarantee space for differences. But then again, you also have 
to look at the context of the kind of space for differences that can be allowed. 
In particular, you need to consider the context in which that struggle for 
the space for differences in Indonesia takes place. So, in that context I really 
understand the difficulty that the government is facing. Whether they should 
actually ban groups accused of deviating from the so-called mainstream, 
or continue to guarantee their existence. The bottom line, with regard to 
Muhammadiyah’s position on this issue, is that violence should not be used 
to resolve this issue. I think that Muhammadiyah’s position on this issue is 
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quite clear on that point. In fact, if I am not mistaken, Muhammadiyah has 
not officially voted in favour of a ban on Ahmadiyah. There are some within 
the Muhammadiyah organisation that want the Ahmadiyah to be banned, 
but then again, it would be against the nature of an organisation with thirty-
five million followers to enforce one particular point of view. 
beena sarwar: I think it would be a big mistake if an organisation like 
Muhammadiyah were to take that line. 
asker 2: Yesterday during a discussion with a Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia 
(HTI)3 activist, he argued that the Qur’an says that Islam and democracy 
are incompatible. This verse he quoted is from Surat al-Ma’idah that says, 
“Don’t accept Jews as our leaders”. Do you think that this verse is doctrine 
supporting the incompatibility of democracy and Islam? Husni, Paramadina.
   
asghar alI engIneer: What the Qur’an says is in a historical context. There 
was some conflict between Jews and Muslims, Christians and Muslims. And 
in that context, the Qur’an says do not follow them. But it is not doctrine. 
On the contrary, as far as doctrine is concerned, the Qur’an says that they 
[Jews and Christians] are ahlul kitab, people of the book. Respect them. 
Respect the book. Respect the Bible. Respect the Torah. That is what the 
Qur’an says. Clearly, you should not quote Quranic verses out of context just 
to prove a point. This would not be honest to the Qur’an. It is very wrong. 
We should understand the Qur’an in totality, not in pieces.
asker 3: I am a student majoring in international relations. In the past two 
decades, the effects of globalisation have accelerated and been accentuated in 
Indonesia. My question is, how should Muslims respond to globalization and 
modernization, based on the Pakistan, India and Indonesian perspectives?
rIzal sukma: The challenges of globalisation are not specific to Muslims, 
3 Arabic phrase refers to the Indonesian chapter of the party of liberation. Hizbut Tahrir is an 
international pas-Islamist, Sunni political party whose goal is to combine all Muslim countries 
in a unitary Islamic state or caliphate, ruled by Islamic law and with a caliph head of state 
elected by Muslims.
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and they do not really require an Islamic response. I think all groups, the 
world over, are faced with exactly the same kind of challenges. The process 
of globalisation challenges their identities, and the problem facing all groups 
is how they will fit into the new world structure, but at the same time 
retain their identity. Globalisation is like a double-edged sword; it brings 
with it both opportunities and problems, which of course have to be dealt 
with. It really a process that gives rise to many contradictions. On the one 
hand, globalisation is an integrating force, bringing groups, nations and 
forces closer together; but at the same time, there needs to be space for 
disintegrated forces. The rise of nationalism, the rise of political sovereign 
identity, where people and groups challenge the identities of other groups. So 
in that context, in general terms, I think it is important for groups, societies, 
and nations to cooperate, that there needs to be cooperation among different 
groups, to identify how globalization can bring economic prosperity, better 
access to technology, and so on. But at the same time, you also need to 
identify the negative impacts of globalisation that need to be addressed. 
asker 4: I am a women’s activist from PBHI Jakarta. My name is Yeni Rosa 
Damayanti. I am a Muslim. I am not being paranoid, but I think you are 
playing down the threat of Islamic political power, especially in Indonesia, 
because I don’t really know anything about the situation in India and 
Pakistan. It is not the radical groups I am afraid of; it is the formal political 
parties that say democracy is compatible with Islam, but that we need not 
adopt western democracy; that we should adopt so-called Islamic democracy 
and turn Indonesia into an Islamic state, because we should not be afraid 
of Islam. The reason that I think Rizal Sukma plays down the power of the 
political parties is because PKS, the most popular Islamic political party in 
Indonesia, campaigns using the language of democracy, but is actually using 
the democratic mechanism to win their struggle. I for one take no notice of 
what they say, because the PKS charter clearly says that they want an Islamic 
state. Take the regional elections for example: PKS won seats in provinces 
and districts all over Indonesia, including North Sumatra, West Java and 
Jakarta. Twenty major parties, including giants PDIP and Golkar, against 
one small PKS. And those twenty parties almost lost. So I am afraid that in 
2014, PKS will gain more than 50 percent of the seats in parliament, and 
then they will have the right to change our constitution and impose Islamic 
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law in Indonesia. I think you are playing down the threat.
asghar alI engIneer: She also raises again the question of whether Islam 
and democracy are compatible. The question is why should we adopt 
‘western democracy’? Why not ‘Islamic democracy’? But the phrase ‘western 
democracy’ does not refer to any religion. It is not Christian democracy. 
So asking why western democracy, why not Islamic democracy, to my 
mind is a non question. In my opinion, there is no such thing as ‘Islamic 
democracy’ because democracy cannot be Christian, Islamic, Jewish, or any 
other religion. Democracy is democracy. Democracy is a system of election. 
It is simply a system of election by the people. How can it be Islamic or 
Christian or Jewish? If the state had a religion, who would define it? Whose 
interpretation would be followed? You can call it an Islamic democracy, but 
there are so many sects in Islam. Who will control that? And then there will 
be power struggles between the different sects of Islam, and to win power 
they will become more and more radical, more and more violent. So that 
is why democracy must not be hijacked by religion. Democracy has to be 
neutral to all religions. I will be a much better Muslim if I follow Islam 
voluntarily than if the state compels me to follow my religion or the state 
recognized religion. I would not be a genuine follower of religion. I would 
be doing it not out of consciousness, but out of fear, and I would have to 
suppress my real feelings. So never mix religion and politics. Religion is 
genuine only when your follow it out of consciousness, not out of fear. 
beena sarwar: I think Yeni again raised an important point that Professor 
Asghar has pretty much covered. But in the Pakistan experience, I can 
say that although the Islamic parties are gaining ground, when you allow 
them to participate in the democratic process, when they participate in the 
democratic process, the people themselves will vote them out. That is what 
has happened in Pakistan.***
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PART 4  CONCLusION
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Learning from Each Other 
in Asia
Some Conclusions
Ihsan alI-FauzI
This book came out of an episode of Asia Calling on Radio 68H, aired live 
in Jakarta with four guests from India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Afghanistan, 
along with two host speakers from Indonesia. Over two days, as well as having 
discussions on papers from each of the countries and presentations from the 
speakers, this live radio show also featured recorded and live commentary from 
others. All this made up the main content of this book.
So, what can Muslims in South and South East Asia learn from each 
other? Lots of things. But here I will focus on four main, inter-related themes: 
(1) Islam and the state, (2) democracy and political participation, (3) Islamic 
radicalism and terrorism, and (4) violence against women.
Before looking at these four topics, it is important to remember that 
each Muslim community in Asia has its own historical context and contempo-
rary society, as discussed in the introduction. This should make us realise that 
just copying the experiences of other countries is not a good idea. But empha-
sising the differences and trivialising the similarities is not a wise idea, either. 
How often we are told that we should learn from industrialised countries (the 
West), as if there were nothing we could learn from each other as Muslims in 
Asia! So, we must be dynamic and learn from each other, while taking into 
account our similarities and differences.
Islam and State: Protecting Pluralism
Today, Muslim communities in Southeast and South Asia are spread 
across borders. That is one of their similarities, and one of their differences. They 
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are part of the same faith, the Muslim faith; but they are citizens of different 
countries (India, Pakistan, Indonesia, Bangladesh, Afghanistan, and so on).
As well as being part of a faith and a country, they are actually also 
part of a smaller group: an ethnic group. In Indonesia, for example, as well 
as having a religious identity (Muslim) and a nationality (Indonesian), an In-
donesian Muslim may also be of Javanese, Sundanese, Acehnese, Makasarese 
or other ethnic origin. In addition, from the religious viewpoint, even smaller 
groups exist: some may be from a particular sect within Islam, following a 
particular theology, law (fiqh), denomination, and so on. In Pakistan, as well 
as being Muslim and Pakistani, a person may also be of Pushtun ethnic origin 
or a Syi’ah or Ahmadiyah Muslim, for example.
This means that every Muslim-- indeed, every human being--has mul-
tiple identities. They are not just a part of a particular religion or a citizen of 
a particular country, but also of a particular ethnicity or religious denomina-
tion. All of this opens up the possibility of violent conflict, if these differences 
are not dealt with peacefully and fairly. On the contrary, if managed properly, 
towards building a sense of human justice and solidarity, these multiple iden-
tities can strengthen and enrich each other. 
In the 20th century, the nation state is the strongest institution that is 
generally accepted as the instrument to manage these differences. And that 
has been the case in South and Southeast Asia since the end of colonialism in 
the mid-20th century. Although some Muslim scholars and political activists, 
such as  Abu al-A`la al-Mawdudi on the Indo-Pakistan sub-continent, op-
posed nationalism, arguing that it was not compatible with Islam, the nation 
state as a polity was ultimately, and inevitably, accepted as the instrument for 
uniting peoples.
The question is: to what extent can the ideology underlying this pol-
ity, the nation state, uphold the plurality that exists within the polity? Here, 
Indonesia and India differ significantly from Pakistan; and it is from here that 
important lessons can be learned.
In his paper, Mr. Asghar Ali Engineer emphasises that India is a nation 
that was formed on the basis of the acceptance of the religious plurality of its 
society. Although the majority of the Indian population is Hindu, when it was 
established in 1947, following the partition from Pakistan towards the end 
of British colonialism (see below), it was not established as a Hindu nation, 
but as nation that fully embraced the principles of secularism. Here, secular-
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ism does not refer to a state administration that hates religion, but one that is 
neutral to religious issues.
It is important to note that the construction of this secular state had 
the full support of Muslim leaders who rejected the two nation theory that 
forms the basis of the Pakistani Islamic state.  “The two nation theory was 
completely rejected by the Ulama belonging to Jami’at-ul-Ulama-i-Hind, and 
its leader Maulana Husain Ahmad Madani argued that Islam does not believe 
in separate nationhood, and that both Hindus and Muslims share the same 
nationality. They also found the concept of secular democracy as being in 
conformity with Islamic teaching,” writes Mr. Engineer.
Was this decision wrong and one to regret? Mr. Engineer believes that 
internationally respected Indian Muslim theology has a very clear answer: No. 
The experience of Muslims in India shows that benefits of secularism have been 
many. Although many in number (140 million, the second largest Muslim 
population in the world, after Indonesia), Muslims are in a minority in India; 
yet the constitution guarantees them the legal right to pursue their own inter-
ests, which includes adhering to certain Islamic laws that apply to their sect.
This sweet experience, although not without serious trials and obsta-
cles, which we will discuss later, was quite the opposite of that of Pakistan, 
a state based on Islam as its ideology. The history of Pakistan ever since its 
establishment has been marked, among others, by unending political violence 
and discrimination of minorities. As Ms. Beena Sarwar, journalist and film 
maker from Pakistan, points out: The two-nation theory ignored the reality 
of overlapping, multinational, multi-faith and multilingual communities.  At-
tempting to develop a homogenous national identity ... successive Pakistani 
governments focused on Islam as the unifying factor.  They also continued the 
authoritarian and colonist policies of the British, resulting in religious, ethnic 
or linguistic groups feeling excluded and discriminated against.” Ms. Sarwar 
also emphasises that the many interpretations of Islam, as noted above, make 
it impossible for a state to be founded on Islam: “The many interpretations 
of Islam also led after a point to religion being not a unifying but a divisive 
force. Islam cannot be an exclusive component of state nationalism because 
Pakistanis do differentiate themselves from the Muslims of other countries – 
Indonesian, Afghan, Iranian, Bangladeshi, or even Indian Muslims.”
The experience of Pakistan demonstrates that rather than being the 
panacea promised by the likes of the Muslim elite that supported the separa-
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tion of Pakistan from India (now being echoed the world over, in slogans like 
“Islam is the solution”), establishment of an Islamic state is in fact the root of 
many social and political diseases. Ms. Sawar bitterly points out how frequent-
ly politicians use Islam for their own political ends. Even by socialist leaders 
known for their secular leanings, such as Zulfikar Ali Bhutto.  “Even Bhutto 
tried to salvage political power by trying to appease the religious elements 
who had taken over the political opposition.  He got Parliament to declare the 
Ahmedis as non-Muslims, made Friday the weekly holiday, banned alcohol 
and gambling, and espoused a pan-Islamic vision (he held the second Islamic 
Summit in Lahore in 1974 and initiated Pakistan’s nuclear weapons – “Islamic 
bomb” – program).” 
In addition to the political violence and discrimination against minori-
ties in Pakistan, the failure of Islam as a unifying umbrella was also indicated 
by the separation and establishment of former East Pakistan as the independ-
ent state of Bangladesh, in 1971. Here, Islam failed to be a unifying factor, 
even though the majority of the Bangladeshi population is Muslim. Unfortu-
nately, as Bangladeshi journalist Zafar Sobhan points out in his paper, recent 
political developments in Bangladesh have shown a strong tendency towards 
calls for the formation of an Islamic state. It is as if the people of Bangladesh, 
including their political elite, have forgotten the most valuable lesson they 
should have learned from their separation from Pakistan: that Islam as the 
basis for a state is not a panacea, because it goes against the basic, plural nature 
of human beings!
That is also why Mr. Sobhan, on his return from Jakarta, called on 
his Bangladeshi colleagues to embark on serious discussions about national 
identity and Islamic identity in Bangladesh. In his column on his impres-
sions of his visit to and discussions in Jakarta in the Daily Star, a weekly co-
managed by Mr. Sobhan, he wrote:  “The country [Bangladesh] deserves an 
honest, thoughtful, and sophisticated discussion on Islamic identity and what 
it means and how it is constructed. As with all other matters of importance, it 
is a discussion we have never had in this country beyond simplistic, unserious, 
and cynical calumnies, accusations, and counter-accusations. Let us talk seri-
ously about Islam and identity....”
In terms of managing this multiple identity, the experience of Muslims 
in Indonesia comes closer to that of their fellow Muslims in India. The dif-
ference is: while the majority in India is Hindu, in Indonesia, Muslims make 
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up the majority, making them more accepting of the  religious (and ethnic) 
pluralism in Indonesia. As Ihsan Ali-Fauzi points out in his paper, and as Rizal 
Sukma confirmed during the discussions, at a crucial stage in the formation 
of the Indonesian state at the end of Dutch colonialism, the founding fathers 
of the Republic of Indonesia managed to convince certain Muslim leaders 
to withdraw their demands for a state based on Islam. Another contributing 
factor, besides the magnanimity of these Muslim leaders, was the claims that 
some areas in the eastern part of Indonesia would withdraw if the fledgling 
republic donned the clothes of an Islamic state, which would disregard the 
plurality of the new nation. The way out was Pancasila, which even today is 
the ‘glue’ of Indonesian unity, with its motto “Unity in Diversity”.  That is also 
the reason why some historians call Pancasila the Muslims’ gift to Indonesia. 
Learning from these experiences, both positive and negative, we hope 
that the current political crisis in Afghanistan can be resolved with the forma-
tion of a new government that has complete respect for pluralism. One of the 
biggest threats comes from the Taliban (see below), which, when in power, de-
stroyed the ancient statues of Buddha in Bamiyan, and whose version of Islam 
would pose a serious threat to the advancement of Afghan society, particularly 
of Afghan women.
Democracy and Political Participation
The discussion above shows that establishment of an Islamic state is not 
a panacea, a cure for all diseases. This can be seen from the experiences of In-
dia and Indonesia, secular nations that provide their citizens opportunities to 
develop to the best of their potential, regardless of their ethnicity or religion.
However, as well as being states based on the principle of secularism 
that is neutral to religion, it should also be noted that India and Indonesia are 
both democratic states. Although the “health” of democracy (stability, durabil-
ity and quality) in these two countries differs, it is clear that democracy allows 
the political aspirations of their citizens, including Muslims, to be channelled 
peacefully in both countries.
Looking at the history of the two countries, democracy in India is 
much “healthier” than democracy in Indonesia. Except for the relatively short 
period of 18 months, between 1975 and 1977, under the leadership of Prime 
Minister Indira Gandhi, democratic institutions have survived in India, with 
128
little damage, since independence in 1947.  Over the past six decades there 
have been no fewer than 13 national general elections, and many more at the 
state level.    At the federal states level, there have been no fewer than seven 
peaceful exchanges of power between contesting political parties.  Since 1967, 
the party in power in New Delhi governed fewer than half the federal states 
of India, which reflects a significant level of state decentralisation. Moreo-
ver, since 1977, incumbent governments have been ousted numerous times 
in general elections.
Meanwhile, civil supremacy has continued to reign, and the armed 
forces in India have never taken power by coup d’etat: the military has dem-
onstrated its commitment to democratisation and plays only a minimal role 
in politics, as in, for example, the United States. The mass media continues 
to perform a critical function; it is free to express opinions and is not in fear 
of government clampdowns or censorship. Also, the judiciary, despite pres-
sure from the executive in federal government, has managed to maintain its 
independence.
The healthy state of Indian democracy -- perhaps the healthiest of 
all developing countries--allow for the political participation of minorities, 
including Muslims. Under this system of democracy, writes Mr. Engineer, 
“Muslims enjoy equal democratic and fundamental rights under the constitu-
tion and also they enjoy rights as a religious minority in respect of their reli-
gion, culture and language. These rights have been guaranteed under Articles 
25 to 30 of the Constitution.”  He goes on to say that, “...one good thing in 
a democracy is that political parties, in order to get Muslim votes, have often 
to compete with each other to please them, and in this competitive political 
environment minorities and other weaker sections of society benefit, though 
not to the fullest extent.”
What about Indonesia? In almost complete contrast to the experience 
of India, in Indonesia, the lifespan of democratic governance has been short 
-- just over a decade in total -- from 1950 to1957, and then again from 1999 
to date. In 1957 and 1959, with backing from the Indonesian Armed Forces, 
President Soekarno dissolved parliament, declared a general state of emergen-
cy, and killed off parliamentary democracy, which, under the 1950 Constitu-
tion, appointed him as head of a state that had no effective power. After that, 
Indonesia was under a regime of authoritarian ‘Guided Democracy’, which 
ended in 1965 following a bloody exchange of power, and the subsequent 
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killing of around 500,000 members and sympathisers of the Indonesia Com-
munist Party, which was accused of plotting a coup d’etat. In 1967, Soeharto 
was officially appointed the second President of the Republic of Indonesia, 
and so began another period of authoritarian rule, under the flag of the ‘New 
Order’. Until the fall of Soeharto in 1998, the government was a military re-
gime, which for most of its history failed to give citizens space to express their 
political rights and civil freedoms.
The two regimes led by Soekarno and Soeharto had an enormous im-
pact on the “health” of democracy in Indonesia. In an overview of this impact, 
Indonesian political observer R. William Liddle, once wrote:“[F]orty years 
of authoritarianism and governmental centralization, from 1959 to 1999 
(1957-1959 was a transitional period) have left an organizational and insti-
tutional legacy of a weak interest group and party system, non-functioning 
legislatures, a corrupted bureaucracy and judiciary, an armed forces not yet 
brought under civilian control, and a frustratingly obscure if not undemo-
cratic constitution.”1
Fortunately, democracy in Indonesia is beginning to grow once more, 
since Soeharto stepped down as President in 1998. Over the past ten years, 
there have been three democratic general elections, in which Muslims were 
completely free to express their political aspirations, and even set up Islamic-
based political parties. They can also freely express their political aspirations 
and participation through the mass media and through peaceful protest action 
and lobby.
Unfortunately, a similarly democratic political system is almost com-
pletely missing in other Muslim countries like Pakistan and Bangladesh. In 
these two countries, the military has been almost continually in power, often 
selling “political Islam” to boost the political participation of citizens. This is 
core of the narrative in the paper by Mr. Sobhan on Bangladesh and in Ms. 
Sarwar’s paper on Pakistan. With bitterness, Ms. Sawar, for example, writes,“...
for most of its existence, Pakistan has been governed by military rulers, who 
prioritized weapons and military training over education and social welfare.” 
One of the consequences of this, continues Ms. Sarwar, is growth of “...a sense 
1 R. William Liddle, “Indonesia,” in W. Phillips Shively (ed.), Comparative Governance 
(Colombus, OH: The Ohio State University, Department of Political Science and McGraw- 
Hill Primis, 2005), p. 250.
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of injustice and deprivation, and divisions along religious, sectarian, class and 
ethnic lines.”
Again, in this case, the positive experiences of India and Indonesia are 
worth noting: democracy opens the way for peaceful citizen participation. But 
this does not mean that everything has gone smoothly for democracy in India 
and Indonesia. Democracy itself is a ongoing process, because at the core of 
democracy lies the continuous and never-ending process of democratisation 
-- who would have thought that a democratic nation as old as the United 
States would find itself embroiled in a scandal over the abuse of detainees by 
the CIA? 
In the contexts of India and Indonesia, as pointed out by Mr. Engineer 
and Mr. Ahmad Suaedy in their papers, one of the challenges, threats even, 
to democracy in these two countries it the growth and growing strength of 
political wings that want to put an end to pluralism in these two countries. 
These include the BJP in India and sharia-inspired by-laws in Indonesia. For-
tunately, in the past few general elections support for right-wing parties with 
agendas like these has dwindled in these two countries.
Another problem gnawing away at democracy in India and Indone-
sia, and that is clearly a long-term threat, is social-economic imbalance. The 
seriousness of this threat has been frequently underlined by those who focus 
on the substantive aspect of democracy, not simply on its procedural aspect. 
For them, for democracy to function properly, social equality, and, even more 
importantly, economic equality, among citizens is a must, without which any 
changes to the representatives and institutions elected by the “people” will 
have little effect. 
In studies on democracy and authoritarianism in South Asia (particu-
larly India and Pakistan), this view is held by, for example, Ayesha Jalal, who 
says that democracy in India is nothing more than a “democratic authori-
tarianism”. He argues that in this regard there is no fundamental difference 
between India and Pakistan, except in terms of political superstructure. He 
writes, “Kecuali jika mereka mampu memperlebar hak-hak mereka untuk memi-
lih melampaui batas-batas arena elektoral yang terlembagakan, memperluasnya 
menjadi sebuah perjuangan yang efektif untuk menghapus eksploitasi sosial dan 
ekonomi, maka warganegara yang legal akan cenderung lebih menjadi korban 
para manipulator politik yang kuat daripada agen-agen otonom yang mengu-
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payakan capaian-capaian konkret dari proses-proses demokratis.”2 (naskah asli 
Inggris menyusul)
It would be impossible to discuss this complex issue in such a limited 
space, but it must be said that people do tend to focus on contestation and 
participation as the two main criteria of democracy. Indeed, democratic theo-
reticians like Robert Dahl assume that if citizens who do not enjoy social and 
economic equality are given equal political opportunities, and if the worst off 
make up the majority of voters, their political choices will, sooner or later, be 
reflected in who comes to power and what public policies are adopted. The 
key assumption here is that: if everyone is given an equal right to vote, regard-
less of any imbalance in the resources they have, giving voting rights to all will 
create mechanisms that will allow for, sooner or later, the eradication of verti-
cal advantages that the elite better off have over the worst off. For example, in 
Europe, the labour parties that have the interests of workers at heart, appeared 
on the political stage at a time when the right to vote in general elections was 
extended to ordinary working people. This is the best way to break the vicious 
circle of food (poverty and economic growth) and democracy. 
The challenge now is to solve this dilemma in India and Indonesia, 
by reducing the poverty rate and improving the social services provided by a 
democratically elected government. Otherwise, this will provide fertile ground 
for the growth of disillusionment in democracy. And more even more fright-
ening, if this disillusionment in democracy is coupled with, or fed by, radical 
ideology that promotes the use of violence in the name of religion, sometimes 
in the form of terrorist actions.
Islamism and Terrorism: Avoiding the Trap of Generalisation
Unfortunately, this phenomenon of violent action in the name of reli-
gion is common in the countries of South and South East Asia, and beyond, 
such as in the Middle East. Almost every day, we hear news of violence, in-
cluding suicide bombings, in these countries.
2 Ayesha Jalal, Democracy and Authoritarianism in South Asia: A Comparative and Historical 
Perspective (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 48.
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Although this is a complex issue, at the Asia Calling meeting in Jakarta, 
we looked at three aspects of this phenomenon: (1) Islamism that promotes 
violent action; (2) the national and international contexts that provide fertile 
ground for this kind of action; and (3) the support or otherwise of Muslim 
communities of this action. Because this is such a sensitive issue, we must take 
extra care when analysing it. First of all, we must avoid the over-generalisations 
that come out of suspicion of all forms of Islamism. 
The word “Islamism” refers to the phenomenon in fwhich Islam is seen 
not only as a religion, but as an ideology, reflecting social and political Islamic 
expression. The word also refers to the adoption of Islamic principles in eco-
nomics, science and so on. And, because its pioneers focused on the practical 
side, or ` amaliyah, its public presence is very much felt. Its adherents are called 
Islamists. 
However, it is very important to note that Islamists are not a monolith-
ic group. Genealogy shows that plurality within the Islamists started to emerge 
when the Islamic world was forced to respond the growing domination of the 
West, which was symbolised physically by the entry of Napoleon to Egypt at 
the end of the 18th century, which is discussed briefly below.
The first dominant response was Wahhabism, an interpretation and 
movement of Islam initiated by Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab in the 18th 
century. This was to become the official interpretation of Islam of Saudi Ara-
bia, which, thanks to oil money, was spread to the world over. Its adherents 
emphasise the importance of the doctrine of tauhid or oneness of God (they 
call themselves al-muwahhidun), one of the excesses of which is the purifica-
tion of Islam from what they call syirik (polytheism). Due to the fanaticism 
of its followers, at certain points in history Wahhabism has dubbed other 
Muslims non-believers. 
The Wahhabi also call themselves Salafi, because, they say, they call for a 
return to Islam as exemplified by Rasulullah and the first generation Muslims 
(al-salaf al-shalih). Islamic traditions that emerged at a later date was rejected, 
along with any influences from outside Islam. This is the reason for their anti-
intellectualism: philosophy is forbidden because it was Greek in origin, mysti-
cism because it came from Persia, and so on.
But 19th century mujaddid (reformists) like Jamal al-Din al-Afghani 
and Muhammad Abduh also claimed to be Salafi. But unlike the Wahhabi, 
they did not reject out of hand Islamic traditions or influences from outside 
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Islam; they asked only that we take a critical view of them all. 
In the early 20th century, the crisis in the Islamic world was exacer-
bated by the intensification of colonialism and the dissolution of the Utsmani 
caliphate in 1924. All this influenced Islamist views and movement. In the 
wars against colonialism, the jargon of jihad, for example, was used more and 
more frequently, although with the nationalist aim of freeing themselves from 
the grip of colonialism. 
In short, it was in this context that Hasan al-Banna formed Ikhwan 
al-Muslimin (IM) in Egypt in 1929. IM emphasised individual piety and the 
importance of brotherhood. As Gilles Kepel3  points out, the critical period 
for the IM was in the mid 20th century, when repression by the government 
of Egypt -- now independent from the British -- forced a split in the IM. Its 
radical wing, led by Sayyid Quthb, argued in favour of war against the Egyp-
tian secular regime, regarding it as a jahiliyah regime that must be replaced 
by an Islamic regime. The non-radical wing of IM, on the other hand, called 
for more gradual change, from the bottom, without violent contestation of 
power. Today, the IM -- its radical and non-radical wings -- is still most often 
used as the prototype Islamic organisation. 
Two important points should be noted here, regarding the recent grow-
ing violence by radical “Islamists”. First, when repressed by the Egyptian gov-
ernment or other governments in the Middle East, hard-line IM activists fled 
to Saudi Arabia. More skilled and better educated than the Muslims in Saudi 
Arabia, these activists became the brains behind the establishment of many 
higher education institutes in Saudi Arabia; the places where people like Os-
ama bin Ladin studied. It is in these spaces that the alignment of IM radical 
views and Wahhabism occurred. This was the origin of the “Salafist-Jihadist” 
movement, an extreme, contemporary Salafist movement that allows the use 
of violence, even against other Muslims who are believed not to be fighting 
against, or fraternising with, the enemy. 
Second, a mutually beneficial relationship grew between these activists 
and the Saudi Arabian government. Although gerah with the hedonism of 
the royal family, these activists benefited from their protection and from the 
3 Gilles Kepel, Muslim Extremism in Egypt: The Prophet and Pharaoh (California & Los Angeles: 
University of California Press, 1993).
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funds they gave them to spread their views around the world. At the end of 
the 1970s and the early 1980s, this relationship gained new momentum with 
the Iran Revolution (1979) and the invasion of the former Soviet Union of 
Afghanistan (1981). “Jihad energy” was also channelled into this scenario: 
first with the increased assistance of Saudi to prevent the revolution in Iran 
spreading to the rest of the Islamic world; and second, with the dispatch of the 
mujahidin to Afghanistan. 
These two points were crucial, as Ms. Sawar’s paper on Pakistan ex-
plains. The Afghanistan war was the moment when Salafist-Jihadists the world 
over got together, were given training in the use of firearms and bomb-making 
by Pakistani and US intelligence agencies, funded by Saudi Arabia, which were 
allies in the Cold War. Their enthusiasm for jihad grew even more when they 
believed that the retreat of the Soviet troops was the result of their superior 
opposition. “Now that we’ve beaten the Soviets, who’s next?” they seemed to 
ask. They were a Frankenstein; created but then neglected, only to eat up their 
masters in the United States, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. This is the context 
we must understand when we read about the actions of Al-Qadea or former 
Afghanistan fighters who have been spreading terror across the world in the 
name of Islam. 
In short: Islamists are not monolithic; not all of them agree with, never 
mind promote, violent action. Even those that do are not in agreement as to 
the extent or targets of this action. A wide variety of Islamists are to be found 
in Indonesia, India, Pakistan, and other Muslim countries. They add local col-
our to the prototype global Islamism. To emphasise the importance of distanc-
ing ourselves from the potentially fatal over-generalisation that all Islamists 
are in favour of, or perpetrate, violent action, I would like to describe in more 
detail their plurality in Indonesia, the country that I know best. 
In Indonesia, Wahhabism had a profound influence on the Padri move-
ment in Padang in the 19th century. More recently, taking on the name of the 
Salafi movement, we have witnessed the expression of Salafism-Wahhabisim in 
certain groups that feel they should grow beards, wear Arabic-style, calf-length 
trousers, and the like.  
The tajdid movement has had a very obvious influence on Muham-
madiyah, the second largest Islamic organisation in Indonesia (with around 
30 million followers), although their puritanism puts us more in mind of 
Wahhabism. Afghani and Abduh Salafism are evident in the ideology and 
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movement of reformist Nurcholish Madjid, one of the most influential Is-
lamic reformists, who places Islamic tradition in a very important position 
and is appreciative of the achievements of Western civilisation. Disregarding 
Salafism in Indonesia would be a great mistake, because in doing so, we would 
only be bowing to the wishes of the Wahhabi, who claim that they are the only 
representatives of Salafism in contemporary Islam.
In Indonesia, the non-radical wing of MI has clearly influenced the 
tarbiyah movement, which in the 1990s grew into the Indonesian Muslim 
student action group Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Muslim Indonesia (KAMMI), 
and in the era of reform, formed the backbone of the Justice Party (Parti 
Keadilan or PK), which recently changed its name to the Prosperous Justice 
Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera or PKS). The very decision to form a political 
party shows that this movement’s activists want to influence political policy in 
peaceful and democratic ways, putting us in mind of the moderate IM wing 
in Egypt.
Finally, there are the Salafist-Jihadists. Some, mainly among the ranks 
of the leaders, are veterans of the Afghan War. They have differed in their 
views as to whether Muslims are legitimate targets of their terrorist attacks.
This latter group is much smaller than other Islamist groups. Unfortu-
nately, it does not take large numbers of people to wreak the havoc that their 
actions have, twice in Bali, several times in Jakarta and in other places in In-
donesia. Almost all the ‘brains’ behind these actions are veterans of the war in 
Afghanistan. They used to be linked to al-Qaida, at least in terms of funding, 
but now able to make their own bombs, they can act outside their ideological 
affiliation with al-Qaida, as in the case of the bombing of two hotels in Jakarta 
on 17 July 2009. 
So, what about developments outside Indonesia? What can we learn 
from this experience with regard to violent action, or terrorism, in the name 
of Islam? What policy choices are available to deal with this problem?
From Mr. Engineer’s paper, we learn that this latter group, the Salafist-
Jihadist, is also small in numbers in India. Like Nahdhatul Ulama (NU), In-
donesia’s largest Islamic organisations, most Islamic organisations in India are 
also opposed to the violent tactics they use. And, contrary to the suspicions 
of many policy makers in the West, in general Islamic schools (madrasah and 
pesantren) are not hotbeds for the promotion and proliferation of Salafist-
Jihadist ideology.
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But, as in Indonesia, broad support is not needed for the actions of this 
handful of people to be dangerous and deadly. Thus, the first lesson that must 
be learned from this development is that Muslims should be critical of and op-
pose this kind of violent action, and the ideology that promotes it. According 
to Mr. Engineer, we cannot count on conservative Muslims in India, who have 
even been known to point the finger at others (the CIA, Mossad and others) 
as the brains behind terrorist attacks -- something that has also happened in 
other countries, like Indonesia and Bangladesh. In this context, a consistent, 
deradicalisation programme is a must. 
Another lesson that must be learned is that policy makers, both at na-
tional and international levels, must never (again) be allowed to play with 
fire with any radical Islamic groups, especially the Salafist-Jihadists, to fight 
their enemies, as they did in response to the former Soviet Union invasion 
of Afghanistan in the early 1980s. As in the many bombings in India and 
Indonesia, and in London and Madrid, there has been a failure to admit that 
almost all the frequent acts of terrorism in the name of Islam in Pakistan and 
Afghanistan were masterminded by veterans of the Afghanistan War, the mon-
ster trained and created in the “devil’s game” -- to borrow a XXX term -- the 
result of collaboration between the US and its allies, particularly in Pakistan 
and Saudi Arabia. 
This is one of the main messages of Ms. Sawar’s paper on the growth 
of militancy, radicalism and terrorism in the name of Islam in Pakistan and 
Afghanistan. She writes, “America’s involvement in the war used the strategy 
of religion to motivate Muslims against the Communist Soviet Union – the 
Afghan ‘jihad’, a term popularized as ‘holy war’ although the word in Ara-
bic literally means ‘to struggle’. ...Jihad, non-existent as an international vio-
lent phenomenon for the last four hundred years, now propped up Pakistan’s 
military ruler, who allowed the country to be used as a conduit for providing 
money, weapons and military training to the Mujahideen against the Soviets, 
with CIA agents recruiting Muslims from around the world.”
On top of all this, as mentioned above, is the strengthening of democ-
racy, which gives everyone the opportunity for full political participation. This 
must, of course, go hand in hand with strengthening of the security and legal 
apparatus, to ensure that all differences of opinion and interest are channelled 
peacefully. And just as importantly, this democracy must demonstrate that it 
has a positive effect not only in procedural terms, such as conduits for political 
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participation through free, fair and transparent elections, but also substan-
tively, in increased social and economic equality. 
Violence against Women
We have looked at the various fatal consequences of the actions of vet-
erans of the Afghanistan War across the world -- from Mumbai to Madrid, 
from Jakarta and Bali to London and New York. But the effects have been, and 
continue to be, felt most in Pakistan and Afghanistan, on almost a daily basis. 
And in these two countries, the people that suffer most are women.
As Ms. Sawar emphasises, in these two countries, and I think every-
where, “...the increase in violence in general overshadows the rising violence 
against women.” For her, this comes as no surprise, because, “...this is the 
pattern wherever ‘religious’ extremism is on the rise” -- an observation that I 
think is true, and perhaps applies to other places, too. 
In remote areas of Pakistan and Afghanistan, it is still common for men 
to blame women for calamities that befall their families. The conservative Is-
lamic view that the voices of women are unimportant is still strongly held, and 
family law is still strongly in favour of the interests of men. 
But the Taliban domination of recent years, the remnants of which lin-
ger even today in some parts of Pakistan and Afghanistan, has multiplied the 
oppression and setbacks that women in particular have suffered. They not only 
closed down beauty salons and forced women to don the burkha, they also 
prohibited girls from going out to learn and attacked women teachers who 
had the courage to carry on teaching. If practices such as these are allowed to 
continue, imagine what the future would hold for Afghanistan, where women 
make up almost half the population!
Unfortunately, practices and policies like these continue even today in 
some areas of Pakistan, particularly on the border between Pakistan and Af-
ghanistan, the area where the Salafist-Jihadists were trained in the war against 
the former Soviet Union. Even more alarmingly, criticism and opposition of 
these practices has provided conservative Muslims the ammunition to covertly 
and overtly gain political power. As Ms. Sawar recalls: 
After the murder of one such teacher, Khatoon Bibi in late 
September last year [2007] in the tribal Mohmand Agency, 
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hundreds of non-local teachers protested, demanding secu-
rity in order to do their jobs. The lack of response from the 
ruling alliance of “religious” parties known as the MMA that 
governed the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) led to 
the closure of over a hundred girls’ schools. The MMA in fact 
encouraged the Taliban mindset. It dismissed, suspended or 
transferred women from public offices, and took no action 
against the vigilantism of “religious militants”. The militants 
have been strengthened by such appeasement and lack of ac-
tion as well as the impetus provided by the US invasions and 
on-going conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
In discussing these matters, it is not my intention to negate or belittle 
the advances that have been achieved by women in Pakistan, for instance. As 
Ms. Sarwar mentioned in our discussions in Jakarta, women in Pakistan have 
long held down professions in Pakistan, working in prominent positions as 
lawyers, pilots, journalists like Ms. Sarwar herself, police officers and so on. 
However, these professionals make up a very small proportion of the total 
population of women in their country. 
That is why, as Mrs. Sarwar pointed out in her presentation in Jakarta, 
traditional communities make up the majority in Pakistan. Development in 
this country has been uneven in rural and urban areas, including in matters of 
education. So, it is not surprising that discover that although Pakistan has pro-
duced one or two internationally-known novelists or scientists, the illiteracy 
rate in this country is still very high. 
At varying levels, this phenomenon is also found in Muslim societies in 
India and Indonesia. And, of course, in Afghanistan, a country that for almost 
four decades has been marked by acute political instability and insecurity. 
That is why the presence and contribution of people like Safia Siddiqi 
is so important to the future of the people of Afghanistan, especially its wom-
en. It is impossible to summarise the story of her determination and courage 
against all odds, in a society that is totally opposed to the advancement of 
women: you must read for yourself the New York Times article about her and 
listen to what she has to say in this book. She is a living example of the dream 
of Muslim society in Asia: a democratic, peaceful Islamic society that respects 
plurality and promotes the advancement of all, including women.***
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Ahmad Suaedy. Executive Director of the Wahid Institute 
in Jakarta who has long been involved in Muslim NGO 
activities, in particular those related to Nadlahtul Ulama 
(NU). He is a founder of the Institute for Islamic and Social 
Studies (LKIS); a researcher for Interfidei (Institute for 
Inter-faith Dialogue in Indonesia) Yogyakarta; program 
coordinator for Islam, democracy and human rights at 
the Community for Pesantren and Society Development 
(P3M); a researcher for the Central Executive Board of 
Lakpesdam NU in Jakarta; from 1999-2001 he was the Publications Coordinator 
for the Institute for the Studies of Free Flow Information (ISAI), and from 2001 – 
2003 he was Program Officer at The Asia Foundation for the Islam dan Civil Society 
program. 
Asghar Ali Engineer is a Muslim scholar and engineer 
born in 1939 in Rajasthan, India. Internationally he is known 
for his work on liberation theology in Islam, the leader of 
the Progressive Dawoodi Bohra movement, and his work 
on (and action against) communalism and communal and 
ethnic violence in India and South East Asia. He is the 
founding chairman of the Asian Muslim Action Network 
(AMAN), director of the Institute of Islamic Studies, and 
head of the Center for Study of Society and Secularism in 
Mumbai. He has authored more than 40 books and many 
articles in various national and international journals and a number of his writings 
have been published and widely distributed in Indonesia.. Asghar has received 
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several awards for his work, including the Communal Harmony Award in 1997 and 
the Right Livelihood Award in 2004 for his ‘strong commitment to promote values 
of co-existence and tolerance’.
Beena Sarwar is a journalist and documentary film maker from Pakistan who 
focuses on human rights, gender, media, and peace, 
and has extensive experience with the print media and 
television in Pakistan and abroad. She was the founding 
editor of weekly The News on Sunday, Pakistan, in 1994, has 
been the OpEd Editor of daily The News, and is Contributing 
Editor in Pakistan for the monthly Himal Southasian, 
Kathmandu. Since completing her Masters in Television 
Documentary at the University of London in 2001, she has 
made several documentaries and worked as a producer 
with Geo Television news, Pakistan’s first 24-hour news 
channel. She was a council member on the Human Rights 
Commission of Pakistan for twelve years until 2005, and a founding member 
of the Women’s Action Forum, established in Karachi in 1981. Ms. Sarwar was 
also a Nieman Fellow at Harvard University, where she returned  as a Fellow at 
Harvard University’s Carr Center for Human Rights Policy to work on a book about 
democratic struggles in Pakistan.
Ihsan Ali Fauzi. Program Director, Paramadina Foundation, Jakarta. As well as 
lecturing at Paramadina Mulya University, Ihsan Ali Fauzi 
is also the editor of Madina, a Muslim magazine popular 
with urban middle class readers, and a doctoral candidate 
in political science from Ohio State University in the 
USA. A graducate of the Ushuluddin faculty of UIN Syarif 
Hidayatullah (previously IAIN), Jakarta, he was a journalist 
for the daily Republika newspaper. He is the author, 
translator and editor of a number of books on Islam and 
Indonesia, with a particular interest in social movements. 
Najiba Ayubi is a writer, journalist, media manager and press freedom activist. 
Ms. Ayubi is the Managing Director of The Killid Group (TKG) in Afghanistan, which 
has five radio stations in Kabul, Herat, Jalalabad, Mazar-e-Sharif and Kandahar 
provinces that are well known for their public service programming. TKG also 
produces two magazines, Killid weekly, with a circulation of 25,000 and Mursal 
weekly, which has a print run of 15,000. Ms. Ayubi is on the steering committee of 
the National Association of Journalists and is a member of the Media Law Working 
Group. She has also published a collection of stories about Afghan women.
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Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Jakarta, 
Indonesia. He is also the Chairman of International 
Relations Division, Central Executive Board of 
Muhammadiyah; member of the board at Syafii 
Maarif Institute for Culture and Humanity; a visiting 
lecturer at Department of International Relations at 
Muhammadiyah University, Malang; and a member 
of the National Committee on Strategic Defense Review, Indonesia’s Ministry of 
Defence. He received his PhD degree in international relations from the London 
School of Economics and Political Science (LSE), United Kingdom in 1997. Dr 
Sukma is the author of numerous papers and reports, and has published in several 
journals and other internationally circulated publications. 
Safia Siddiqi. Member of Parliament from the South Eastern province of 
Nangahar and a former deputy chair of the constitutional Loya Jirga that ratified 
the Afghan constitution. Ms. Siddiqi holds degrees in 
literature, law and business administration and is also 
one of only a half-dozen published Pastho poetesses in 
Afghanistan. She fled to Pakistan in 1988 during the Soviet 
occupation after the Communist leadership objected to a 
collection of her poems. In 1999 she migrated to Canada 
before returning to Afghanistan shortly after the fall of the 
Taliban. Ms. Siddiqi has since held high-ranking positions 
in the Afghan Ministry of Women’s Affairs and as a gender 
advisor at the Ministry for Rural Rehabilitation and Development.
 
Zafar Sobhan is the Editor of Forum, a monthly political magazine, and opinions 
editor of The Daily Star, Bangladesh’s biggest English 
language daily. He also writes a weekly column for the 
Daily Star and has published numerous articles, interviews, 
and essays. With a Masters in English literature and a J.D. 
in law, Mr. Sobhan previously worked as a public school 
teacher and a corporate attorney in the USA. In addition 
to his work in media, Mr. Sobhan is also involved with a 
number of organizations aimed at engaging young people 
on political, social, and civic issues, and helping them find 
a voice. Mr. Sobhan was selected as a Young Global Leader 
by the World Economic Forum in 2005 and is currently a 
member of the Forum of Young Global Leaders.
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Oganizations hosting the events
Asia Calling radio program. Developed to reflect the lives and reality of 
citizens across the region, Asia Calling is a weekly radio programme from 
Indonesia’s radio news agency KBR68H. Since its launch in October 2003, 
Asia Calling has been covering significant events in South, South-East and 
East Asia, with a network of correspondents keeping listeners informed of 
developments taking place in their region. This includes coverage of breaking 
news stories, as well as background features exploring issues in more depth, 
allowing listeners to develop an understanding of the context in which events 
are taking place. Today, Asia Calling can be heard on 169 radio stations 
throughout Indonesia, and in local languages in 8 other countries on 89 
radio stations across Asia. 
PPMN (Perhimpunan Pengembangan Media Nusantara, Indonesian 
Association for Media Development) is a non-profit organization established 
in 2006 to develop the professionalism of all forms of media and to extend 
access to information in Indonesia and other countries in Asia. It does so 
through capacity building programmes, establishing new media in remote 
locations, emergency assistance for media in disaster areas, and media 
content production.
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